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ABSTRACT
SOLVING THE “COFFEE PARADOX”:
UNDERSTANDING ETHIOPIA’S COFFEE COOPERATIVES THROUGH ELINOR
OSTROM’S THEORY OF THE COMMONS
MAY 2011
SUSAN R. HOLMBERG, B.A. UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA, MISSOULA
M.A. UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA, MISSOULA
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor James K. Boyce

This dissertation evaluates the applicability of Elinor Ostrom’s theory of the commons to
other forms of collective action by mapping it on a case study of the Oromia Coffee
Farmers Cooperative Union in Ethiopia and its efforts to overcome the vast disparities
that have long structured the global coffee commodity chain (the “Coffee Paradox”). The
conclusions I draw are the following. While Ostrom’s theory has serious omissions, it
also sheds much needed light on the struggles of Ethiopia’s coffee farmers to overcome
their poverty. Both the design principles that Ostrom identifies for governance rules and
her list of predictors for successful common property resource management institutions
suggest that Ethiopia’s coffee cooperatives could be in peril. However, by expanding
Ostrom’s governance framework to incorporate a broader enabling role for governments
as well as supportive roles for civic organizations, NGOs, and social movements, we see
greater potential for the success of the Oromia Coffee Farmers Cooperative Union.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
It took a global crisis for anyone to point to the dismal state of the dismal science. The
heroes of the mainstream economics profession and supporters of free markets and
financial regulation were forced to admit mistakes. The bail-outs and recovery
programmes have been multibillion-dollar lessons that mainstream economics is
unrealistic. Economists such as Keynes and Minsky came to the fore again to explain the
crisis. It is time that the economics perspectives of nonmainstream economists are given
an ear (Mohamed 2010).

In 2009, Elinor Ostrom won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics, becoming the first
woman to do so in the forty-year history of the award. When the Nobel committee
announced their landmark decision, they stated that Ostrom, who is actually a political
scientist by trade, won the prize “for her analysis of economic governance, especially the
commons” (Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences 2009). Beginning with her 1990
magnum opus, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective
Action, Ostrom’s research career has focused on challenging the argument that groups
cannot use and manage natural resources collectively and sustainably. In other words,
Ostrom’s research shows that the “tragedy of the commons” is actually not such a
tragedy, but a problem—one that many communities all over the world have been solving
for centuries.
Ostrom won the Nobel Prize during a time when the broader public, overwhelmed by
the encroaching front of existing environmental problems, has been ripe for hearing her
message. Instead of the widespread but stale belief that solving our environmental
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problems is limited to two very disparate paths—the market or the state —Ostrom’s
research has the potential to empower people and communities to collectively devise
solutions to these pressing issues.
What is less known about Ostrom’s work, even in academic circles, is that her
underlying purpose has long been to develop a broad theory of collective action, one that
moves beyond the cases of communities managing watersheds and forests, to other
examples of group self-organization. “My choice of the CPR [common-pool resource]
environment for intensive study was based on a presumption that I could learn about the
processes of self-organization and self-governance of relevance to a somewhat broader
set of environments” (Ostrom 1990, 27). Furthermore,
What is missing from the policy analyst’s tool kit—and from the set of
accepted, well-developed theories of human organization—is an
adequately specified theory of collective action whereby a group of
principals can organize themselves voluntarily to retain the residuals of
their own efforts…I hope this inquiry will contribute to the development
of an empirically supported theory of self-organizing and self-governing
forms of collective action (Ostrom 1990, 25).
If Ostrom’s claim is true, that the framework she developed for her research on the
environmental commons can be applied to other examples of collective action, then her
work has the potential to shape debates about the disheartening state of our economy and
the burgeoning efforts to build economic alternatives that enhance the well-being of
people and the environment.
The fallout from the global financial crisis, dovetailing with the longer-term
overgrowth of a neoliberal varietal of globalization, has created a public cry for
fundamental changes in our economic system.
1

Either the market will achieve the best possible outcome via private property rights or the market is so
addled with inefficiencies that environmental quality can only be achieved by state regulation.
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This wake-up call is inspiring unprecedented numbers of people to take
action to bring forth the culture and institutions of a new economy that can
serve us and sustain our living planet for generations into the future
(David Korten 2010).
Ostrom’s set of ideas could very well contribute to the development of a “new economy.”
In the spring 2010 issue of Yes! Magazine, which was essentially an homage to Elinor
Ostrom, Jay Walljasper, former editor of the Utne Reader and a contributor to
onthecommons.org, described her Nobel win as a milestone for the “emergence of a
commons-based society” (Walljasper 2010).

2

As exciting as Ostrom’s work is, and as hopeful as the prospect of applying her
theory to the development of a different kind of economy is, we should be mindful of its
limitations when using it. There is a genuine risk that communities will become the new
3
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panacea, which puts the onus for devising economic solutions on people rather than
their governments (or the market) and ignores the fact that communities can be parochial
and harbor bigotry (Bowles and Gintis 2002). Thus, before we indiscriminately apply
Ostrom’s theory of the commons to other forms of collective action, we need to think
carefully about the feasibility and implications for doing so.
Beyond the commons, Ostrom identifies cooperatives as one of the main forms of
collective action that can and should be included in her comprehensive framework
(Ostrom 1990, 25). That claim is what this dissertation will explore.

2

The magazine also published Ostrom’s “8 Keys to a Successful Commons,” and Fran Korten, the
magazine’s editor, conducted a feature interview with Ostrom.
3

For the record, Ostrom is very clear that that there are no panaceas, but that does not negate the possibility
of other people treating community-level solutions as such.
4

This is true of environmental solutions as well.
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To what extent does Ostrom’s theory of CPR governance elucidate our understanding
cooperatives?
I answer this question by demonstrating what Ostrom’s theory looks like in a
particular cooperative setting—a union of coffee farmers cooperatives in the Oromia
region of Ethiopia—and evaluate the ways in which the features that are important and
necessary for CPR institutions explain the achievements and struggles of Oromia
cooperatives.
The International Cooperative Alliance (ICA)—the main organizing body of the
global cooperative movement—defines cooperatives as “autonomous associations of
persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs and
aspirations through a jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enterprise”
(International Cooperative Alliance 2009). In other words, cooperatives are formed,
owned, and controlled by groups of people for the purpose of producing, selling, and/or
buying.

5

By grouping cooperatives with CPR institutions, Ostrom is arguing that, like CPR
institutions, cooperatives are forms of collective action. Ostrom defines collective action
as occurring when two or more people act collectively to achieve a common goal, which
is to say, to solve an initial free-rider problem, like the “Tragedy of the Commons.” But,
the institutions that arise from the collective action are themselves public goods, which
thereby create new free-riding opportunities. Thus, any viable group effort, in solving
their initial collective action problem, must simultaneously solve the secondary freeriding problems.

5

There are a wide variety of cooperatives types; one purpose of chapter 3 is to describe those various
forms.

4

By linking them theoretically, Ostrom is saying that both CPR institutions and
cooperatives conform to this definition of collective action. Thus, both are using
institutional governance to solve free-rider problems, and both must overcome the freeriding problems that arise from the group effort itself. Other similarities to note: first, the
institutions themselves are nested within broader institutional governance (locally and at
the state level) and market contexts that both support and pose challenges beyond their
group interactions; and second, both have broader, longer-term goals of securing
sustainable livelihood security.
At this point, the comparison between CPR institutions and cooperatives becomes
more complicated. While both institutions are solving collective action (free-riding
problems), they diverge in terms of the nature of those problems and the specific
mechanisms with which they solve them.
To be specific, CPR institutions essentially transform open-access resources into
common property through the elaborate design and enforcement of informal rules.
“Hardin’s parable hence is better termed the ‘tragedy of open access,’ referring to freefor-all situations where rules for the joint use of common property do not exist” (Boyce
2002, 8). The collective action of CPR institutions, then, is the appropriation, creation,
management and protection of a certain bundle of property rights for the sustainable,
group management of a particular natural resource.
In terms of Oromia’s coffee cooperatives, collective action does not necessarily
6

center on managing a natural resource via property rights. I argue that instead, they are

6

Although, managing natural resources might be a secondary function.
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using their collective agency and power to overcome what Daviron and Ponte (2005) call
the “Coffee Paradox.”
Not only were Northern coffee drinkers blissfully unaware of a devastating “coffee
crisis” that smallholder coffee farmers in the global South experienced from 1999 to
2005, in the global North, there was actually a “coffee boom” occurring.
The coffee market has gone through a ‘latte revolution,’ where consumers
can choose from (and pay dearly for) hundreds of combinations of coffee
variety, origin, brewing, and grinding methods, flavoring, packaging,
‘social content’, and ambience. Retail coffee prices continue to rise in the
specialty market […] At the same time, coffee farmers receive prices
below the cost of production (Daviron and Ponte 2005, xvi).
Daviron and Ponte argue that instead of interpreting this juxtaposition as simply a
disparity in who controls market share, it is better understood in terms of the ability to
“define the ‘identity’ of a coffee—in other words to set the language and the reference
values that determine production norms and quality standards” (Daviron and Ponte: xvii).
I will demonstrate that the “Coffee Paradox” is an extremely befitting way to frame
the collective action of Oromia’s coffee cooperatives. Nowhere did the coffee crisis hit
harder than in Ethiopia, the very birthplace of coffee. Here the farmers were already a
few price points away from starvation; they rely on coffee not just for income, but also
for deep cultural sustenance and connection; and they grow some of the most reputed
coffees in the world. These poor coffee farmers have had no control over the valuable
attributes of their supreme coffees, and, thus, the price they are receiving is well-below
the “true” value of their coffees.
Thus, rather than solving the “Tragedy of the Commons,” the free-rider problem that
Oromia’s coffee farmers are working to solve is the “Coffee Paradox.” Rather than
instituting property rights, the collective action of coffee cooperatives entails the creation,
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appropriation, management and/or protection of a certain bundle of their coffees
attributes. Defining the collective action of Oromia coffee cooperatives in terms of the
“Coffee Paradox,” we can then ascertain whether Ostrom’s theory offers a
comprehensive enough explanation of the successes and/or failures of their efforts.
The conclusions I draw are the following. In profound ways, Ostrom’s theory sheds
much needed light on the struggles of Ethiopia’s coffee farmers to overcome their
poverty and nourish their families and communities. The design principles that she
identifies for CPR governance rules suggest that Ethiopia’s coffee cooperatives could
strengthen their sense of proprietorship over their organizations if they first played a
larger role in writing their own governance rules. Her list of predictors for successful
CPR institutions validate what Ethiopian activists have long been saying, that civic
organizations cannot play an authentic role in the governance of their society underfoot a
government that does not recognize the basic democratic rights of its citizens.
Ostrom’s theory is a major methodological contribution to the social sciences. Her
understanding of the role and limitations of economic theory is profound. The style of
her theory, a “list of ingredients” if you will, is accessible and even democratic—
something any idealistic and capable cooperative organizer could pick up and understand
(as opposed to the formal models of economists written for each other or, at best, for
policymakers).
Ostrom’s theory, however, also has some egregious omissions, which makes it a less
than comprehensive framework of Oromia’s coffee cooperatives. For example, she does
not address issues of power disparities or the ways that inequality in general manifests in
collective action. Inequality between those who control valuable coffee attributes and
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those who do not is what perpetuates the “Coffee Paradox,” but in coffee cooperatives’
attempts to close this “social distance” (Boyce 2002), other forms of social inequality are
reproduced. (So too with CPR institutions.)
In addition, Ostrom’s viewpoint on the state’s role in collective action governance is
overly narrow. For cooperatives to succeed, governments must nurture an enabling
environment through carefully established laws and direct support to farmers in
overcoming market failures (e.g. imperfect credit markets) that are beyond their capacity
to solve independently. Furthermore, Ostrom pays inadequate attention to other levels of
governance. She makes no mention of the roles that civic organizations, NGOs, and
social movements might play. These other types of governance are all important in
empowering Ethiopia’s coffee farmers, especially within the context of such an
authoritarian government.
Finally, although Ostrom’s view of economic rationality is much broader than what
has been canonized in mainstream economics, she fails to articulate or theorize any
degree of altruistic intentions—for example, Amartya Sen’s (1977) concepts of sympathy
and commitment—that have the potential to help groups overcome free-rider problems
and are, at least to some extent, present in the coffee cooperative setting. Social justice
activists, whose actions have undoubtedly altruistic underpinnings, have long been
working to support cooperative struggles. Oromia’s cooperatives in particular can only
be fully understood in light of broad efforts—especially since the coffee crisis—of the
global justice movement’s efforts to build alternative trade paradigms
Incorporating Elinor Ostrom’s theory of collective action into cooperative analyses is
an important step in improving cooperative research. Instead of assuming cooperatives
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are inefficient because of free-rider problems, we can think about how some cooperatives
overcome these. Furthermore, Ostrom’s work forces us to ask ourselves about what
theory is, what its role should be, and for whom we are constructing it. And the
shortcomings of her theory are by no means fatal; they simply need to be accounted for to
better tell the cooperative story.

Overview of the Following Chapters
Chapter 2 “Detaining Potential: Economic Theories of Collective Action” provides the
impetus for this dissertation, which is that the existing economic models of cooperatives
are insufficient and misguided.
I do this by, first, describing what Ostrom cites as the main collective action theories
that are paradigmatic in economics and her critiques of them. I also discuss Ostrom’s
objection that the aforementioned collective action theories are misused because of the
confusion within economics on the distinction between a theory and a model. In the
second section, I present a literature review of the economic models of cooperatives.
Finally, I provide my own argument that the problems of the models discussed in this
chapter stem from their use of rational choice theory to describe human behavior, which
is ultimately a distorted assumption for understanding the motivations, values, and
capacities of cooperative members.
The purpose of Chapter 3, “Internalizing ‘Social Distance’: Cooperatives and the
Global Justice Movement,” is to contrast the mainstream economic approach to
cooperatives with a social movement perspective by locating them both in the current
movement to combat corporate-centric globalization and the older cooperative movement

9

to battle industrial capitalism. Instead of simply another institutional means with which
to achieve Pareto efficiency, these movements portray cooperatives as a symbol of, and a
mechanism for building, democracy and equality. Because cooperatives come in a wide
variety of forms, a second purpose of this chapter is to elucidate their complexity by
providing a brief historical account that identifies the various types of cooperatives.
Chapter 4, “Ostrom’s Theory of Collective Action” gives a detailed presentation of
Ostrom’s work, drawn mainly from Governing the Commons, but supplemented with
several of her other publications. First, I argue that Ostrom’s greatest contribution to the
social sciences (and heterodox economics) is her interdisciplinary methodology that fuses
theoretical and empirical practices. Second, I define CPRs and discuss one CPR scenario
in great detail. Third, I present the details of Ostrom’s theory of collective action. The
final section provides my critique of her theory, alluded to earlier in this chapter.
Chapters 5 and 6 provide my case study. In chapter 5, I present “Part 1: The Political
Economy of the Coffee.” Although coffee is similar to other food commodities in many
ways, there arguably is no global commodity industry that contains such vast power
disparities as the coffee trade. Because of these inequities, the global justice movement
and cooperatives play a central role in the battle to weaken corporate hegemony in the
global coffee trade. For example, trade alternatives, especially Fair Trade, are arising as
a different route than the conventional global coffee commodity market that leaves so
many small coffee farmers vulnerable to poverty. There is no better example of
cooperatives battling global market forces than the vast uprising of coffee farmer
cooperatives across the global South.

10

Chapter 5 provides a detailed picture of the global coffee industry, including its early
history, its policy narrative, and the uneven impacts of the coffee crisis on coffee farmers
and coffee producing countries. It then describes in detail Daviron and Ponte’s (2005)
concept of the “Coffee Paradox,” and their framework of material, symbolic, and inperson service attributes that we can use to define the collective action of Oromia’s
coffee cooperatives. I then describe the prominent alternative trade paradigm being
developed in response to the coffee crisis, as well as the mainstreaming debate brewing
within Fair Trade about its trajectory and how it can be most beneficial to coffee farmers.
Finally, I use this discussion to further specify the nature of collective action for coffee
farmer cooperatives, which weighs on the mainstreaming debate.
There are several reasons why I have chosen Oromia Coffee Farmers Cooperative
Union (OCFCU) as the focus of my case study (Chapter 6, “Case Study Part 2: The
Political Economy of the Oromia Coffee Farmers Cooperative Union,”). First, its
leadership has played a pivotal role in Ethiopia’s impressive cooperative renaissance of
the past decade (a revival made even more remarkable in light of the country’s sordid
cooperative history). Second, as the “stars” of the documentary film Black Gold,
OCFCU has become a symbol of coffee farmers’ worldwide efforts to overcome the
devastating impact of the coffee crisis by forming cooperatives.
The chapter tells the story of OCFCU, which begins with the history of the country’s
cooperatives, continues to the challenges and opportunities of Ethiopia’ coffee sector, and
ends with the birth and growth of the most successful cooperative union in Ethiopia.
In Chapter 7, “Understanding Cooperative Governance: Lessons from Oromia,” the
final chapter of this dissertation, I assess the extent to which Ostrom’s theory of CPR
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institutions can explain the collective action of Oromia coffee cooperatives. The first
section compares CPR institutions and Oromia coffee cooperatives, while also defining
the collective action of Oromia’s coffee cooperatives in terms of Daviron and Ponte’s
(2005) the “Coffee Paradox.” The second section provides examples of Oromia’s
collective action, defined in terms of the attribute framework that Daviron and Ponte
(2005) present for overcoming the “Coffee Paradox.” The third section describes the
secondary free-rider problems that could arise from these examples of collective action.
The fourth section evaluates the Oromia and Ethiopian evidence and draws some
preliminary conclusions, arguing that many of OCFCU’s cooperatives (and Ethiopia’s
cooperatives in general) could be in peril. The fifth section reintroduces a discussion of
Ostrom’s theory, and my critiques.

The final section provides some recommendations

based on the results derived from this analysis, regarding both the use of Ostrom’s theory
to interpret the collective action of Oromia cooperatives and my broadening of it to
reflect inequality considerations and the role that broader forms of governance play in
Oromia’s collective action struggles.

Conclusion
In a recent New York Times blog entry, Nancy Folbre suggests “another economics is
now under way” (Folbre 2010). One of the main cornerstones of the burgeoning effort to
build this new economy is, indeed, cooperatives.
The task of developing a new economy, one that fully reflects humanity’s concerns
and capabilities, is not simple, especially with current economic tools that are
“fragmentary and incomplete and not yet adequate to the task of institutional design
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(Folbre 2010). By focusing on Elinor Ostrom’s work and by carefully studying
cooperatives, it is my hope and intention that this dissertation contributes to this growing
movement to design better economic tools and frameworks.

13

CHAPTER 2

DETAINING POTENTIAL: ECONOMIC THEORIES OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to explain and critique mainstream economic approaches to
collective action in general, and to cooperatives in particular, in order to make the
argument that developing an improved economic framework of cooperatives is
imperative.
I do this by, first, describing what Ostrom cites as the main collective action theories
that are paradigmatic in economics and her critiques of them. I also discuss Ostrom’s
objection that the aforementioned collective action theories are misused because of the
confusion within economics on the distinction between a theory and a model. In the
second section, I present a literature review of the economic models of cooperatives.
Finally, I provide my own argument that the problems of the models discussed in this
chapter stem from their use of ration choice theory to describe human behavior, which is
ultimately a distorted assumption for understanding the motivations, values, and
capacities of cooperative members.

Economic Models of Collective Action

14

Ostrom argues that there are three models that are the basis of current economic thinking
on collective action: Mancur Olson’s Theory of Collective Action, Hardin’s “Tragedy of
the Commons,” and the prisoner’s dilemma.
Before Olson’s 1965 thesis, it was widely assumed across the social sciences that
individuals can and will achieve the best possible outcome for the group (Azfar 2001).
Olson’s central argument was a counter to that supposition. “Even if all of the
individuals in a large group are rational and self-interested, and would gain if, as a group,
they acted to achieve their common interest or objective, they will still not voluntarily act
to achieve that common or group interest” (Olson 1965, 2). Individuals might benefit
from clean air, for example, but their desire to maximize their individual well-being
7

limits their willingness to contribute to the collective good, “unless there is coercion to
force them to do so” (Olson 1965, 2).
Hardin’s 1968 article “The Tragedy of the Commons” has, of course, become the
most commonly referenced in an extensive history of arguments concluding that humans,
left to their own devices, will inevitably destroy natural resources. Hardin’s most famous
passage is the following:
Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will
try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. Such an
arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because
tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the numbers of both man and beast
well below the carrying capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes the
day of reckoning, that is, the day when the long-desired goal of social
stability becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent logic of the
commons remorselessly generates tragedy (Hardin 1968, 1244).
Not only has Hardin’s article been used to advocate population control, which was, in
fact, the original purpose of the article, but it also has been frequently wielded on both
7

This is the definition of “free-riding” behavior.
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sides of the private property/free market versus state ownership/regulation debate (see
Smith 1981 and Percival 1992, respectively).
Finally, according to Ostrom, the third most commonly used collective action model
is the prisoner’s dilemma, which articulates that two hypothetical prisoners will
simultaneously choose a “non-cooperative solution.” Both prisoners are better off if
neither betrays the other, but the incentive immediate to each (a shorter jail sentence) is
to, in fact, betray their partner. (The prisoner’s dilemma is often used to formally
illustrate Hardin’s tragedy of the commons—see Hanley et al. 1997 as an example.)
What Ostrom finds problematic about collective action theory is not these models per
se, but the way they are brandished.
When models are used as metaphors, an author usually points to the
similarity between one or two variables in a natural setting and one or two
variables in a model. If calling attention to similarities is all that is
intended by the metaphor, it serves the usual purpose of rapidly conveying
information in graphic form (Ostrom 1990, 7-8).
Yet, these models are used for policy-setting. In other words, it is assumed that only the
state can change fixed or exogenous variables, which crowds out collective action efforts
and essentially imprisons citizen power and agency.
The prisoners in the famous dilemma cannot change the constraints
imposed on them by the district attorney; they are in jail. Not all users of
natural resources are similarly incapable of changing their constraints. As
long as individuals are viewed as prisoners, policy prescriptions will
address this metaphor (Ostrom 1990, 7).
A poignant example is the following:
Nationalizing the ownership of forests in Third World countries, for
example, has been advocated on the grounds that local villagers cannot
manage forests so as to sustain their productivity and their value in
reducing soil erosion. In countries where small villages had owned and
regulated their local communal forests for generations, nationalization
meant expropriation. In such localities, villagers had earlier exercised
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considerable restraint over the rate and manner of harvesting forest
products. In some of these countries, national agencies issued elaborate
regulations concerning the use of forests, but were unable to employ
sufficient numbers of foresters to enforce those regulations. The foresters
who were employed were paid such low salaries that accepting bribes
became a common means of supplementing their income (Ostrom 1990,
23).
In this example, it is the assumption that local villagers are powerless and incapable of
working together to decide governance rules for usage—and the subsequent state
intervention and control —that opened the borders to a tragedy of overuse.
Ostrom’s critique stems from what she argues should be a clear distinction between a
model and a theory. Theories or frameworks (will refer to them interchangeably
throughout this dissertation) are meant to be general or universally applicable. Models,
on the other hand, are for application in very specific contexts. The problem with
mainstream economic methodology in general, and the collective action models
discussed above, is they are taken as theories even though they carry with them the
assumption that certain variables are fixed. As we saw above, this can undermine the
goals of the policymakers, not to mention the “recipients” of the policies.
Theories, on the other hand, are loose associations of variables that “relate whole
families of models together” (Ostrom 1990, 192).
They point to the set of variables and the types of relationship among
variables that need to be examined in conducting any theoretical or
empirical study of a particular type of phenomenon. From a framework,
one does not derive precise prediction. From a framework, one derives the
questions that need to be asked to clarify the structure of a situation and
the incentives facing individuals (Ostrom 1990, 192).
“Once the incentives are clarified”—in other words, once the framework is applied to
a specific context—“the theorist can analyze a situation and predict likely behavior in
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terms of choice of strategy and the consequences that are likely to result” (Ostrom 1990,
192).
How does Ostrom’s critique of mainstream collective action theories apply to
economic models of cooperatives? After presenting a literature review of these models,
this chapter will answer this question.

Economic Models of Cooperatives
The Mystery of the Disappearing Cooperatives
Providing a review of economic literature on cooperatives is a somewhat paradoxical
exercise, as it first requires a discussion about cooperatives’ pervasive absence in the
literature. For example, despite cooperatives’ growing presence in today’s economy
(described in the following chapter), both Hill (2000) and Kalmi (2007) argue that the
majority of today’s economists perceive cooperatives as entirely nonexistent institutions
or, at best, only worth mentioning in a footnote. Their evidence comes from conducting
surveys of economics textbooks, which they contend are good indicators of the fields’
priorities overall.
Hill evaluated seventeen contemporary economics textbooks, finding that the “basic
institutions around which production is organized […] are commonly thought of as either
proprietorships, partnerships, or corporations” (Hill 2000, 281). Eight of these textbooks
gave absolutely no discussion of cooperatives. Of the textbooks that did, “coverage
ranges from a passing mention up to one page” (Hill 2000, 283). Hill finds that there is
no in-depth discussion of, for example, why cooperatives exist in a capitalist economy,
their strengths and weaknesses, and the ways they differ from investor-owned firms.
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Kalmi reviewed a sample of 24 textbooks from between 1905 to 2000. He found that
despite the fact that cooperative membership has increased globally over time, “textbook
coverage” vastly differs between the pre-1945 period and the current period. “The main
finding from the statistical analysis is that […] the textbooks of the early twentieth
century contained much more analysis of cooperatives than those originating from the
post-World War II period” (Kalmi 2007, 632). Furthermore, the textbook coverage in the
pre-1945 period was much broader in scope. “Early authors typically examined
cooperatives widely, devoting an almost equal number of pages to the main forms of
cooperation” (Kalmi 2007, 631). Discussions in the later texts mainly dealt with
cooperative financial institutions, while no post-World War II textbook author discussed
worker cooperatives whatsoever.
Both authors claim that the absence of cooperatives from mainstream economics
education prevents them from breaching the main enclosures of the discipline. “The
majority of students who study some economics are exposed only to these books. These
textbooks set the framework within which students are taught to think about the
economy” (Hill 2000, 282) and, therefore, future economists will ultimately fail to
recognize the importance of cooperatives.
•

•

•

Despite the absence of cooperatives from mainstream economics textbooks, there does
exist a sizable amount of economic literature on cooperatives, mainly in the subfields of
organizational economics and agricultural economics. Although neither of these areas of
study arguably hold much sway within the mainstream, the models are useful for
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illustrating how economists apply their theoretical tools to cooperatives or, in other
words, how economists think about and portray cooperatives when they do study them.
The following discussion frames the cooperative literature into two schools of
economic thought: the first is the neoclassical literature on cooperatives; the second is the
8

new institutional economics literature (NIE), which is organized further into two strands
(transaction costs/property rights and information asymmetry).

Neoclassical Theories
Benjamin Ward (1958) is generally credited with introducing the neoclassical treatment
9

of cooperatives (Sisk 1982 and Kamshad 1997). He was writing in the midst of a debate
on the feasibility of socialism, in the context of “some Eastern European countries
groping toward a less centralized form of economic organization” (Ward 1958, 566).
Ward devised a model of the labor managed firm (LMF)

10

that he argues closely

resembles a Yugoslav industrial firm. What he designates the “Illyrian firm” operates in
a perfectly competitive market, but instead of maximizing profits as the objective
function (as the neoclassical firm does), the worker-managers of the LMF are
maximizing their individual incomes over a specific time period.
The key result from Ward’s model is called the “Ward effect” or “perverse supply
reaction”—when output prices rise, employment and output do the opposite of what we
8

Although technically the NIE school is definitively separate from the neoclassical school, their
simultaneous uses of rational choice theory lumps them together in this discussion.
9

John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, and Alfred Marshall were actually the first economists to expound the
benefits of cooperatives and, according to Staatz (1989), Stephen Enke (1945) was the first to use
neoclassical theory to analyze (consumer) cooperatives as a separate kind of business firm..
10

According to Jossa (2001), the difference between an LMF and a worker-managed firm (WMF) is that a
LMF borrows capital whereas in an WMF, members inject their residual profits.
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typically expect: they decrease (in the short-run). In other words, in order to maximize
per-worker income, LMFs lay workers off.
Evsey Domar (1966)—arguably the second most recognized author in the
neoclassical literature on cooperatives—applied Ward’s model of the LMF, which he
calls the “Pure Model,” to the Soviet Kolkhozes (or collective farms). Domar refined
Ward’s model by reworking it into a more generalized production function (Sisk 1982).
And lastly, Jaroslav Vanek (1969) improved Ward’s model (within the LMF
example) by assuming that employees received residual income rather than wages. One
of Vanek’s main results was that the Ward effect was only a special case.
In contrast to the Ward-Domar-Vanek models, Amartya Sen (1966), who was also
speaking to a broader debate on socialism—examining the respective welfare advantages
of the principle “to each according to his needs” versus “to each according to his
work”—took a very different approach to modeling cooperatives. Unlike Ward, Sen
fixed the number of workers and made the amount of labor hours per person a variable
and also unlike this set of models, which demonstrated an underutilization of labor, Sen’s
key result was to demonstrate that cooperatives can in theory result in an overutilization
of labor, too. (I will return to Sen’s model later in the chapter.)
Pryor (1983) observes that Sen’s model (along with Israelsen 1980 and Ireland and
Law 1981) had a decentralized perspective. In other words, he focused on the ways in
which incentives (created once a production decision is made) induce the labor responses
of the individual cooperative members, whereas the centralized tradition of Ward,
Domar, and Vanek focused on aggregate employment and output and assumed that “a
manager or the cooperative itself has sufficient knowledge of the production function and
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the utility functions of its members so that in some unspecified fashion, a once-and-forall production decision (quantity, labor force, production methods, etc.) is made which
maximizes group utility and thereafter, each member does exactly what is decided at this
time” (Pryor 1983, 140).

11

By the late 1980s, what was a fairly strong interest in the neoclassical, Illyrian-style
12

models had dissipated.

Kalmi (2007) conjectures that this demise was caused by both

the unavailability of data (it is impossible to test a theory about an economy that does not
exist) and the political climate of the time, i.e. it is probable that the dissolution of the
Soviet Union in the early 1990s made theories of “socialist organizations” seem fairly
irrelevant.
It is probable that the empirical invalidity of the Illyrian-style model also played a
role, particularly with regard to the perverse supply reaction result of the Ward-DomarVanek approach. According to Bonin et al. (1993), “Plywood PCs [producer
cooperatives] behave as if both earnings and employment matter and do not exhibit the
perverse or inefficient behavior predicted by the simple model” (Bonin et al. 1993, 1300).
Indeed, one would be hard-pressed to find a cooperative that fires members in response to
growth!
It was widely agreed that the neoclassical, Illyrian-style models were simply not the
right fit and eventually they lost the attention of economists; in its place emerged the new
institutionalist school.

11

Pryor says that the two different traditions give opposing results. “The centralized production
cooperatives leads to an underutilization of labor (vis-à-vis a twin capitalist firm), while a decentralized
production cooperative yields an overutilization of labor (vis-à-vis) its capitalist twin” (141).
12

The decentralized approach seems to have been less popular.
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New Institutional Economics
As background, new institutional economics (NIE) is an interdisciplinary school of
thought

13

that, like the neoclassical school, uses methodological individualism to explain

social and political institutions—cultural norms, property rights, contracts, and laws—
within the efficiency paradigm.

14,15

The concept of institutions encompasses such broad

social phenomena that it is easy to understand why there is disagreement about what NIE
is exactly (Brousseau and Glachant 2008). Bardhan (1989), however, provides a useful
framing device for the NIE literature by distinguishing between two strands of the NIE
school: the first strand he calls the CDAWN school (for Coase-Demsetz-AlchianWilliamson-North) and the second is built upon the theory of imperfect information
(Stiglitz and Akerlof). This is an extremely useful way of sorting through the NIE
16

literature on cooperatives.

CDAWN
According to Bardhan, CDAWN originated from two papers by Ronald Coase, “which
led to the flowering of a whole school of neo-classical writers on property rights and

13

Involving disciplines such as law, sociology, political science, and anthropology.

14

Oliver E. Williamson (1975) coined the term new institutional economics, which appears to be the point
at which scholars began to self-identify as members of the NIE school and movement.
15

Methodological individualism is what differentiates NIE from “institutional economics” or “old
institutional economics”, which had a much more holistic approach. One way to understand the difference
between the two schools of thought is institutional economics borrows from the other social sciences to
study economic institutions, whereas NIE uses neoclassical economics to apply to other social institutions.
An example of the criticisms of the old institutionalist school was that it was too descriptive and
theoretically lazy (Bardhan 1989).
16

Of course, these strands overlap, especially as the field has developed over time. However, there tends to
be a pattern as to the “point of entry” that NIE theorists choose, which is a useful way of understanding
both NIE in general and NIE as it is applied to cooperative studies.
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transaction costs” (Bardhan 1989, 4). In The Nature of the Firm (1937), Coase presented
the idea of transaction costs to explain why firms exist (because, theoretically, in a
perfectly competitive market, they do not). According to Coase, “the main reason why it
is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price
mechanism” (Coase 1937, 390). Thus, individuals are motivated to collaborate in
business activity (as opposed to producing and selling independently) to reduce the
prohibitive costs that individuals face when engaging in market transactions. In other
words, the cost of a good or service involves not only producing the good or service but
also the costs associated with buying or selling the good or service: gathering
information, bargaining, coordination, monitoring, enforcement of contracts, etc.
According to Coase, the reason firms arise and evolve is to minimize these transaction
costs.
Coase’s discussion of property rights comes in his article The Problem of Social Cost
(1960), in which he presents his famous theorem:

17

individuals can solve problems of

externalities (without government intervention) through the process of negotiation and
bargaining; the initial allocation of property rights does not matter for an efficient
outcome, because rights can be transacted during this negotiation process. The exception
to this rule occurs when transaction costs of negotiation are prohibitively high (arguably
more often than not); moreover, when transaction costs are high, the allocation of
property rights is important.
True to Bardhan’s claim, transaction costs and property rights theory are major
themes in the NIE cooperative literature. Transaction cost theory postulates that
17

Bardhan (1989) calls it a “so-called theorem” because Coase never stated it as such.
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cooperatives, as a particular governance structure, arise to minimize transaction costs.
For example, Bonus (1986) says that cooperatives internalize important transactions,
thereby avoiding rent-capturing threats to their investment. Similarly, John M. Staatz
(1987) uses transaction cost theory to emphasize the ways in which cooperatives, in
minimizing transaction costs, create “countervailing power,” which he says stem from
asset fixity.

18

Porter and Scully (1987) offer a paradigmatic property-rights approach to
cooperatives. Arguing that transaction costs are present, they look at the impacts of a
cooperative’s property rights structure on efficiency (and find that this very structure
renders cooperatives inefficient). Other examples include Sykuta and Cook (2001), Cook
(1995), and Fulton (1995), all of whom argue that cooperatives’ organizational structures
affect the incentives of their members, which thereby have implications for efficiency.

19

Imperfect Information
The other NIE strand is the theory of imperfect information. When asymmetric
information exists, according to Stiglitz (1994), there is an power imbalance that renders
the market inefficient. Furthermore, Bardhan (1989) argues that, in the theory of

18

Asset fixity or specificity is a term in transaction cost theory that refers to assets intended for a use in a
given transaction, which are generally limited in some way to that use.
19

The main critiques (in the literature) of the CDAWN strand fully apply to these cooperative models.
North (1998) argued that many NIE theorists “simply are ignorant” about the ways institutions emerge
(North 1998, 21). Instead of explaining the ways in which property right structures, for example, emerge
and develop, they simply appear because there is a net benefit for them to exist. Additionally, according to
Bromley (2000) “since transaction costs – indeed all costs – depend upon (are functions of) the
institutional setup, it is circular to advance a theory suggesting that institutions depend on transaction costs”
(Bromley 2000, 10). Finally, Valentinov (2007) argues that a transaction cost viewpoint automatically
frames institutions like cooperatives to be advantageous (the most efficient), because, otherwise, they
would not exist—another tautological argument.
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imperfect information, institutions develop as substitutes for missing markets “in an
environment of pervasive risks, incomplete markets, information asymmetry, and moral
hazard” (Bardhan 1989, 4).
The theory of imperfect information is related to transaction cost theory, as
information costs are a form of transaction costs. Bardhan (1989) claims, however, that
the theory of imperfect information is
usually cast in a more rigorous framework, clearly spelling out assumptions
and equilibrium solution concepts, drawing out more fully the implications of
strategic behavior under asymmetric information, sharply differentiating the
impact of different types of information problems, and yielding somewhat
more concrete and specific predictions than the usual presentations of
transaction cost theory about the design of contracts, with more attention to
the details of the terms and conditions of varying contractual arrangements
under varying circumstances (Bardhan 1989, 6).
One example of the imperfect information analysis in the cooperative literature is
Braverman and Guasch (1989). The authors evaluate the motivation of credit
cooperatives in developing countries—incomplete credit markets— as well as their
formation and design. They find that credit cooperatives can be extremely successful and
provide important advantages to their members as long as the “intrinsical and moral
hazard problems are properly accounted for” (Braverman and Guasch 1989, 353).

20

The Tragedy of Rational Choice
20

Agency theory, and the principal-agent problem around which it centers, is an offshoot of the imperfect
information approach. The principal-agent problem describes a situation in which a principal (e.g. a
shareholder) hires an agent (e.g. a manager) who does not hold the same selfish interest as the principal.
The “problem” is one of moral hazard, which could potentially arise because managers shirk their
responsibilities for which they were hired. Monitoring, then, becomes a fundamental issue in agency
theory, as a way to mitigate the principal-agent problem (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Agency theory is
applied to cooperatives in the following way: members are defined as the principals and cooperative
managers are the agents (Van Bekkum 2001). The same incentive problems are theorized to exist, for
which monitoring is necessary. According to Egerstrom (2004), a major accomplishment of the agency
theory of cooperatives is the comprehensive list of problems it addresses (including free-rider, horizon,
portfolio, control, and decision-making problems).
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How does Ostrom’s discussion of economic methodology apply to the economic models
of cooperatives? Ostrom would argue that these models are applied out of context
(inappropriately elevated to the status of theory), and thus the conclusion is made that
only the state can change exogeneous variables.
Here I want to both extend Ostrom’s argument and also offer a critique of it, by
claiming that the way these models—the collective action models and the cooperatives
models— are used “out of context” stems from the fact that the majority of them (though
not all, as I discuss below) base their theories on the rational-choice/efficiency paradigm,
which is especially inappropriate for cooperatives.
Notwithstanding the vast range of differences within heterodox economics, one of its
defining characteristics is a rejection, or at least a modification, of neoclassical rational
choice theory. Rational choice theory—the behavioral assumption that buttresses the
whole of mainstream economics—is a framework that depicts individuals as solely out to
maximize their benefits and minimize their costs while facing a limited amount of
resources (and employing a given set of preferences). The argument then follows that the
entire economy is an aggregate of individual cost-benefit analyses, which ultimately
results in Pareto optimality—the most efficient outcome for society.
The foundational assumption that threads together all three of the economic collective
action models discussed in this chapter is that individuals are “rational” in the
neoclassical sense. For example,
It is not in fact true that the idea that groups will act in their self-interest
follows logically from the premise of rational and self-interested
behavior” […] “rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve
their common or group interests (Olson 1965, 1-2).
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As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly
or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, ‘What is the utility to me
of adding one more animal to my herd?’ (Hardin 1968, 1244).
This assumption about human behavior is directly linked to the conclusions of these
models. If Hardin’s herdsman were altruistic towards each, then the “tragedy of the
commons” will not occur.
Ostrom herself defines her conception of rationality to be much more flexible than
what is assumed in these economic models.
I presume that individuals try to solve problems as effectively as they can.
That assumption imposes a discipline on me. Instead of presuming that
some individuals are incompetent, evil, or irrational, and others are
omniscient, I presume that individuals have very similar limited
capabilities to reason and figure out the structure of complex
environments. It is my responsibility as a scientist to ascertain what
problems individuals are trying to solve and what factors help or hinder
them in these efforts. When the problems that I observe involve lack of
predictability, information, and trust, as well as high levels of complexity
and transactional difficulties, then my efforts to explain must take these
problems overtly into account rather than assuming them away (Ostrom
1990, 26).
Nevertheless, what is striking in Governing the Commons is that despite her
broadened notion of rationality, Ostrom never explicitly criticizes these collective action
models for using rational choice theory. In fact she states that “these models are thus
extremely useful for explaining how perfectly rational individuals can produce, under
some circumstances, outcomes that are not ‘rational’ when viewed from the perspective
of all those involved” (Ostrom 1990, 6). In other words, there are collective action
circumstances whereby Olson and Hardin predict correctly. In 2000, however, she states
that, although they might be useful in extremely competitive scenarios,
Thin [neoclassical] models of rational choice have been unsuccessful in
explaining or predicting behavior in one-shot or finitely repeated social
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dilemmas in which the theoretical prediction is that no one will cooperate
(Ostrom 2000, 474).
Although Ostrom’s prisoner metaphor in Governing the Commons is extremely
poignant, she seems somewhat stuck in the cement of (false) positivism; she fails to
follow through with her analogy by extending the problem directly to rational choice
theory. I suggest that it is the very assumption that people base their collective action
decisions solely on a self-interested cost and benefit calculus, instead of their motivations
and actions reflecting a wide set of values, concerns, structures, goals, and behaviors—
including free-riding behavior—that ultimately incarcerates their capabilities and
potential, and leads to the assumption that the state needs to alter the cost-benefit
structures by instituting policy in order to effect change.
Rational choice theory is even more inappropriate for understanding cooperatives,
institutional forms that embody principles of democracy and equality, that foster a range
of development outcomes (not just economic), and, since their inception, have been
embedded in social movements that confront the abuses of capitalism, whether that be of
the industrial revolution or 21st century globalization.
Just as rational choice theory informs the conclusions of collective action models, so
too for cooperatives. Recall that Sen’s 1966 model of producer cooperatives
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demonstrated a possible overutilization of labor, a result that hinged on a key behavioral
assumption: what Sen calls “sympathy,” which could also be termed “empathy.”
Specifically, Sen defined the utility functions of cooperative workers to include valuing
the well-being of fellow workers, which results in the opposite of “Ward effect.” Maybe
21

Stiglitz (1989) describes a “peasant rationality,” one in which peasants are rational, but not fully
informed. This is certainly an improvement on the neoclassical definition. However, the imperfect
information is still not broad enough to capture the social and political features of cooperatives.
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it is, in fact, the assumption that cooperative workers are rational in the neoclassical sense
that is “perverse,” for this assumption is the ultimate cause of Ward’s “perverse effect.”

Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that we need better a better economic
framework for understanding cooperatives. Transaction costs, property rights, and
imperfect information are all useful and relevant concepts to build on, but they are
constrained by rational choice theory, which precludes any meaningful understanding of
this organizational form that also embodies the values of democracy and social justice.
Applying strict rational choice assumptions to frame the motivations of cooperative
members implies they are not capable of solving their collective challenges, which
incarcerates their potential and, as Sen illustrated with his model of producer
cooperatives, drastically changes the range of possible results.
In proceeding to develop a more useful framework with which to identify the
objectives, struggles, and achievements of cooperatives, it is incumbent upon
economists— heterodox economists especially—to do better than this. The next chapter,
by contrasting the economic framing of cooperatives with one that locates them in social
justice movements, is an attempt to provide a more nuanced and realistic picture of
cooperative motivations, functions, and possibilities.
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CHAPTER 3

INTERNALIZING “SOCIAL DISTANCE:” COOPERATIVES AND THE GLOBAL
JUSTICE MOVEMENT
Cooperatives in their various forms are an […] existing example of the possibility of extending democracy to
economic life (Hill 293).

Introduction
The purposes of this chapter are twofold. The first is to contrast the way mainstream
economists frame cooperatives with the way they are described by social movements—
namely the global justice movement and the older, global cooperative movement itself.
Rather than the rational-choice/economic-efficiency paradigm, this perspective defines
the goals of cooperatives in terms of a broader notion of well-being for families and
communities and, still more broadly, as an effort to combat corporate-centric
globalization. This dissertation will draw from this alternative conception of
cooperatives and incorporate it into its analysis. The second purpose is descriptive: to
provide some clarifying definitions of the various types of cooperatives.
The first section of this chapter describes the global justice movement and situates
cooperatives within it. The second section reviews the early history of the various kinds
of cooperatives as well as of the International Cooperative Alliance, the main organizing
body of the global cooperative movement that has advanced the widely used cooperative
definitions, goals, and principles from which this dissertation draws.
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The Global Justice Movement
Its recipients called it the “summit special,” water laced with pepper spray shot into the
masked faces of protesters at the 2001 Summit of the Americas in Quebec City. This was
accompanied by what were quickly becoming standbys for the “anti-globalization”
protests—tear gas, rubber bullets, and water cannons. Even though it did not burn the
eyes or choke a crowd out of the dead-end, cobblestone streets of the old part of Quebec
City, the very misnomer “anti-globalization” was (and is) arguably just as irritating—to
the protesters and the movement—as the weapons wielded by riot police.
[In] Quebec we get painted as anti-globalization protesters, but really
[who] I think we are is Canadian citizens fighting for a more just and
democratic world. A world where trade lawyers don’t negotiate
agreements over the course of years without consulting with
Canadians….We’re not struggling against globalization per se. We’re
struggling against capitalism. We’re struggling for a more democratic
world (Member of Toronto Video Activist Collective. April 13th, 2001.
Summit of the Americas).
Quebec City protesters interviewed by the New York Times mirrored this sentiment,
citing their objections not to globalization, but to the ways in which multinational
corporations have brandished it: impacting human rights, livelihoods, and environments.
In light of the Mexican maquiladoras (otherwise known as “democracy-free zones”), one
labor advocate objected to the certain demise of workers’ rights across the globe. A
Vermont farmer worried about the impact of corporate-held international patents that
gave companies like Monsanto and Cargill legal entitlement to seeds that small farmers
have been developing for centuries or more, degrading genetic diversity and leaving them
economically shackled to these companies. All were focused on globalization’s tendency
to concentrate corporate power, while diluting rights of people (DePalma 2001).
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The activists themselves have come up with much better epithets for their collective
intentions—the global justice movement, counter-hegemonic globalization, alterglobalization, the movement of movements, and the anti-corporate globalization
movement. Regardless of its name (I will call it the global justice movement), all can
agree that its focus is building a new kind of globalization, one that offsets neoliberal
globalization with more equal distributions of economic resources and power.
Globalization is a sweeping term for an extremely complex reality that is difficult to
define. Scholars get quickly tangled up in debates simply defining globalization, i.e. its
meaning, whether it exemplifies a process or event or whether its origins are economic,
cultural, or social (Steger 2003).
Boyce (2004), however, articulates a clear conception that is well-suited to the
motivations and beliefs of the global justice movement. First, he draws from the works
of Karl Polanyi (an “old” institutionalist), who articulated the economy as a system of
markets and institutions that shape and constrain market activity.
Markets are nested within social institutions that both enable them to
function and temper their effects. The rise of capitalism was characterized
by what Karl Polanyi (1957[1944], p. 132) called a ‘double movement’:
the expansion of the market, coupled with the expansion of ‘social
protection aiming at the conservation of man and nature as well as
productive organization’ (Boyce 2004, 2).
Boyce defines globalization as the global integration of that same process, the spread of
economic activities (both market and institutional) around the world. But this “has long
been an uneven process, not only across regions but also across the social spheres that
structure economic activity” (Boyce 2004, 2). What the global justice movement objects
to is that globalization, as it stands, “has proceeded furthest in the sphere of the market”
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(Boyce 2004, 2), a bias that weakens society’s ability to use institutions to curtail
corporate concentrations of power.
This unevenness fosters what sociologists call “social distance.” Social distance
refers to the divisions in society among people in different social categories: economic,
race and ethnicity, gender, etc.. Boyce describes social distance in the context of
globalization and international trade.
When trade occurs at prices that do not capture external costs and external
benefits, market integration is accompanied by the globalization of market
failure. It also can widen what can be termed the ‘social distance’
between the beneficiaries of cost externalization and those who bear these
costs, making the latter less able to influence the actions of the former
(Boyce 2004).
Boyce argues that market globalization expands social distance. The global justice
movement’s task at hand, then, is to counterbalance the dominant spread of market
globalization, thereby narrowing the social distance between those who benefit and those
who are harmed and fostering “internalization” of costs and benefits.
Visible configurations of the global justice movement are innumerable and have
moved well-beyond the protests that launched it. Via Campesina, Peoples’ Global
Action, Jubilee 2000, and the Solidarity Economy Network are just a few of its
organizational pillars. Among the many examples of direct alternatives to market-centric
globalization and capitalism are Community Supported Agriculture (CSAs), community
currencies, fair trade, neighborhood associations, farmers markets, and the one that is
ever present in discussions and description of the global justice movement, and is the
central focus of this dissertation: cooperatives.
The economic equality that worker cooperatives strive for is a constant,
vibrant catalyst for equality among sexes, nations, and races, through a
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drive towards democracy, first in our workplaces, and then in our
communities and societies (Trott 2008).
Cooperatives play a central role in the global justice movement, serving as a symbol
of democracy as well as a form of governance with which to counterbalance the
dominance of markets in the globalization process and to internalize the social distance it
causes. This is, indeed, the same mantle cooperatives have held since their inception
over two hundred years ago.

The Early Cooperatives—Consumer, Credit, Worker, and Agricultural
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The Rochdale Pioneers of Britain—formed in 1844—are often incorrectly portrayed as
the first cooperative society on record. Actually, many cooperative associations predate
the Rochdales—in Britain and the rest of Europe, in North America, and in Japan. It
would be more accurate to say that the Rochdales became the model that launched the
global cooperative movement (Birchall 1997).
There is no exact moment when cooperatives first appeared on the economic stage.
Humans have always engaged in cooperation for productive purposes, but cooperatives as
a formal governance structure only appear in societies where markets have already come
into existence. Fairbairn (2004) connects cooperatives’ inception to the beginnings of
“modernism,” a period between the late eighteenth and twentieth centuries characterized
by “rational pragmatism, secularism, growing urbanism, the power of nation-states, the
economization of many aspects of society, and other related mentalities and behaviors”
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The most helpful and comprehensive sources I have found on the four main types, and the development
of the International Cooperative Alliance is Johnston Birchall’s The International Co-operative Movement.
I used Birchall as my primary resource, and supplemented with other resources, which are cited in the
appropriate sections.
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(Fairbairn 2004, 24). Again in Karl Polanyi’s terms, it was an era dominated by two
parallel institutions, the state and the market. “These processes [that reshaped society to
fit the state and the market] had immense impacts on the lives of ordinary people, and it
is in these impacts that we see the origins of co-ops” (Fairbairn 2004, 24).
According to Digby, a historian of the early cooperative movement, although
cooperatives were not fully formed until the early nineteenth century, the “germs of
many cooperative ideas are to be found in [earlier] schemes: the combination of self-help
and mutual aid; a voluntary, democratic, and egalitarian association for economic
purposes; direct relations between producers and consumers and the elimination of the
middleman” (Digby 1948, 14).
Digby traces the concept of an economic community, which operates within the state,
to Protestant England of the seventeenth century, quoting a Dutchman residing in
England named P.C. Plockboy. Plockboy published a pamphlet in 1659 that laid out a
plan for forming “economic associations of agriculturalists, artisans, seamen, and
professional men, who would all contribute capital and work to the undertaking, while
retaining the right to withdraw and take their capital with them if they so desired. The
products of the farm would be exchanged within the group for the products of industry
and any profits would be distributed among the members” (Digby 1948, 14).
In 1695, a Quaker named John Belers published another pamphlet that expanded on
the ideas of Plockboy. His Proposals for Raising a Colledge of Industry of all Usefull
Trades and Husbandry proposed that consumer and producers, farmers and artisans form
a single organization to sell on the market, with profits from these sales to pay capital
costs that Belers assumed should come from outside the group.
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When the first formally recognized cooperative was formed is unclear. According to
Williams (2007), the very first formal cooperative on record was a fire insurance
cooperative, formed in the UK in the early 1700s. Birchall claims that it was not until
1760 that groups of shipbuilders in the south of England created flour mills to bust local
monopolies that sold poor quality bread at extremely high prices. “By the end of the
century the idea had spread to several other ports along the east coast, and baking
societies began to appear in Scotland” (Birchall 1997, 4). Birchall calls this expansion
the first cooperative movement. The second movement, according to Birchall, “began in
1826 in Brighton and which by 1833 had spread all over Britain and even to Ireland”
(Birchall 1997, 4). Williams (2007) states that by 1830, 300 cooperative societies had
been officially recognized by the UK.
The cooperatives of this second, early nineteenth century movement were based on
the ideas of Robert Owen

23

and William King—both successful men concerned with the

poverty of the working people. Owen was a self-made, wealthy industrialist, who was
well-known for his philanthropy and personal efforts to improve the labor conditions of
his employees. King was a physician who had long worked on self-help solutions for the
working poor.
Owen’s influential idea was the cooperative village, where the working class could
reside and work, producing for their own consumption and exchanging with each other
and with other villages. He traveled across Europe and to North America to establish
these communities, but they all ultimately failed. The key issue was the lack of funds:
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Owen is often characterized as the father of the modern cooperative movement.
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the aristocracy was not interested in contributing their money and the working classes
lacked the capital to establish these villages.
Many “Owenites” established cooperative shops (consumer cooperatives) as an
alternative to the villages, despite Owen’s skepticism on the grounds that they did not
reach far enough. King, however, preferred the shops because they did not rely on the
wealthy class for funding, and because the revenues from the cooperative shops could
potentially be the capital used to establish the Owenite villages. In any case, King
believed that establishing cooperative shops was a worthwhile goal in and of itself.
24

In 1833, according to Birchall, the second cooperative movement collapsed.

Cole

(1944) provides several reasons for its disintegration: a collapse of the trade union
movement, caused by government pressure and employee lock-outs; an economic
downturn that pushed cooperative members deep into poverty; and the internal problem
that the cooperatives did not have a way to distribute their profits, so the only mechanism
members had for accessing their dividends was to dissolve their societies.
Like the cooperative shops of previous decades, the Rochdale group formed in
response to the economic conditions of the era:
The handloom weavers were being squeezed out by power-driven looms.
The mills were still paying the low wages of the preceding depression.
There was much unemployment […] Hours of work were long. Mean and
crowded houses without adequate water or sanitation had been run up to
provide for the rapidly increasing population and fill the pockets of
speculative builders (Digby 1948, 21).
The Rochdales opened their own store (1844) in order to sell foodstuffs they could
not afford otherwise. They began with a paltry selection (four items: butter, sugar, flour,
24

Birchall (1996) is somewhat inconsistent in his description. Recall that he first states that the second
movement had spread all over Britain (and reached Ireland) by 1833. Then on the next page claims that the
movement collapsed by 1833. It is possible he meant that there was growth across Britain until 1833, at
which point the movement began to implode.

38

and oatmeal) and were only open two nights a week. Within a few months, however,
they expanded their coffers, became notable for providing high quality items, and were
open for business 5 days a week. By 1850 the Rochdales established a corn mill and sold
flour to their members (by then 600 strong) as well as to other cooperatives.
It is noteworthy that the original Rochdale pioneers (a group of 28 men, mostly
flannel handloom weavers and a few other trade artisans, who worked in the cotton mills
of Rochdale, England) were politically active. “All the pioneers were Owenites or
Chartists, leaders of strikes or agitators for the ten-hour day or the repeal of the Corn
Laws. They were men with a good deal of political experience, used to working with
their fellows” (Digby 1948, 21).
The Rochdales were very cognizant of the mistakes made by the failed cooperatives
that preceded them, and established a broad set of principles with those missteps in mind.
Over time these “Rochdale Principles” became the founding principles of the global
cooperative movement (Birchall 1997).

These principles were the following:
1. Open membership.
Anyone—man or woman—could be a member (up to a fixed total) and on equal terms
with the founding members. There could be no discrimination of any kind. Only people
known to have bad characters could be refused admission.
2. Democratic control (one person, one vote).
Power to determine the affairs of the society are distributed equally, and financial
contribution should have no bearing on political influence.
3. Payment of fixed and limited interest on capital
The idea of limited interest was to strike a balance between the group’s need for capital
investment and its beliefs about unsavory profits.
4. Distribution of surplus in proportion to trade.
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The Rochdales figured out that instead of having to dissolve the cooperative, trading
25
surplus could paid as a dividend in proportion to member purchases. This principle is
often credited with the success of the Rochdale society (Birchall 1997).
This devise solved one of the most difficult of the problems confronting
the early cooperators. They had not come together to make profits. If
they could, they would have provided their members with the necessities
of life at cost price. But, even apart from the violent opposition this would
have aroused among rival shopkeepers, cost price would have been almost
impossible to determine in advance in an immature organization, with the
running expenses and the overhead charges, the risks of spoilage and
unsold goods, all unknown at the time when prices would have to be
determined (Digby 1948, 23).
The dividend on member purchases, paid quarterly, made it possible to in effect sell at
cost price retroactively.
5. Cash trading
No credit could be established for trading. This was a safeguard for the Rochdale society
and a response to what was considered a social evil of the industrial era.
6. Commitment to pure and unadulterated goods
Providing quality goods, which were generally not available to the masses, was one of the
main reasons for the formation of consumer cooperatives.
7. Promotion of education
The use of society funds for educating members signified that the organization, and the
broader cooperative movement, was something more than just a business enterprise.
8. Political and religious neutrality
The point of this, beyond reinforcing the open membership principle, was to ensure that
the society could not become tied to any church or political group.

The Rochdales were so influential that by the mid-1850s there were almost 1,000
consumer cooperatives established in Britain based on their model (Woolf 1928).
But the Rochdale’s influence moved well-beyond the consumer form of cooperative.
Once the Rochdales had established a solid set of cooperative practices and principles,
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The Rochdales preferred the term “trading surplus” to profit.
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the movement devised new kinds of cooperation—credit, worker, and agricultural.

According to Birchall (1997), “each form emerged mainly within one country and then,
whenever the environment was congenial, spread rapidly throughout Europe and then the
world” (Birchall 1997, 11). Credit cooperatives, as I will describe below, were conceived
in Germany.

Credit Cooperatives
Germany’s economy in the mid-nineteenth century was vastly different from Britain’s,
closer to that of Tsarist Russia than to the industrial transformation that seeded the
Rochdales. In the towns, artisans still dominated production, selling to the surrounding
rural areas. The agrarian reforms of 1848 gave peasants land rights that exposed them
more to the fluctuations of the market (Birchall 1997).
The first major figurehead of the credit cooperative movement was Hermann
Schulze—a judge and liberal mayor of Delitzsch, a small village in northeast Germany.
Concerned about the welfare of workers and artisans, he realized that lack of capital was
a fundamental economic issue for the townspeople. He established a “friendly society” in
1849 similar to those that preceded the consumer cooperatives in Great Britain. In 1850,
he established the first credit cooperative, with ten members, all artisans. Members
subscribed to one share each, which could be paid in installments. Liability was
unlimited, and profits, after twenty percent was first placed in capital reserves, were
distributed to members as dividends. The cooperative held accounts and made loans to
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All other cooperative forms derived from these original four sometime during the twentieth century;
these are mainly insurance, forestry, fishing, electricity, and health care cooperatives.
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members, and was run by a salaried professional who was chosen democratically
(Birchall 1997).
While Schulze’s credit cooperatives were located in Germany’s towns and cities,
Friedrich Raiffeisen founded the first rural credit cooperative in 1862, in which only
farmers comprised the membership. Raiffeisen built on Schulze’s model, but with some
fundamental differences: the cooperative did not require any share capital from farmers,
members used their properties and assets as collateral, no dividends were distributed
(instead used for reserves), and loans were drawn from savings and deposits. The
societies were also very small—kept to the village level (Birchall 1997).
Both Germany’s urban and rural credit cooperative movements were a success. By
1905, there were over 1,000 urban cooperative banks with 600,000 members—a bank in
almost every town. In the countryside, over half of the small farmers in Germany were
members of approximately 13,000 rural credit cooperatives. According to Birchall,
“Taken together, both [urban and rural] movements were an astonishing achievement
which got the urban and rural workers out of debt to money-lenders and enabled them to
survive in the new market society” (Birchall 1997, 13).

Worker Cooperatives
Worker cooperatives are non-agricultural production cooperatives: business enterprises
owned and controlled by workers. Today the Mondragon cooperative group in Spain is
the most notable—and influential—collective of worker cooperatives in the world. It
began when a prisoner turned priest named Don Josè Maria Arizmendi came to the small
Basque city of Mondragon to help improve the local school system. Later, when five of
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his students set up a stove-making company (in 1956), they were supported by Arizmendi
(and the local community), who helped by writing the statutes that would fit the
cooperative into Spanish law. Soon other groups followed suit and cooperatives were
being formed throughout the town (Whyte and Whyte 1991). There are now over 250
cooperatives in Mondragon, representing almost 100,000 worker-members (Mondragon
Corporation 2010).
Worker cooperatives were first conceived in France and Italy in the mid-nineteenth
century. Charles Fourier, like Robert Owen, was concerned about the dire poverty
among France’s working class. (In France, the working class was largely made up of
independent, skilled workers rather than factory workers.) Fourier, too, believed in selfenclosed communities, and like Owen’s they too failed. Philippe Buchez was France’s
William King, bringing the more pragmatic sensibility to the cooperative movement.
Buchez established an association of cabinet makers and codified a set of principles for
worker cooperation that resembled the Rochdale principles,
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which prompted a workers’

cooperative movement worldwide.
In Italy, the worker cooperative movement developed in Piedmont, the most
industrialized region at the time. When the government granted the region freedom of
association in 1948, groups began to set up mutual aid societies that insured members
against sickness (informal health cooperatives). The Owen-like figurehead was a
political leader named Mazzini, and the first producer cooperative was a glass-making
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The members elected their representatives democratically. Each would receive a market-competitive
wage. However, they would also receive a return of the surplus in proportion to the work they contributed.
Capital was “indissoluble”. Workers had a probation period of one year, and then be eligible for full
membership.
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cooperative set up in the village of Altare; by the 1860s there were several others
(Birchall 1997).
Worker cooperative movements did not develop significantly outside of France and
Italy until the 20th century. In many countries, the movement grew sporadically, in fits
and starts. For example, in the United States, there was a small worker cooperative
movement in the 1930s, which revived in the 1970s. Those that survived from the 1970s
became the catalyst for growth in the 1990s (Hoover 2007). “Many of them were
thriving; they had demonstrated that the model was viable and they were committed to
helping grow it, through replication, spinoff, and technical assistance. These older 1970s
co-ops provided resources, inspiration and in many cases directed capital to help those
new co-ops get started in the 1990s” (Hoover 2007, 241).

Agricultural Cooperatives
The terms “agricultural cooperative” and “farmer cooperative” do not denominate one
form of cooperative, but several. A simple typology for distinguishing among
agricultural cooperatives is to classify them as either production cooperatives or service
cooperatives.
The function of the agricultural production cooperative is to turn an input or product
into a higher value product ready for consumption (by humans or animals). In other
words, production resources—land and/or machinery—are pooled and members either
farm or produce jointly. Agricultural production cooperatives include the Soviet-era
cooperatives that collectivized either land rights or labor power (and sometimes both).
Other examples are the dairy cooperatives of Europe and North America. According to
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Birchall (1997), the first agricultural cooperative was a cheesemakers cooperative in
France, formed in 1750.
Agricultural service cooperatives can be broken down further, into marketing, supply,
and credit cooperatives. Marketing cooperatives are comprised of farmers with
individual land rights who collectively transform, package, market, and distribute their
products.

28

The marketing cooperatives can also be traced to the United States in the

early nineteenth century; the first marketing cooperative was a pork cooperative in
Granville, NY (1820). Supply cooperatives do just that: they supply their members with
agricultural inputs, e.g. seeds, fertilizer, fuel, and sometimes machinery. The first supply
cooperative was established in 1865 in Switzerland for the purchasing of fertilizer
(Birchall 1997).

The International Cooperative Alliance
During the second half of the 19th century, several leaders of the cooperative movement
in Europe galvanized to establish a formal international cooperative body in order to
further strengthen and expand the global movement. After fifty years and several
unsuccessful attempts, the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA) was finally founded
in 1895.
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Birchall (1997) defines production cooperatives as those that add value to an agricultural product for use
but that seems to fall in the definition of market cooperative.
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Furthermore, the ICA is now the largest non-governmental organization in the world and is considered
by both the UN and the ILO to be extremely important to the cooperative movement. Its members are 237
national (from 89 countries) and international cooperatives representing the range of cooperative types
(ICA 2010).
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The ICA was formed to accomplish three goals: to provide information on the
cooperative movement to member cooperatives; to establish commercial relations
between cooperatives in different countries; and to elucidate the nature of cooperative
principles.
The extent to which they succeeded at these goals varied. In terms of providing
information, they were quite successful. In 1897, at the Paris Congress of ICA, the
organization began to gather statistics, and in 1909 they began publishing their bulletin in
multiple languages. They have continued to publish the Review of International
Cooperation and gather statistics (some are presented in Appendix A), both of which
have helped connect national cooperative movements. The results of the efforts to
stimulate international trade amongst cooperatives were not as promising. Travel was
slow and expensive, logistics intimidating, and even the committee designated to
organize and promote this trade could not meet because members lived so far from each
other.

30

ICA has been hugely successful in achieving its third goal. Its cooperative principles
have been widely influential in the cooperative movement, providing a standard as to
whether an organization can call itself a cooperative, and have evolved gradually over
time.
Three official reviews of principles were undertaken over the course of the ICA’s
history. In 1995, the latest set of principles was developed and accepted (see Appendix B
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The extent to which this is still an ICA goal is unclear. It seems, however, that the global justice
movement—and globalization—at least have the potential to help the cooperative movement fulfill its
original goal of building networks and trade by devising new kinds of trade paradigms that did not exist
when they the ICA was established.
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for the 1937 and 1966 versions), as well as this clear statement as to what defines a
cooperative:
an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their
common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a
jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enterprise.
The principles, underlaid by a clear list of values, are widely used today. These are the
following:

1. Voluntary and Open Membership:
Cooperatives are voluntary organizations, open to all people able to use their
services and willing to accept the responsibilities of membership, without gender,
social, racial, political or religious discrimination
2. Democratic Member Control
Cooperatives are democratic organizations controlled by their members who
actively participate in setting their policies and making decisions. Men and
women serving as elected representatives are accountable to the membership. In
primary cooperatives members have equal voting rights (one member, one vote)
and cooperatives at other levels are also organized in a democratic manner.
3. Member Economic Participation
Members contribute equitably to, and democratically control, the capital of their
cooperative. At least part of that capital is usually the common property of the
cooperative. Members usually receive limited compensation, if any, on capital
subscribed as a condition of membership. Members allocate surpluses for any or
all of the following purposes: developing their cooperative, possibly by setting up
reserves, part of which at least would be indivisible; benefiting members in
proportion to their transactions with the cooperative; and supporting other
activities approved by the membership.
4. Autonomy and Independence
Cooperatives are autonomous, self-help organizations controlled by their
members. If they enter to agreements with other organizations, including
governments, or raise capital from external sources, they do so on terms that
ensure democratic control by their members and maintain their cooperative
autonomy.
5. Education, Training and Information
Cooperatives provide education and training for their members, elected
representatives, managers and employees so they can contribute effectively to the
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development of their cooperatives. They inform the general public – particularly
young people and opinion leaders – about the nature and benefits of cooperation.
6.

Cooperation among Cooperatives
Cooperatives serve their members most effectively and strengthen the cooperative
movement by working together through local national, regional and international
structures.

7.

Concern for Community
Cooperatives work for the sustainable development of their communities through
policies approved by their members.

This most recent iteration of the ICA cooperative principles was formulated in direct
response to the efficiency approach to cooperative theory. According to Birchall, there
was a “crisis of consciousness” about their ideological nature and meaning. “[This crisis
of consciousness] arises from gnawing doubts about the true purpose of cooperatives and
whether they are fulfilling a distinct role as a different kind of enterprise. If cooperatives
do nothing more than succeed in being as efficient as other businesses in a commercial
sense, is that good enough?”
The ICA’s answer was no; the cooperative definition and set of principles that the
organization devised in response to this question are now used by all members of the
Committee for the Promotion and Advancement of Cooperatives (COPAC), which
includes major development players like the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations (FAO), the International Labour Office (ILO) and the United Nations
general secreteriat (UN).
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Conclusion
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The International Federation of Agricultural Producers (IFAP), the Canadian Cooperative Association
(CCA) and the Swedish Cooperative Centre (SCC) are also members.
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This chapter has begun the process of developing an alternative framework for
cooperatives. Instead of an economic institution comprised of rational-choice actors who
form an organization for the purpose of reducing transaction costs and maximizing
efficiency, this chapter places cooperatives in the center of global justice movement’s
effort to narrow the social distance created by market-centric globalization (to borrow
Boyce’s conception) and the much older global movement to confront the debilitating
effects of industrial capitalism. This chapter also draws from the definition, goals, and
principles of cooperatives developed by the International Cooperative Alliance, which is
the organizing body central to the global cooperative movement.
Of course, not all cooperatives are exemplars of all that is fair and democratic, as this
dissertation will well-establish in its discussion of inequality and collective action.
When trying to think theoretically about cooperatives, however, it would be irresponsible
and narrow-minded not to acknowledge the ICA’s framings and the broader role that
cooperatives serve in building democracy.
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CHAPTER 4

OSTROM’S THEORY OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to explain the nuts and bolts of Ostrom’s theory of
collective action and then provide a critique and a preliminary analysis by applying her
theory to what we know of cooperatives thus far (from chapter 3).
This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section discusses Ostrom unique
methodology, which I argue is what makes her work especially relevant and useful,
especially to heterodox economists. The second section describes one example of the
many case studies that Ostrom uses to develop her theory. The third section presents
Ostrom’s theory of collective action, and the final section provides a critique of her
theory.

Ostrom’s Methodology: Fusing Theory and Experience
In the issue of Yes! Magazine honoring Ostrom’s work,
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the magazine’s editor, Fran

Korten, conducted an interview with Ostrom in which the main emotion she expressed
from her Nobel win is relief. Relief?
Well, relieved in that I was doing a bunch of research through the years
that many people thought was very radical and people didn’t like. As a
person who does interdisciplinary work, I didn’t fit anywhere. I was
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Briefly mentioned in chapter 1.
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relieved that, after all these years of struggle, someone really thought it did
add up. That’s very nice.
Indeed, Ostrom’s work is radical, not just for nullifying the “tragedy of the commons,”
but for how she did so—her distinct methodological style that shatters stiff disciplinary
boundaries and ignores dogmatic epistemological attachments.
Ostrom explains that her research approach began developing in the mid-1980s, when
she became aware of “the possibility of using detailed case studies written by other
authors to obtain a sufficiently rich empirical base for understanding CPRs” (Ostrom
1990, xiv). Ostrom and her colleagues at Indiana University began collecting citations to
case studies of CPR institutions, and Fenton Martin, in particular, compiled a
bibliography of the list, which reached 5,000 entries by 1990 (when Governing the
Commons was published). Several academic disciplines, across the social and physical
sciences, were represented in these case studies, but the researchers found that the
majority stayed within disciplinary boundaries by referencing sources strictly from within
their subject area. “Consequently, a vast amount of highly specialized knowledge had
been accumulated” without much synthesis or application of the knowledge to the policy
problems involved” (Ostrom 1990, xv). Ostrom thought it was important to use this
compilation of literature to understand empirically how institutions help users manage
CPRs. With an NSF grant, Ostrom and several of her colleagues screened these case
studies and selected a smaller subset for further scrutiny, coding, and analysis. “We have
now developed a structured coding form that enables us to transform the indepth
qualitative data into a structured database amenable to quantitative analysis” (Ostrom
1990, xv). Throughout this process, the scholars wrote several papers trying to “elucidate
a theory that would help us understand the patterns we were beginning to see in reading

51

these diverse materials” (Ostrom 1990, xvi). The result of that work is the theory Ostrom
presents in Governing the Commons.
Ostrom’s use of such a wide range of multidisciplinary studies has nurtured a fluid
epistemological approach. She uses both inductive and deductive reasoning, both
empiricism and reason, in a continual back and forth interchange between observations
“on the ground” and “arms-length conceptualizing” that she says gives her a deeper
understanding of what she is observing.
Ostrom calls her method a blend of biology and “new institutionalism.” She
characterizes the biology piece as follows:
Biologists also face the problem of studying complex processes that are
poorly understood. Their scientific strategy frequently has involved
identifying for empirical observation the simplest possible organism in
which a process occurs in a clarified, or even exaggerated, form. The
organism is not chosen because it is representative of all organisms.
Rather, the organism is chosen because particular processes can be studied
more effectively using this organism than using another (Ostrom 1990,
26).
Ostrom’s “organism” is the “CPR situation.” She defines a “common-pool resource”
(CPR) as a “natural or man-made resource system that is sufficiently large as to make it
costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits
from its use” (Ostrom 1990, 30).
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Her list of examples of such resource systems include

fishing grounds, groundwater basins, grazing areas, irrigation canals, streams, lakes,
oceans, and other bodies of water.
New institutionalism is a form of institutionalism that begins with “broad
rationality”—the idea that human beings have purpose and plans, and are both limited
33

Hanley et al. 1997 distinguish the meaning of the commons and common-pool resource as follows: the
commons is the actual environmental asset, whereas common-pool resource or common property resource
is the property right regime that governs it.
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and capable in their abilities to find solutions to their shared dilemmas. The
“institutional” piece feeds into the solution in the form of norms, conventions, and rules
that both enable and constrain people in achieving their collective action goals. If strict
rational choice theory argues that individual decisions are essentially a series of static,
cost-benefit analyses, then new institutionalism is saying that, yes, individuals weigh
costs and benefits in making those decisions, but how those costs and benefits are shaped
and perceived (and sometimes not perceived) is shaped by a broad range of institutional
factors.
My criticisms of Ostrom’s work are not meant to overshadow the fundamental
contribution she has made to the social sciences. Ostrom’s methodological style is truly
interdisciplinary in spirit and in practice, and refreshing in its pragmatic autonomy from
both rationalism and empiricism. In academia, that is a radical way of doing things. In
economics, it has had the effect of throwing not only “the Tragedy of the Commons” on
its head, but also the market-state dichotomy on which mainstream economics rests. This
is a profound methodological contribution, and one that heterodox economists should
notice.

CPR Case Studies
Ostrom’s case studies are field settings in which “appropriators” have devised their own
rules for using their CPRs. The successful CPR systems are those where the CPRs—and
the rules the groups have designed to manage them—have survived for long periods of
time. “The institutions […] have survived droughts, floods, wars, pestilence, and major
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economic and political changes” (Ostrom 1990, 58) over the course of decades or
centuries (in one case, 1000 years).
One case study is located in Törbel, Switzerland (written by Robert McC. Netting
1981). In Ostrom’s Yes! interview with Korten, she says that one example:
that just unglued me—because I wasn’t expecting it—was the work of
Robert Netting, an anthropologist who had been studying the alpine
commons for a very long time. He studied Swiss peasants and then
studied in Africa too. He was quite disturbed that people were saying that
Africans were primitive because they used common property so frequently
and they didn’t know about the benefits of private property. The
implication was we’ve got to impose private property rules on them.
Netting said, ‘Are the Swiss peasants stupid? They use common property
also’ (Korten 2010).
Törbel is an alpine village of about 600 people in southern Switzerland. The terrain is
steep, and there are a range of microclimates based on the variance in altitude. For
hundreds of years, the peasants have raised grains, vegetables, fruit trees, and hay on their
personal plots. The land they share in common includes pasture, forests, land used for
waste, irrigation systems, and paths and roads that connect all of these with each other
and the private land.
Legal documents dating back to 1224 detail the various land tenure and management
arrangements for the five commons in Törbel. In 1483, the residents formally established
an association to improve regulation over their use and, in 1507, they set specific
boundaries, limiting access to Törbel residents and restricting use for those who do have
access (modifying the rules over time as necessary). For example, “regulations written in
1517 stated that ‘no citizen could send more cows to the alp than he could feed during the
winter’” (Ostrom 1990, 62). That regulation is still enforced with severe fines imposed
(by an elected local official) on anyone who violates it.
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All statutes that establish CPR use are voted on by all local citizens and managed by an
association of Törbel residents (who own cattle). They meet annually to discuss rules
and hold elections. The elected officials have clearly specified duties: they hire staff for
monitoring, impose fines, organize maintenance work, etc.
Ostrom states that the Törbel CPR institutions are not simply holdovers from a
bygone era, but part of a conscious and long-term effort by residents to match land tenure
to specific types of land use. Although productivity for many of these commons areas is
low, they have also been sustainably maintained over the course of their collective use.
“The CPR not only has been protected but also has been enhanced by investments in
weeding and manuring the summer grazing areas and by the construction and
maintenance of roads” (Ostrom 1990, 64).34

Ostrom’s Theory of Collective Action
Recall from Chapter 1 that Ostrom defines collective action as any effort by a group to
organize themselves to retain the residuals of their own efforts. Any theory of collective
action must address how groups solve the problems inherent in that action: the free-rider
problems that the group is addressing, and the secondary free-rider problems that arise
within the institutions themselves (thus, they become the “commons” or public good).
Ostrom’s point is that people do find ways to overcome free-rider problems, and a
comprehensive collective action theory should explain how they do it.
What Ostrom has discovered is that groups devise complex sets of rules to overcome
free-riding problems. They create rules with which members must make a “credible
commitment” to comply and they set up comprehensive monitoring to ensure compliance
34 Ostrom has evaluated thousands of case studies like the Törbel system.
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with those rules. Ostrom’s theory of collective action identifies how this is accomplished
by identifying the specific design principles of those rules and identifying the specific
factors that predict whether the rules of groups will conform to the design principles.
The following is a discussion of both of these pieces of Ostrom’s theory.

Design Elements of Governance Rules of Successful CPRs
According to Ostrom, the rules of every successful CPR system conform to the following
design principles, which I will briefly describe in order:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Clearly defined boundaries
Congruence between rules and local conditions
Collective choice arrangements
Monitoring
Graduated sanctions
Conflict-resolution mechanisms
Minimal recognition of rights to organize
Nested enterprises

1. Clearly defined boundaries:
Individuals or households who have rights to withdraw resource units from the
CPR must be clearly defined, as must the boundaries of the CPR itself.
Ostrom calls this the “first step in organizing for collective action” (Ostrom 1990, 91). If
the boundaries of the resource and the rules about who can use it are fuzzy, “no one
knows what is being managed or for whom” (Ostrom 1990, 91). The benefits are likely
to be appropriated by free-riders, and the CPR could be destroyed.
If there are substantial numbers of potential appropriators and the demand
for the resource units is high, the destructive potential should all be
allowed to freely withdraw units from the CPR could push the discount
rate used by appropriators toward 100%. The higher the discount rate, the
closer the situation is to that of a one-shot dilemma in which the dominant
strategy of all participants is to overuse the CPR (Ostrom 1990, 91).
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This is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for the transition of a natural resource
from “open access” to “common-property.”

2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions:
Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or quantity of
resource units are related to local conditions and to provision rules requiring
labor, materials, and/or money.
“Well-tailored” appropriation and provision rules is the second condition that accounts
for the sustainability of the successful CPRs. In every case study, the rules reflect the
specific features of the particular natural resource. For example, small differences in
levels of water scarcity are reflected in different rules for allocating water.

3. Collective-choice arrangements:
Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying the
operational rules.
When CPR institutions apply this principle they are better able to fulfill principle #2 and
design their rules to the specific circumstances of their resource.

4. Monitoring:
Monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator behavior, are
accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators.
Even in situations where social reputation is important and there are norms for upholding
agreements, these are not necessarily sufficient for ensuring compliance of CPR rules.
Thus, in all of the successful cases, monitoring systems are in place.

5. Graduated sanctions:
Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be assessed graduated
sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offense) by other
appropriators, by officials accountable to these appropriators, or by both.
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“Now we are at the crux of the problem—and with surprising results. In these robust
institutions, monitoring and sanctioning are undertaken not by external authorities but by
the participants themselves” (Ostrom 1990, 94). Collective action theories often assume
that participants will not sanction (and monitor) because it takes too much time and
effort. But Ostrom’s case study examples of successful CPR systems demonstrate that
participants do. “The appropriators in these CPRs somehow have overcome the
presumed problem of the second-order dilemma” (Ostrom 1990, 94).

6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms:
Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to
resolve conflicts among appropriators or between appropriators and officials.
Unlike collective action models that assume the rules that structure the strategies of all
participants are unambiguous, in the CPR systems applying rules is complicated.
Even such a simple rule as ‘each irrigator must send one individual for one
day to help clean the irrigation canals before the rainy season begins’ can
be interpreted quite differently by different individuals. Who is or is not an
‘individual’ according to this rule? Does sending a child below age 10 or
an adult above age 70 to do heavy physical work meet this rule? Is
working for four hours or six hours a ‘day’ of work? Does cleaning the
canal immediately next to one’s own farm qualify for this community
obligation? (Ostrom 1990, 100).
The fact that these rules can be interpreted in various ways creates opportunities for
shirking them. Conflict-resolution mechanisms allow the participants to navigate this
ambiguity.

7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize:
The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not challenged by
external governmental authorities.
When external governmental officials do not give some level of recognition to the
legitimacy of the CPR rules, and they presume they themselves only have the authority to
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set the rules that govern, for example, inshore fisheries, then anyone who wishes to
circumvent the CPR rules created by the fishers can do so by getting the external officials
to overturn them.

8. Nested enterprises:
Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and
governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises.
Ostrom argues that “all the more complex, enduring CPRs” fulfill this last design
principle (Ostrom 1990, 101). By nested enterprises, she means that the CPR systems are
organized in three or four nested layers of rules, which are in turn nested in local,
regional and national government in some capacity. As an example,
There are two distinct levels in the Philippine federation of irrigation
systems. The problems facing irrigators at the level of a tertiary canal are
different from the problems facing a larger group sharing a secondary
canal. Those, in turn, are different from the problems involved in the
management of the main diversion works that affect the entire system.
Establishing rules at one level, without rules at the other levels, will
produce an incomplete system that may not endure over the long run
(Ostrom 1990, 102).

Predicting Institutional Change
The second piece in Ostrom’s theory is a list of predictive factors:
1. Most appropriators share a common judgment that they will be harmed if they do
not adopt an alternative rule.
2. Most appropriators will be affected in similar ways by the proposed rule changes.
3. Most appropriators highly value the continuation activities from this CPR; in
other words, they have low discount rates.
4. Appropriators face relatively low information, transformation, and enforcement
costs.
5. Most appropriators share generalized norms of reciprocity and trust that can be
used as initial social capital.
6. The group appropriating from the CPR is relatively small and stable.
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As Ostrom’s research has progressed, this list has evolved. In Gibson et al. 2000, the list
of predictive factors for sustainable forestry management included:
1. Salience:
Users are dependent on the forest for a major portion of their livelihood (or for
other variables of importance to them).
2. Common understanding:
Users have a shared image of the forest and how their actions affect each other
and the forest
3. Discount rate:
Most users have a sufficiently low discount rate in relation to future benefits to be
achieved from the forest.
4. Trust and reciprocity:
Users trust one another to keep promises and relate to one another with
reciprocity
5. Autonomy:
Users are able to determine access and harvesting rules without external
authorities counterdemanding them.

Finally, in a 2004 International Food Policy Research Institute brief, Ostrom includes
these attributes:
1. Agreement by the involved individuals that the problem at hand is important.
2. The degree of autonomy a group has to take collective action on its own or within
a nested institutional setting.
3. Secure property rights.
4. Participants must also have some level of trust in the reliability of others and be
willing to use broad strategies of reciprocity.
5. Prior organizational experience & presence of supportive local leaders.

The following is a discussion of the most current list.

1. Agreement by the involved individuals that the problem at hand is important.
Individuals must share the idea that they will be worse off if they do not adopt a new rule
or set of rules. “At first this characteristic sounds trivial, but it is not. Government
agencies frequently complain that local populations do not perceive collective action
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problems as either relevant to their concerns or within their abilities to address” (Ostrom
2004, 1).

2. The degree of autonomy a group has to take collective action on its own or within
a nested institutional setting.
Indeed, collective action can prove to be dangerous for the participants. “In a highly
authoritarian regime, independent action is perceived as threatening to the center.
Individuals who have lived in such regimes for long periods of time are always nervous
about independent action, even when assured that the regime has changed” (Ostrom
2004, 1).

3. Secure property rights.
Ostrom argues that those who have been successful in overcoming collective action
problems typically have a lower discount rate in regard to the particular situation at hand.
In other words, they value the future and, therefore, exiting is not a viable short-term
option. Resource users with a higher discount rate lack the motivation to commit time
and effort to creating a healthy, long-term governance system.
These individuals [with a low discount rate] live side by side and farm the
same plots year after year. They expect their children and their
grandchildren to inherit their land. In other words, their discount rates are
low. If costly investments in provision are made at one point in time, the
proprietors—or their families—are likely to reap the benefits (Ostrom
2004, 1).
Holding secure property rights, Ostrom argues, is the key ingredient in reinforcing low
discount rates and the long-term perspective.

4. Participants must also have some level of trust in the reliability of others and be
willing to use broad strategies of reciprocity.
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Ostrom doesn’t elaborate, but simply says, “If participants fear that others are going to
take advantage of them, no one will wish to initiate costly actions only to find that others
are not reciprocating” (Ostrom 2004, 2). I will further discuss trust in the inequality
section.

5. Prior organizational experience & presence of supportive local leaders.
Ostrom tags these two factors as mechanisms for reducing the transaction costs of solving
collective action problems. The costs associated with market transactions—information
gathering, bargaining, coordinating, monitoring, and enforcement—all apply to solving
problems of the commons (and to cooperatives). Ostrom has found that the two
fundamental ways to minimize transaction costs are ensuring organizational experience in
the leadership as well as the existence of support from community leaders.
Unfortunately, she does not explain how effective leadership is accomplished. This is
probably easier said than done.

Critiquing Ostrom: Inequality, Rational Choice, and Collective Action
This dissertation is founded on the conviction that the majority of mainstream economists
have failed to understand and portray the economy and society adequately.
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The power

of the mainstream school to dominate policy and popular rhetoric is not benign, and can
be damaging to human and environmental well-being.
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Heterodox economics is an umbrella term for a range of economic theoretical and methodological
approaches—institutional, Marxian, Post-Keynesian, feminist, Austrian, evolutionary, ecological, and so
forth. The essential element that links all of these, often contradictory, approaches—and defines their place
in the heterodox tradition—is their explicit objection to mainstream economics.
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Heterodox economist Neva Goodwin (2008) states that “in graduate school I was told
that ‘economics is about equity and efficiency: we don’t really know how to deal with
equity, so we will focus on efficiency.’ The outer circle [heterodox economists], as I see
it, includes those economists who reject that conclusion, who are at least as concerned
with equity as with efficiency” (Goodwin 2008, 38). Heterodox economics takes equity
seriously, and addresses one of the foundational premises of mainstream economics—the
alleged tradeoff between efficiency and equity.
Ostrom’s Nobel Prize win is a promising recognition of the need to combat the
ideological dominance of neoclassical economics. Ostrom’s framework, however, does
not push the boundaries of the mainstream far enough; it is severely lacking any analysis
of power disparities, and other forms of inequality, which is a primary focus of many, if
not most, heterodox economists.
In a 2010 symposium
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of distinguished political scientists that was formed to

understand and critique Ostrom’s work in response to her Nobel win, Margaret Levi
argues,
Ostrom does […] incorporate issues of power into her analysis, but it is
the power to enforce […] By largely considering societies in which the
power differences are relatively small and where the most important
conflicts are often between higher levels of government and local
communities, she does not go as far as she might in identifying
inequalities of power (Levi 2010, 574).
One of the predominant criticisms heterodox economists have of the mainstream’s
rational-choice theory is its complete lack of awareness of the presence of power
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The title of the symposium was “Beyond the Tragedy of the Commons. A Discussion of Governing the
Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action.”
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disparities that distort individual decisions and market outcomes (See Folbre 1983 for this
critique within the realm of economic fertility models).
Indeed, neither Ostrom’s “broadened” rationality, which is the behaviorial foundation
of her theory, nor the theory itself, provides a discussion of the ways in which power
disparities manifest across wealth and social structures to impact individual-level
decisions and collective action outcomes. As Fine (2010) argues, Ostrom’s “theoretical
points of reference” might not conform to “the cruder forms of rational choice” (Fine
2010, 538), but she still conforms to its neglect of the role of power in the economy.
Since Ostrom wrote Governing the Commons, the research on the merits of
community-level natural-resource management has been growing (Jodha 1986; Baland
and Platteau 1996; Leach et al. 1999 to name a few). Along with these studies, however,
are the scholars, heterodox economists included, who have been voicing their concerns
that decentralized approaches to natural resource management tend to neglect issues of
inequality. This concern has gradually become a stronger theme in the collective action
literature,
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and has centered on whether inequality is instrumentally good or bad for

collective action.
Olson (1965) himself addressed this question, arguing that inequality promotes
cooperation among groups by increasing the opportunity for the wealthy few to obtain
enough benefit of the public good to be willing to provide it, regardless of free-riders.
Wade (1988) made the argument that a wealthy and powerful minority in the group
can be particularly effective in leadership roles and are likely to have the political
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Culminating in an impressive edited volume by Baland, Bardhan, and Bowles (2007)
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connections that others will lack. This argument is especially relevant, as Ostrom does
not address how effective leadership is best achieved.
On the other side are those who argue inequality within CPR institutions has the
undesirable effect of only being reproduced and expanded via the motion of collective
action. Agarwal (2006) calls this “participatory exclusion:” the idea that “new
institutions built on a bedrock of pre-existing inequalities can further entrench those
inequalities” challenging our “notions of communities as benign institutions” (Agarwal
2006, 6).
For example, according to Beteille (1983), access to local common-property in Indian
villages is determined by caste position, which further perpetuates this social division.
Hildyard et al. (1998) argued that more powerful groups enjoy “structural dominance” in
collective forest management. Finally, Agarwal (2006) argued that not only are women
typically excluded from decision-making in forest communities, but their gendered
division of labor means they have a profound stake in the sustainability of the resource as
well as a deep knowledge of it. Thus, gender inequality undermines the efficiency of the
community management of the resource because women’s possession of decision-making
38

power can make dramatic improvements in environmental outcomes.

Disturbingly, this

duality is “unfolding across the globe—in the Amazon, in Africa, and most especially in
the forests of India and Nepal” (Agarwal 2006, 3).

Trust and Inequality
38

Boyce’s (2003) finding that power inequities can exacerbate environmental degradation complements
Agarwal’s result. “The extent of pollution and resource depletion is shaped by the distribution of power:
the greater the power of the winners vis-à-vis the losers, the greater the extent of environmental
degradation. Hence a solution requires a more equitable distribution of power” (Boyce 2003, 12).
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Returning to Ostrom’s theory, all is most certainly not lost. The entry-point within her
framework in which we can think about the impact of inequality on collective action is
via her emphasis on the social underpinnings of trust and reciprocity.
Ostrom, with Janssen (2007), defines trust as follows:
While many definitions of trust exist, all involve a trustor extending
something of value to a trustee based on an assumption that the trustee
will reciprocate the faith that the trustee has extended. A core aspect of
most definitions of trust is the ‘intention to accept vulnerability based
upon positive expectations of the intentions of the behavior of another
(Janssen and Ostrom 2007, 67).
Again quoting Levi (2010), however, “[Ostrom] does not go as far as she might in
identifying inequalities of power that inhibit trust and constraints on that power, which
might facilitate trust” (Levi 2010, 574). True, but in the Janssen and Ostrom (2007)
piece, she does at least hint at a link between inequality and the presence of trust in
writing that, along with factors like available information and repeated interaction (in a
game setting), “the identity and homogeneity of the individuals involved all appear to
affect the level of trust” (Janssen and Ostrom 2007, 69).
Levi cites Henry Farrell’s recent work (2004), which distinguishes amongst modest
and extreme power asymmetries. In the former, trust is often present and possibly even
fostered by minor differences in power. In the latter instance, trust is essentially
impossible to obtain. Cardenas (2007) writes that “heterogeneous groups may find it
more difficult to cooperate if, for instance, there are wealth distances in the group that
limit the possibility of getting group communication to be effective for building trust,
cooperation, and a commonly shared goal” (Cardenas 2007, 229).

Inequality and Cooperatives
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The body of research on inequality and collective action typically focuses on the
instrumental aspects of inequality, i.e. the way it functions to impact collective action
outcomes. What is important to note in the case of cooperatives is that inequality is also
intrinsically problematic. For cooperatives, inequality in any of its potential dimensions
(economic and social) is contradictory to the underlying philosophy (at least for the
cooperatives that adhere to the principles the ICA has set forth and those that interact
with the global justice movement) and undermines the development goals they have set
out to achieve.
There are very few studies exploring how inequality impacts cooperatives. The most
prominent is a piece by Banerjee et al. (2001) in which they find that increased
heterogeneity of landholdings (amongst 100 sugar cooperatives in Maharashtra) causes
productive inefficiency by causing a lower input price and a lower level of production
capacity.
Another piece by Mayoux (1993) analyzes the role that Nicaraguan agricultural
cooperatives play in empowering women. Despite the fact that women have been
encouraged to participate in farmers cooperatives by the Nicaraguan government, gender
issues have been generally ignored in national cooperative policy and, not surprisingly,
women’s empowerment via-a-vis cooperatives is insufficient, especially considering
existing roles of production, which include “childcare responsibilities, the heavy burden
of housework, and husband’s opposition limited women’s involvement” (Mayoux 1993,
67). And Lodhia (2009) documents the fact that in many countries in Asia and Pacific
the participation of women in cooperative leadership positions has not occurred despite
efforts of policymakers, academics, and NGOs.
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Bringing the discussion back to trust, Jones (2004) argues that trust is a mechanism
by which wealth inequality positively affects cooperatives’ efforts. “Specifically, the
presence of perceived economic differences between members of small agricultural
cooperatives in northwest Ecuador’s agricultural frontier encourages trust in the wealthy,
thus facilitating coop development during the initial stage of cooperative formation”
(Jones 2004, 691). But such inequality may later undermine cooperative efforts. Jones
does not argue this, but one reason for this later effect may be that the poorer members
expect their income and asset levels to rise (relative to the wealthier members) through
cooperative participation. If and when this does not happen, members have less incentive
to be active.

Conclusion
Ostrom’s theory makes a substantial contribution to understanding how groups overcome
their collective action problems. Her methodology should be lauded and used as an
example, especially for heterodox economists. However, her lack of attention to how
inequality functions to impact collective action outcomes is problematic, especially for
the purposes of this dissertation. Inequality, particular gender inequality, is an important
issue in Oromia’s coffee cooperatives. How the theoretical framework should contend
with that is something this dissertation will address in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 5

CASE STUDY PART 1: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COFFEE

All of the major issues of the twenty-first century—globalization, immigration, women’s
rights, pollution, indigenous rights, and self-determination—are being played out through
[a] cup of coffee, in villages and remote areas around the world (Cycon 2007, viiii)

Introduction
The movie Black Gold, produced and directed by British filmmakers Nick and Marc
Francis (2006), tracks the massive coffee industry from gatherings of Master Cuppers to
the New York Board of Trade to the virescent highlands of western and southern
Ethiopia, the reputed birthplace of coffee. The movie features Tadesse Meskela, general
manager of the Oromia Coffee Farmers Cooperative Union (OCFCU) in Ethiopia and
follows him over the course of three years as he visits Oromia coffee farmers, travels to
London to meet with buyers, and attends the 17th Annual Specialty Coffee Association of
America conference in Seattle—all in a single-minded quest to generate business outside
of the volatile market for coffee as a mass commodity.
Black Gold brings to staggering visual form the deep fissures that split the coffee
world: the image of the western consumer drinking her daily grande latte juxtaposed with
the malnourished and uneducated children of Ethiopia’s coffee farmers; the image of
New York traders betting on fluctuations in the price of coffee (the very fluctuations that
pushed these coffee farmers into such dire poverty); and the footage of a WTO meeting
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where marginalized representatives of developing countries battle to abolish egregiously
unfair trade policies.
Since its release in 2006, US showings of Black Gold at independent theatres,
colleges and community libraries are creating a broad awareness of the economic plight
of the world’s coffee farmers, as well as of the new trade paradigms that are gradually
building momentum. Fair Trade, the “third wave,” direct trade, organic certification, and
so forth are all part of a broad attempt to harness the power of coffee cooperatives by
developing alternative pathways to global commodity chains. However, as these trade
alternatives—especially Fair Trade—develop, there is much debate about the trajectory
that will be most beneficial to coffee farmers, their families, and their communities.
This chapter provides a detailed picture of the global coffee industry, including its
early history, its policy narrative, and the uneven impacts of the coffee crisis on coffee
farmers and coffee producing countries. It then describes in detail Daviron and Ponte’s
(2005) concept of the “Coffee Paradox” and their framework of material, symbolic, and
in-person service attributes that we will use to define the collective action of Oromia’s
coffee cooperatives. I then describe the prominent alternative trade paradigm being
developed in response to the coffee crisis, as well as the mainstreaming debate brewing
within Fair Trade about its trajectory and how it can be most beneficial to coffee farmers.
Finally, I further specify the nature of collective action for coffee farmer cooperatives,
which relates to the mainstreaming debate.
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The History and Policies of the Global Coffee Industry
The Early History of Coffee
Coffee is an ancient global commodity—one of the world's oldest. Common lore
pinpoints its origins to the verdant highlands of Ethiopia over fifteen hundred years ago.
As the story goes: when a herder named Kaldi came across his goats dancing, he realized
that the source of their frenzy was the bright red “cherries” hanging from an unfamiliar
bush. Kaldi took the cherries to a nearby monastery, where the monks confirmed that,
whatever this plant was, it had a powerful, magical effect on humans as well as goats
(Cycon 2007).
The Abyssinians were creative in using bunn (their word for coffee). They initially
chewed the beans and leaves, but eventually moved on to brewing tea, grinding the beans
with animal fat for energy, and making wine—kisher—from fermented pulp (Pendergrast
1999).
The coffee trade began when the beans found their way across the Red Sea to Yemen,
around the the sixth century. The Yemenis were the first to roast coffee beans. It was not
until the Ottomans occupied Yemen in the mid-sixteenth century, however, that longer
trade routes developed—beginning at Yemen’s port of Mocha—and coffee and coffee
plants were transported to the rest of the Arab world, and then to Europe, Asia, and the
39

Americas (Pendergrast 1999).
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Coffee consumption was introduced in Europe (via the coffeehouse) in the seventeenth century; the first
coffee trees had been introduced in the New World in the eighteenth century; and coffee arrived in Latin
America in the nineteenth century (Pendergrast 1999).
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The Regulatory Era: the International Coffee Agreements
By the nineteenth century, the world trade in coffee had risen dramatically, and with it
the inherent price volatility of the global coffee market. This volatility prompted the
formation of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) in 1965. The ICA (1965-1989)
was an intergovernmental agreement among producing and consuming countries,
designed to stabilize market prices by setting export quotas. “The aim was to keep the
price of coffee relatively high and relatively stable, within a price band or ‘corset’
ranging from $1.20 to $1.40/pound” (Petchers and Harris 2008, 44). Producers
controlled their supplies by stockpiling coffee, destroying it, and selling it at lower prices
40

to non-ICO member countries, namely Soviet-block and developing countries.

When

prices rose above the agreed ceiling level, they were able to export above their quota
limits to member countries.
According to Petchers and Harris (2008), producer countries found the ICA agreeable
because prices remained generally high and stable throughout the quarter century the ICA
was in place. Daviron and Ponte (2005) characterize the ICA regime as relatively
successful for several reasons. First, both producer and consumer countries negotiated
the quota system (not very common in commodity regulation). Second, governments of
producing countries had a certain level of control in export decisions. Last, Brazil, the
largest exporter, accepted its shrinking market share, which was a direct result of the ICA
agreements.
The International Coffee Agreement, however, was also beset with problems that
40

Not always made explicit, an underlying motivation of the ICA was the Cold War. During a Senate
Committee on Finance discussing the U.S. ratification of the 1962 ICA, Wendell Rollason of a Miami antiCastro Organization said of Latin American farmers, “They seek a piece of land, a steady job, a full belly, a
child’s education...It is going to be us or the Russians. It’s that simple” (Pendergrast 1999, 278-79).

72

eventually overwhelmed it. The quotas were extremely costly to negotiate—partly
because members squabbled over what they should be—and hence they often remained
unchanged even when consumption varied. This undermined the participation by
roasters, who could get coffee from non-members at lower prices (Daviron and Ponte
2005). This, along with the waning of United States Cold War concerns in Latin
America, the ICA was eventually abandoned by its major supporters—the roasters, the
small producer countries, and the U.S. government—and it was dissolved in 1989.
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The Global (South) Coffee Crisis
In 2001, twelve years after the ICA ended, coffee prices in real terms fell to 100-year
lows, causing devastation for farmers and coffee-exporting countries all over the global
South. The standard explanation of the cause of the coffee crisis was oversupply caused
by several factors: the aforementioned breakdown of the ICA; the increasing presence of
Vietnam as a coffee producer; and an industry-wide trend of overproduction.
According to Prince (2002), in the early 1990s Vietnam was producing about 90,000
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tons per year of Robusta —very low quality Robusta. “There's good robusta, and not so
good robusta—Vietnam had stuff that was just about the worst robusta you could grow,”
akin to drinking a cup of “burning rubber” (Prince 2002, 1). Nevertheless, with the help
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By 1994, the International Coffee Organization (ICO), the formal organization associated with the ICA,
had essentially become an industry promotion group.
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There are two primary commodity futures markets—located in New York, New York Board of Trade,
and London, London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange—that determine global prices
for coffee. The New York market represents Arabica beans; London, robusta beans. Arabica beans are
considered to be of higher quality. Robusta beans are lower quality, have a higher caffeine content, have a
more bitter flavor and are generally used as filler for blends.
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of loans from the World Bank, government provision of cleared and irrigated land,
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subsidies to encourage farmers into coffee, loans by “the big 4” (Nestle, Kraft, Sara Lee,
and Proctor and Gamble), and the implementation of new techniques that lowered
production costs on plantations, by 2000 Vietnam had become the world’s second-largest
producer of coffee (after Brazil)—producing close to a million tons, an eleven-fold
increase in ten years. Again, “quality of product was not a concern—maximum profits
and yields were” (Prince 2002).
Vietnam’s surge in coffee production was matched by a broader industry trend of
oversupply in the 1990s. For example, production increased in India, Uganda,
Guatemala, and Ethiopia by 20 to 30 percent, while Brazil had a bumper crop in the
1998-99 growing season (Luttinger and Dicum 2006). Some of this increase was caused
by structural adjustment policies that demanded developing countries service their debts
through increased exports. “With so many of the coffee-producing nations in the same
straits, these demands only worsened the worldwide glut, driving countries deeper into
debt they were even less able to pay” (Luttinger and Dicum 2006, 101).
The result of Vietnam’s ascendancy as a top producer of coffee and the industry-wide
production increases was that the price of coffee fell to historic lows. By 1999, the
“coffee crisis”—a five year period of record-low coffee prices—had begun.
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What

ensued was nothing short of a disaster for coffee producing countries and farmers across
the global South.
The impacts of the coffee crisis have been long-lasting. “National economies are
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The country cleared 300,000 acres of forestland to plant.
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The “C” price did not rise above a dollar per pound for six years until poor weather hit Brazil and
Vietnam.
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suffering and some banks are collapsing. Government funds are being squeezed dry,
putting pressure on health and education and forcing governments further into debt”
(Mayne et al. 2002, 2). Coffee farmers, the majority already living at the edges of
poverty, plunged even deeper:
Families dependent on the money generated by coffee are pulling their
children, especially girls, out of school. They can no longer afford basic
medicines, and are cutting back on food. Beyond farming families, coffee
traders are going out of business (Mayne et al. 2002, 2).
Farmers had little protection or support at the national or local level, as coffee boards,
extension services, and other mechanisms had been dismantled during the deregulatory
era under pressure from neoliberal policies.

The Coffee Paradox
According to Daviron and Ponte (2005), while the global South was experiencing a
coffee crisis, the global North was having a “coffee boom.”
The coffee market has gone through a ‘latte revolution,’ where consumers
can choose from (and pay dearly for) hundreds of combinations of coffee
variety, origin, brewing, and grinding methods, flavoring, packaging,
‘social content’, and ambience. Retail coffee prices continue to rise in the
specalty market […] At the same time, coffee farmers receive prices
below the cost of production (Daviron and Ponte 2005, xvi).
Daviron and Ponte call this “the Coffee Paradox.” They argue that a typical way to
understand the dynamics of market power in the coffee industry (and in primary markets
in general) is by defining the growing gap between the price of the raw product (“green”
coffee beans) and the final product as “oligopolistic rents captured by an increasingly
concentrated roasting industry” (Daviron and Ponte 2005, xvii). As an alternative, they
suggest that “the Coffee Paradox” is better understood in terms of who controls “the
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ability to define the ‘identity’ of a coffee—in other words to set the language and the
reference values that determine production norms and quality standards” (xvii). In other
words, market power is not just a question of market share but of “capturing the most
valuable attributes while underming the value of the attributes that need to be purchased”
(Daviron and Ponte 2005, xvii).
Daviron and Ponte categorize coffee’s attributes into three groups: material,
symbolic, and in-person service.

Material Quality
Material quality is based on official grade standards and includes color, size, shape,
moisture content, number of defects, presence of disease or mold, etc. These are called
“objective parameters” by the coffee industry and can be measured by the senses and by
machines that separate and sort coffee beans. Mainstream or commodity coffee (coffee
traded on the New York and London exchanges) is evaluated in producing countries
solely in terms of material quality.

Symbolic Quality
Symbolic quality is developed through branding, packaging, retailing, and consumption.
These are based on reputation, signaled through methods like trademarks and
45

geographical indications, often protected by intellectual property rights.
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Daviron and Ponte argue that the main difference between brands and indications lies in the collective
nature of property for the latter. Labels are awarded to products provided by enterprises or organizations
that meet specific criteria. They are also protected, to some degree as intellectual property, but are in
principle open to all actors who can match their criteria” (Daviron and Ponte 2005, 128).
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symbolic attributes do not play an important role in a producer country, its coffee is
nothing more than a primary commodity crop to be processed and consumed elsewhere.

In-Person Service Quality
In-person service quality is a “product of interpersonal relations between
producers/providers and consumers”. These attributes are about not only the quality of a
physical transformation, but a quality of the “affective work” (Daviron and Ponte 2005,
128). This can include the interactions between consumers, the expertise of the barista,
and the ambience of the coffee shop, or even the particular language used by coffee
chains like Starbucks.

Alternative Trade Paradigms
In response to the coffee crisis, there has been a broad movement to develop new trade
paradigms in the coffee world. The most well-known of these is Fair Trade.

Fair Trade
The aim of the Fair Trade system is to directly connect producers in the global South with
consumers in the North, while ensuring that small-scale farmers earn a price that is
46

reflective of the cost of production.

In turn, the farmers comply with established

economic, social, and environmental requirements, one of the main standards being that
only producer cooperatives, defined as formally organized groups of farmers, are eligible
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There are a variety of Fair Trade products, including crafts and textiles as well as food commodities like
banana, sugar, rice, nuts, tea, as well as coffee.
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for Fair Trade certification and they, in turn, must follow specific guidelines, such as
following democratic decision-making processes.
The Fair Trade movement started in Europe in the late 1950s as missionary church
groups began importing textiles and hand-made crafts from developing countries. In the
1960s, “world shops” began to sell these wares with the goal that the artists and
producers get a better price than what they received from intermediaries in the traditional
commodity chain (Conroy 2006).
As these grassroots efforts progressed, the movement became more organized and
both the Dutch Max Haavelar Foundation and Transfair International in Germany began
developing specific standards for selling these goods. In 1998, these organizations
merged and established the Fairtrade Labeling Organizations international (FLO), an
international Fair Trade certifying body with over 24 associative national organizations in
the global North, including Transfair USA—the sole US FLO certifier (FLO International
2010).
For Fair Trade coffee, certification occurs for the two main groups: the producers,
and the importers or buyers. Fair Trade eliminates the middlemen in the typical coffee
commodity chain, and requires that coffee importers pay coffee cooperatives $1.31 per
1

pound of coffee and $1.51 per pound of organic coffee. The importers also required, if
requested by the producer organization, to pre-finance 60% of the contract value, which
helps prevent farmers from incurring debt.
In exchange, coffee farmers are required to comply with the following rules: only
coffee cooperatives of small farmers are eligible for certification; the cooperatives must
“have a democratic structure and transparent administration, which enables an effective
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control by the members and its Board over the management”; they “must not discriminate
regarding membership and participation;” they must meet a set of specific environmental
standards; and they must direct ten cents from each pound of Fair Trade certified coffee
1
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to the cooperative as a whole (Fairtrade Labelling Organization 2007).

Fair Trade is not without its controversies. As the system grows and adopts more
formal rules and practices, there is arising a “mainstreaming” debate that separates those
whose main aim is to expand the Fair Trade market and those who are concerned that this
kind of growth is diminishing the relationship qualities that are the philosophical
underpinnings of the system.
Proponents of Fair Trade “mainstreaming” (a.k.a. the “market niche camp”) argue
that this induces the steady growth of Fair Trade demand, which can only be beneficial to
impoverished coffee farmers. The simple reality is that coffee farmers need a steady
demand for their coffee, and an expanding the Fair Trade market is essential for that to
happen.
Opponents argue that mainstreaming is eroding the integrity of support that existed
for indigenous and peasant farmers and their struggle for political and economic rights
within the context of their nation states. “Active and explicit engagement with the
politics of solidarity and social justice for producers in the global South is being
dissipated” (Goodman 2008). This kind of advocacy diminishes as a more standardized
system implements regimented visits of unknown Fair Trade inspectors only once
annually.
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After voting to decide how to allocate their funds, many cooperatives use the “social premium”, as it’s
called, to build community schools, clinics, roads and bridges, and coffee producing infrastructure.

79

Moreover, as the Fair Trade system expands and corporate roasters enter the market,
the activist side argues that these buyers are out of touch with coffee farmers. According
to Dean Cycon, owner of a small 100% Fair Trade and organic coffee roaster, “Green
Mountain doesn’t even know where 50% of their coffee comes from”
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(Cycon 2006, 1).

He argues that according to Green Mountain Coffee’s own website, in 2003 only 10% of
their coffee was Fair Trade certified.
Another worry is the deluge of certification schemes that have hit the specialty coffee
market and the concern that this saturation weakens the Fair Trade standards of social and
economic justice and environmental sustainability. Some of these certification schemes
have been instituted by large-scale coffee companies accused of “greenwashing.”
Starbucks’s C.A.F.E. (Coffee and Farmer Equity) practices and Utz Kapeh
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are

examples of these alternative certification programs. Starbucks maintains its own
certification practices, which critics find problematic because it erases the objectivity of
third-party monitoring. Utz Kapeh was developed in 1997 by Ahold, a Dutch food retail
giant, with Guatemalan coffee producers, and is generally considered less strict than Fair
Trade’s criteria (Courville 2008). Furthermore, both Starbucks and Utz Kapeh use a pure
premium model, meaning they pay a premium above the “C” price, rather than using a
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A Vermont-based coffee roaster that supplies Newman’s Own Organics coffee line.
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Another potential problem is that behemoth companies like Nestle and Starbucks are becoming “Fair
Trade companies”, but are only selling a miniscule portion of their coffee as Fair Trade. Thus they engage
in a form of “greenwashing” in which a company takes credit for environmental or social virtue that is
essentially unjustified. The worry is that consumers will buy from these companies, thinking that they are
supporting Fair Trade, when they are actually only diluting the much needed consumer demand for Fair
Trade.
50

“Utz Kapeh” means good coffee in the Mayan Quiche [remember to add accent on e] language
(Courville 2008).
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price floor (as Fair Trade does). This allows for the possibility that the price farmers earn
could be well below their production costs.
Advocates of mainstreaming often argue that it is too simplistic to view corporate
involvement in Fair Trade as a greenwashing ploy (Grodnik and Conroy 2007). Instead it
reflects the ways that companies are shifting their emphasis to social and environmental
accountability, in part due to consumer demand and in part to cultural changes within
companies stemming from employee pressure. Green Mountain has moved from
resistance to Fair Trade to embracing dual-certified organic and Fair Trade coffee, which
is becoming its fastest growing sales sector (Grodnik and Conroy 2007).
As Fair Trade shifts to the mainstream, activists, scholars, and coffee buyers are
moving beyond it to preserve that original goal of building relationships between
producers and consumers. Some call this the “third-wave,” out of which a new system
called “direct trade” is brewing.

The Third Wave of Coffee
After you break the crust, inhale its fragrance. Write down the sort of
aromas you smell….Stir the coffee very gently to lull the grounds to the
bottom. Now take a spoonful, take another sniff, and slurp quickly to
aerate ….
Brooklyn, NY January 2008
So went the instructions given at my first coffee cupping, held by Counter Culture Coffee
at one of several “third wave” coffee shops around New York City in 2008. "Use your
memories to draw out the subtle perfumes and flavors." I thought back to my childhood
backyard in Minnesota, pretending to taste prairie grass and crabapple; others claimed
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spelt flour, watermelon Jolly Ranchers, seaweed, and rubber gloves. Clearly, at least at
our amateur level, this was not an exact science.
The recent manifestation of coffee cuppings–long the domain of professional “master
cuppers”–offers aspiring connoisseurs a chance to explore and compare the
characteristics of coffees from the different growing regions in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America. Coffee aficionados claim that the subtle and complex features of a coffee come
from the environmental characteristics of its particular region, much the way wine’s
celebrated terroir or appellation system produces grapes with their own distinguishable
features. Coffee cuppings offer an opportunity to explore the delicate regional variations
that make a Jamaican Blue Mountain or Tanzanian Peaberry so unique.
The “third wave of coffee” is a burgeoning movement within the specialty coffee
industry that elevates coffee making to new heights, and is largely responsible for making
coffee cuppings a public forum. If the first wave of coffee was Chock Full o’Nuts and
Folgers freeze-dried instant breakfast blend—coffee in a can—and the second wave was
half-caf skinny lattes with a double shot of sugar-free hazelnut syrup, the third wave is
something else entirely.
Baristas, tired of pumping candied coffee drinks that no longer taste like coffee, are
refining their work into craftsmanship. Their efforts, formalized into the Barista Guild of
America, involve perfecting techniques for steaming milk to a silky microfoam,
extracting honey-thick espresso shots topped with caramel-shaded crèma and, more
philosophically, the promotion of coffee preparation as the art and science of brewing a
perfect cup. The third wave has resulted in exuberant sales for contraptions like the
Clover and the Japanese siphon bar, both reputed to brew transcendent single cups to
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order with machine prices ranging between ten and twenty thousand dollars. This is no
freeze-dried breakfast blend.
Beneath the obsession—or even fetishism—of coffee’s third wave is something more
than innovative latte art or the strongest pistons and levers for extracting espresso. By
emphasizing the importance of coffee’s origins, the third wave is also emphasizing the
relationship between specialty coffee buyers and the coffee farmers at the origin.
John Moore of Counter Culture Coffee, the organization responsible for many of the
public coffee cuppings in New York (as well as in DC and its base in Durham, North
Carolina) describes his company’s “relationship-based business model” as identifying
unique, high-quality coffees and working directly with the growers as well as customers
to help them perceive the special characteristics of their coffee. “It’s the reason we cup
the way we do” (Moore 2008). Meaning, they don’t just organize public cuppings for
coffee drinkers, but also hold tastings with the coffee farmers.
This is critical because most growers do not know the attributes of coffee that are
prized by consumers; indeed, some do not drink coffee at all. These cuppings, according
to Moore, help the coffee farmers develop a palate for the beverage, which in turn helps
them design growing methods that enhance distinct aromas, mouthfeel, and flavor
profiles that the company and farmers identify together.
Illy, an Italian espresso company that has expanded from its humble origins in the
1930s to become a massive international company that sells to over 130 countries, buys
directly from the source. According to Ernest Illy, interviewed in Black Gold, “We
purchase a coffee that is special, a lot that you cannot exchange with any other lot, which
is unique, so this is something that does not belong to the kind of negotiation that is made
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in New York. New York is commodity, we don’t purchase commodity” (Black Gold
2006).
Along with ensuring supreme coffees, third-wave’s relationship-based business
51

model also focuses on farmer empowerment and building livelihoods.

Many third-

wave coffee roasters operate within the direct trade certification system. Stumptown, a
Portland-based coffee roaster that participates in direct trade believes that quality and
fairness go hand-in-hand. The company, like Counter Culture, shares its ideas about
production methods with coffee farmers, which they argue ensures better quality and
empowers producers to have more of a stake in their own success. Furthermore,
Stumptown guarantees premiums paid out at the farm level for coffees
with the Direct Trade logo on the bag. We’d be happy to show you
verifiable documentation proving it. It’s about great coffee here at
Stumptown, but it’s also about forming and nurturing relationships with
coffee farmers in the producing world that have become our friends.
Is there a greater satisfaction than knowing you’re about to release a
coffee worthy of philosophical conversation while simultaneously doing
what’s right, at a uniquely innovative level, with the folks who created the
experience? Perhaps only by drinking it in… (Stumptown 2010)

Framing the Collective Action of Coffee Cooperatives
Across the global South, basic patterns have emerged in the ways that farmers have
responded to the coffee crisis. Some abandoned their farms and migrated to cities or
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Beyond coffee, Jaffe and Bacon (2008) see, in the plethora of certification programs that are developing,
a broader interest in developing alternative, locally-based food networks that are in direct opposition to the
conventional food system. One example, in the US, is the growing movement for the Japanese community
supported agriculture (CSA) model. CSAs are a system in which community members buy produce shares
from a local farmer, for which they receive food throughout the growing season but gives the farmer early
season revenues to purchase seeds, fertilizer, etc. (avoiding debt) and spreads the risk inherent in farming
among all the participants. It, of course, benefits the consumer by providing them with a consistent supply
of fresh, often organically grown, food.
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outside their home countries.

Some farmers ripped out their coffee plants and began

growing other crops, including illegal drugs. And others formed coffee farmer
cooperatives to build power and wealth in the face of a newly restructured coffee industry
and as a means to access the alternative trade paradigms that developed, and are still
developing, in the wake of the coffee crisis.
Daviron and Ponte’s (2005) conceptualization of coffee as a bundle of attributes is an
extremely useful way of understanding the nature of the collective action problems of
cooperatives. Put in terms of the globalization discussion of chapter 3, social distance
underlies the “Coffee Paradox.” If coffee is the aggregate of material, symbolic, and inperson service produced by different actors along the value chains, and market power is a
matter of capturing the most valuable of those attributes, the power disparity between
who controls the valuable attributes and who does not (or who controls less valuable
attributes) creates externalities—vis à vis price distortions—that create free-rider
problems. As I will discuss in detail in chapter 7, Ethiopia’s poor coffee farmers have
had little control over the valuable attributes of their highly reputed coffees, while cafè
chains like Starbucks have had considerable control. Thus, while Ethiopia’s coffee
farmers are receiving a price well-below the “true” value of their coffees, Starbucks is
selling them at a premium.
The objective of the coffee farmers is to internalize external benefits via cooperative
governance, in order to capture these valuable attributes for the purpose of ensuring their
own sustainable livelihoods. They can do this by not only accessing the existing
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In fact, some scholars argue that the coffee crisis is one of the main causes of the escalation of illegal
immigration from Mexico and Central America to the U.S.; “several Mexican coffee farmers were among
those who have died attempting to cross the U.S. border” (MacDowell 2005).
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attributes, but also by defining new ones that they can subsequently control. Coffee
cooperatives can, for example, help their member farmers enhance their coffees’ quality
by teaching them improved processing methods or can create symbolic attributes through
branding, packaging, and retailing. (In-person service attributes are more difficult to
appropriate by producers because, by definition, this occurs in the consuming country.) I
will discuss further examples from Ethiopia in chapter 7.
What role do the alternative trade paradigms have in this story? Daviron and Ponte
(2005) call Fair Trade a “sustainability label” and categorize it as symbolic. More
specifically, they describe Fair Trade, as well as labels like certified organic, as processoriented standards that signal to consumers which products conform to specific criteria.
Organic certification defines the characteristics of inputs whereas Fair Trade articulates
the rules regarding the way decisions are made and income streams are partitioned.
Daviron and Ponte, and others (see Weber 2007) argue that the main problem with
sustainability labels is that the markets for them are small. Because there is such a small
market for these labels, accessing these attributes is difficult. The cooperatives that tend
to gain access are those who can afford the certification process. This perpetuates
inequality among coffee farmers—in this case, between rather than within cooperatives—
translating income inequality into disparity in the access to the value derived by
sustainability labels.
The critique that can be drawn directly from their analysis is that certification labels
do not necessarily change the power relations of the global coffee trade. While the
mainstreaming advocates argue for expanding the market, Daviron and Ponte’s
framework suggests that the same multinational coffee conglomerates that benefit from
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“the Coffee Paradox” can also benefit from expansion of the market for the labels,
without giving coffee farmers much added value. I would add that many farmers feel no
sense of ownership over the governance process of Fair Trade, in part because so few
serve within FLO’s decision-making bodies (Cycon 2006).
The “third wave” and “direct trade” were not very formed when Daviron and Ponte
(2005) articulated their framework. But this new paradigm arguably does more to
strengthen farmers’ power position in the coffee trade than the other labels, because it
operates at the material as well as symbolic level, thereby addressing a greater sum of
coffee attributes.
Stumptown, for example, helps farmers improve the material attributes of their coffee
by giving feedback and technical advice on several stages of the production process.
Through the joint cuppings, they also empower farmers and cooperatives to identify the
material attributes in their coffee, effectively giving them “the right to know” its value.

Conclusion
The “global” coffee crisis, in truth, is a misnomer. The dire impacts of the coffee crisis
stood in stark contrast to the vast growth in consumption of “grande lattes,” a
juxtaposition known as the “Coffee Paradox.” The extent to which Oromia coffee
cooperatives have been able to overcome their own experiences of the coffee crisis is
something Chapter 6 will seek to answer.
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CHAPTER 6

CASE STUDY PART 2: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE OROMIA COFFEE
FARMERS COOPERATIVE UNION

Introduction
Western minds generally associate Ethiopia with despairing images of famine and war, of
children’s swollen bellies and Soviet supplied AK-47s. To be sure, there are substantive
reasons for these stereotypes—Ethiopia has been mired in conflict for decades (with
Eritrea and Somalia and, within its borders, among its many ethnic groups) and Ethiopia
is one of the world’s poorest countries.
Despite Ethiopia’s overwhelming challenges, poverty and war are far from its only
narrative. Extraordinary demonstrations of collaboration, entrepreneurship,
determination, and hard work are also emerging. One such example is the Oromia Coffee
Farmers Cooperative Union (OCFCU), whose offices bustle with the commotion of
selling the world’s finest coffees to the world’s most caffeinated consumers.
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OCFCU

provides an inspiring story of farmers, once debilitated by the global coffee crisis’s deep
plunge in prices, working together to overcome their perennial hardships, access better
coffee markets, and give back to their communities.
The purpose of this chapter is to tell the story of OCFCU, which begins with the
sordid history of the country’s cooperatives, continues to the challenges and opportunities

53

Including the U.S., Japan, Australia and parts of Europe (Daviron and Ponte 2005).
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of Ethiopia’s coffee sector, and ends with the birth and growth of the most successful
cooperative union in the country.

The History of Ethiopia’s Cooperatives
Figure 1

Ethiopia’s First Cooperative Proclamation
PROCLAMATION No. 31 of 1975
“ETHIOPIA TIKDEM” (ETHIOPIA FIRST)
WHEREAS, in countries like Ethiopia where the economy is agricultural
a person’s right, honor, status, and standard of living is determined by his
relation to the land;
WHEREAS, several thousand gashas of land have been grabbed from
the masses by an insignificant number of feudal lords and their families as a
result of which Ethiopian masses have been forced to live under conditions of
serfdom;
WHEREAS, it is essential to fundamentally alter the existing agrarian
relations so that the Ethiopian peasant masses which have paid so much in
sweat as in blood to maintain an extravagant feudal class may be liberated
from age-old feudal oppression, injustice, poverty, and disease, and in order to
lay the basis upon which all Ethiopians may henceforth live in equality,
freedom, and fraternity;
WHEREAS, the development of Ethiopia of the future can be assured
not by permitting the exploitation of the many by the few as is now the case,
but only by instituting basic change in agrarian relations which would lay the
basis upon which, through work by cooperation, the development of one
becomes the development of all;
WHEREAS, in order to increase agricultural production and to make the
tiller the owner of the fruits of his labor, it is necessary to release the
productive forces of the rural economy by liquidating the feudal system under
which the nobility, aristocracy and a small number of persons with adequate
means of livelihood have prospered by the toil and sweat of the masses;
WHEREAS, it is necessary to provide work for all rural people;
WHEREAS, it is essential to abolish the feudal system in order to release
for industry the human labor suppressed within such system;
WHEREAS, it is necessary to narrow the gap in rural wealth and
income;
NOW, THEREFORE, […] it is hereby proclaimed…

The fact that cooperatives are having a resurgence in Ethiopia is, well, a marvel. The
Derg instituted cooperatives across the countryside as part of their land reform and for
54

constructing their particular brand of socialism.

By the time the Derg collapsed, in

1991, cooperative buildings had been looted, arsoned, and abandoned, and many
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History often credits the Derg with being the first to introduce cooperatives to Ethiopia. In fact, it was
Haille Gabre Sellasie’s regime (1930-1974) that was the first. But these were fairly limited in scope and
generally considered ineffective at enhancing agricultural productivity and generating income (Mengisteab
1989).
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cooperative organizers were thrown in jail. But not ten years later—thanks both to
remarkable efforts from new organizers who learned how cooperatives can successfully
function using democratic practices within a market system, and to the substantial
support of organizations, especially the International Labor Organization—cooperatives
are increasingly on the rise in Ethiopia.

Land Reform
Prior to the 1974 revolution that overthrew Haile Gabre Selassie (1930-1974), Ethiopia
has an extremely complex land tenure system. “In Welo Province, for example, there
were an estimated 111 types of land tenure” (Ofcansky and Berry 1993). By the mid1960s, Ethiopia’s land reform movement, led mainly by university students, argued that
the complex land tenure system was archaic and an obstacle to agricultural productivity
and rural development. The force of these arguments was central to the 1974 revolution,
and land reform was one of the first policies that the Derg instituted.
In 1975, the Derg initiated its land reform program, nationalizing all rural land
through proclamation No. 31. The “Proclamation to Provide for the Public Ownership of
Rural Lands” was considered one of the most radical of its kind at the time, on par with
China’s and South Korea’s.
According to Dessalegn (1984), by changing the system of landholdings, the Derg’s
land reform was intended to change the social profile of rural Ethiopia.
It has abolished landlordism, tenancy, the hiring of labor, and envisages a
self-laboring peasantry of small-holders, all of whom have only
possessory or usufructurary right over the land they cultivate. All land
resources and rural assets are ‘the collective property of the Ethiopian
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people’. In the rist areas, the abolition of recurrent land claims and
therefore of the ‘corporate’ family system […] is bound to have profound
social and familial implications. In the South, and especially the tenancy
areas, the elimination of landlordism, and the removal of ‘outsiders’ who
previously exercised control over the land of the indigenous population,
will do away with some of the causes of ethnic discontent which was
common in the past (Dessalegn 1984, 39).
The Derg also instituted land reform to foster agricultural productivity, which had
been mired in stagnancy. “The basis of this development is founded upon a new agrarian
order in which the independent smallholder will become the major force in rural
production” (Mengisteab 1989, 37).
Ethiopia’s land reform policies involved two specific processes: declaration of land
tenancy rights and the establishment of peasant associations. Specifically, the Derg’s
land reform proclamation of 1975 bestowed the right to own land to the state. Peasants
could not own, sell or transfer land, but they could claim use rights (usufruct rights) of a
maximum of ten hectares of arable land.
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The government mobilized 60,000 students to organize peasants into peasant
associations (PAs). The purpose of the PAs was to set in motion the provisions of the
land redistribution policies, as well as to coordinate and strengthen the peasantry. “These
rural organizations, which are open to all peasants, were to enable peasants to give up or
modify their isolated and scattered form of existence, and become involved in activities
of common concern and benefit” (Dessalegn 1984, 74).
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Dessalegn (1984) explains that, rather than the term “communal land,” the term “rist” is the technically
appropriate name for land collectively owned by kin. In this context, “rist rights” in a farming community
were held “if he was able to establish descent from one who was recognized to be the original holder of the
land in question or the founder of the community” (Dessalegn 1984, 17). Thus, what Dessalegn means by
“rist areas” are areas in Ethiopia predominated by the rist tenure structure. Ofcansky and Berry (1993)
further explain that the principle of rist rights exist mainly in the Amhara region, with some variation
among the Tigray.
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Peasants could inherit usufruct rights from family members.
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Each PA was assigned a minimum of 800 hectares of land to allocate (via usufruct
rights) to farmers. Land to be allocated came from those having more than the allowable
amount, commonly shared farmland, land left fallow or abandoned altogether, and
government-owned land (Engdawork 1995). Members of PAs included former tenants,
landless laborers, hired agricultural workers, and landowners holding fewer than 10 acres.
Former landowners who had held more than 10 hectares could join only after their land
was redistributed.
The land reform proclamation gave peasant associations a broad range of functions
and power:
[The PAs] general assembly is the highest decision-making authority, and
elects the leadership of all subsidiary bodies as well as its own executive
council. More importantly, PAs have assumed many of the functions of
the old local administrative apparatus of the previous regime. It is the PA
which is responsible for collecting taxes, resolving community conflicts,
providing services and maintaining law and order. The agrarian reform
has thus drastically restructured rural society, and promises the peasant the
opportunity to administer his own affairs (Dessalegn 1984, 39).
The peasant associations were also the main apparatus for organizing cooperatives in
Ethiopia.

Cooperatives
Between 1975 and 1981, the government issued several proclamations outlining specific
procedures for forming cooperatives. Proclamation 71/1975 targeted cooperatives as the
basis for socialist agriculture, introduced both types of cooperatives—service and
producer—and outlined their objectives, powers, and duties.
The service and producer cooperatives were designed to complement each other.
Service cooperatives were intended to teach socialist philosophy and the cooperative
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system for the purpose of raising the political consciousness of the peasantry. The
producer cooperatives collectivized individual land holdings and labor power, and thus
were seen as the primary mechanism for creating the Derg’s socialist economic system
(Dessalegn 1984).

Service Cooperatives
Beyond their function as a political apparatus, service cooperatives (SCs) were marketing
and purchasing cooperatives organized by PAs. SCs held tasks like supplying members
with consumer goods (based on perceived need), selling members other goods at
reasonable prices, providing loans, providing storage facilities, promoting small
businesses, and school development, etc. (Engdawork 1995).
SCs were promoted to Ethiopians as demonstrating the merits of cooperative activity:
building capital, making consumer items available to peasants, and releasing producer
cooperatives (PC) members from shop management duties.
Because service cooperatives were affiliated with PAs, and membership in PAs was
not voluntary for farmers, membership in service cooperatives was also compulsory. “It
was the Peasant Association rather than the individual that was a member of service
cooperatives, and the individual peasant, who of course was a member of the PA, had no
choice in the matter” (Dessalegn 2002, 115).

Producer Cooperatives
The Derg’s conception of PCs was directly taken from the Soviet Union and Eastern
European models. “To those who easily fell into the traps of the revolution, the borrowed
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concept of PCs had seductive appeal at face value, tempting them to embrace it without
questioning” (Engdawork 1995, 356).
In 1979, the government issued a policy edict called the National Policy of
Cooperative Organization that defined the objectives, responsibilities, and powers of its
producer cooperatives. It stated the government’s intentions for the development of
cooperatives, how the means of production were to be used, membership requirements,
organizational structures, government support, etc.. (Teka 1988). It defined producer
cooperatives as “an economic organization whereby individual peasant proprietors
willingly combine their means of production, in part or in whole, under one economic
management and into collective ownership” (Teka 1988, 129).
The specific stated objectives for the PCs were as follows:
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1. to bring to an end to capitalist exploitation to see that it is not reinstated in the
rural areas, and to do away with the exploitation of man by man;
2. the use of modern agricultural technology to transform fragmented and smallsized farms to large-scale farming and to develop small-scale industry;
3. by creating socialism in the rural areas, to safeguard the political, economic and
social rights of the peasantry; and
4. to prepare the ground for national planning.
In 1983, the Derg government articulated its expectations for the growth of its service
and producer cooperatives. According to its “Ten Year Development Plan (1984-1993),”
by 1994, more than half of the country’s cultivated land would be collectivized into
producers’ cooperatives (Ofcansky and Berry 1993).
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A PC could be established by a minimum of three people who were willing to give their livestock and
other means of production to the collective and who clearly stated their understanding of the
responsibilities and benefits of producer cooperatives. Once a cooperative had 30 members it could be
registered with the local PA and enjoy legal rights.
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Neither goal was met. For a variety of reasons, most peasants felt alienated from the
Derg’s cooperative ideals and policies:
The kinds of cooperative activities advocated by the Military government
were […] foreign to the Ethiopian people. Socialist cooperatives […]
were not well received at all by the peasantry. Although the general
public shared the concern of resource degradation in rural Ethiopia, only a
handful of people endorsed collectivization as a policy to tackle the
problem. As a result of imposing a socialist policy, serious damages
occurred on various aspects of the life of the people including
disintegration of established norms of communities (Engdawork 1995,
354).
Ethiopian social and cultural lives are a mosaic of collective activities and groups. For
example, an Equb is an informal money or credit market organization in which money is
collected from each member on a specified day of each week and the participants take
turns receiving the full amount of the funds each week. Edir’s are groups that contribute
money to an emergency fund, for times of illness and deaths in families. Mahber have
more of a social focus: members take turns preparing meals and gather to eat and discuss
matters of community interest. Debo, Jige, and Wonfel are rural work groups that gather
to share work tasks, as well as eat together (Taye 2007).
Yet despite these norms of collectivity, most rural Ethiopians despised the Derg’s
cooperatives because they were instituted with “destructive vigor by party ideologues and
callous functionaries” (Dessalegn 1994, 195). This “profoundly destabilized the
peasantry, exacerbated its vulnerability and ruined what little chances the farming
population had of improving its livelihood, income and nutrition (Dessalegn 1994, 195).
It did not help matters that the new cooperatives were notoriously mishandled and
corrupt. Money laundering was common and overlooked when party members or anyone
close with officials was involved. Leadership was typically ineffective; party and
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government officials approved all decisions, which forced peasants to wait for
instructions, sometimes about the most menial issues. The cooperative leaders promised
too much, out of their own ignorance and desire to hold power, and often failed to deliver
on their commitments. The system never lived up to its espoused ideals of “democratic
centralism.” Cooperative leaders felt emboldened by their affiliation with party and
government officials, threatening members not to ask questions regarding the operation
of their own cooperatives. A two-year term limit was never enforced, leaving corrupt
leaders in place indeterminately (Engdawork 1995). Finally, many farmers were coerced
into membership. “They recalled how they were pushed into becoming a member of a
cooperative simply because the local political leaders wanted to get credit for organizing
them….Campaigns were launched by cadres to form as many PCs as possible regardless
of individual or community point of views or prevailing circumstances” (Engdawork
1995, 356).

The Demise of the Derg Cooperatives
It is very important to note that the peasant’s conception of [the Derg] government
initiated cooperative endeavor has been seriously distorted (Engdawork 1995, 359).
When Derg regime fell…it was a really bad time for the cooperative movement in
Ethiopia… There was so many problems in cooperative movement during Derg, the
members didn’t like to continue. So they withdrew…simply dismantled the cooperatives.
And some of the cooperatives were looted (Jena 2007).

In 1990, the Derg regime began to implode. As the government became more desperate,
it introduced a new mixed economic policy that, among other things, made cooperative
membership voluntary. Not surprisingly, most farmers promptly reallocated cooperative
lands back to the original individual holders and dissolved their cooperatives. “Hence,

96

most members did not lose time to take action in partitioning the land and their common
property as soon as they got hold of the new policy news” (Engdawork 1995, 359).
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In 1991, the EPRDF (Ethiopian People’s Republic Democratic Front) overthrew the
Derg regime. The new government upheld the public ownership of rural land, but viewed
cooperatives as mechanisms of the corrupt and violent regime of the past. Meanwhile,
farmers looted and set fire to any cooperatives that were still in place during the regime
change. “Thus the cooperative experiment of the Derg period ended in bitterness and
violence” (Dessalegn 2002, 115).

Ethiopia’s Cooperative Resurgence
It took several years for the new government to change its course on cooperatives, a shift
in mindset and policy that was pushed by the steadfast determination of cooperative
activists and organizers who held a vision of what cooperatives can and should look like.
Ethiopian cooperatives would be organizations that farmers joined freely and that they
operated for their own wealth-building and livelihood security. They would harness the
bargaining power of the group to obtain better prices for their products and to buy more
affordable farm inputs. These cooperatives would be democratically managed by farmer
members who are elected, and their profits both shared (paid out as dividends) and
reinvested back in the cooperative (Jena 2007).
In 1993, the ILO Cooperative Branch came to Ethiopia and organized study tours to
neighboring countries “to expose Ethiopian cooperative leaders to the cooperative
experience in a free-market system” (ILO 2005). The tours were then proceeded by
58

The exception were the few model cooperatives that were heavily subsidized by the government and
remained functioning for some time.
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programs that trained cooperative managers to be leaders in the cooperative movement.
(ILO 2005).
Among those trainees were Tadesse Meskela and Dessalegn Jena, the manager and
deputy manager, respectively, of what is now the Oromia Coffee Farmers Cooperative
Union.
Meskela, a young agricultural extension worker from the Oromo region, came back
from his cooperative training in Japan in 1994 with a fierce cooperative fever. Jena,
having worked in both the Ministry of Coffee and Tea Development and in the Ministry
of Agriculture, trained (at the same time as Meskela) in Israel and Tanzania. Together,
along with other cooperative activists, they began the slow process of organizing farmers,
and the government, towards building a cooperative resurgence in Ethiopia.
The first step for the organizers was to lobby the government to legally support
cooperatives. They were successful—the EPRDF issued its first cooperative
59

proclamation in 1994.

The proclamation declared the importance of making

“conditions convenient so that an Ethiopian peasant living in rural areas in scattered
manner by being organized on free will may be able to solve jointly the economic and
social problems facing him” (EPRDF 1994, 1). To this end, the proclamation established
a policy framework for cooperatives to be established on a voluntary basis. It also
articulated clear objectives, rights, and guiding principles for cooperatives.
The cooperative organizers considered this proclamation to be weak as it focused
solely on agricultural cooperatives and lacked sufficient detail. However, for the first
time in Ethiopian history, the legal space opened to organize cooperatives democratically
59

Proclamation No. 85.
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and within a market setting.
Once the proclamation was issued, the next order of business for the promoters was
organizers farmers. “After [the law was written] we started restrengthening or
reregistration according to new proclamation” (Jena 2007). But their early reception was
dismal. According to Jena, “It was very very big problem. Because still [the farmers]
had bad image of Derg regime. And members didn’t like to be organized.”
They decided to do a demonstration project in East Shoha and “after one year they
started paying dividend to their members” (Jena 2007). They broadly publicized this
initial success, which prompted many farmers to form new cooperatives or rejoin their
old ones.
Eventually the cooperative promoters pushed the government to issue a new
proclamation (147/1998), expanding beyond the agriculture sector and creating an
organizing body—the Federal Cooperative Agency. It added two features that the Derg
had forbidden: it set up a clear payment system and a broad organizational structure. The
1998 proclamation mandates that cooperative unions deduct 30% of the net profit and
divide the remaining 70% among member cooperatives. The member cooperatives, in
turn, provide 70% of their profit to cooperative members.
In addition, the proclamation allows cooperative societies to have four organizational
layers: primary cooperatives, unions, federations, and cooperative leagues. This
organizational structure is designed to foster the broader growth of the movement and
further capture economies of scale. Thus far, only primary and union levels have been
formed.
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By the end of the 1990s, the attitude towards cooperatives thus had changed
dramatically—with both farmers and the government becoming more aware of the role
cooperatives could play in improving their lives. This was timely because in 1999 the
global price of coffee sunk to historic lows, devastating the already vulnerable birthplace
of coffee.

The Political Economy of Ethiopian Coffee
Some Economic Indicators
Ethiopia is an extremely poor country; its GDP per capita is ranked 171st out of 182
countries and its HPI-1
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is 50.9%, ranking it 130th among 135 countries. Its annual

growth rate is rising but its GDP per capita is only $779 (UNDP 2010). Approximately
61

forty-four percent of the Ethiopian population

lives under the poverty line. Most of the

country’s impoverished live in rural areas—they are mainly small-scale farmers—and
most rural households subsist on a daily per capita income of less than 50 cents. A little
more than half of Ethiopia’s 12 million smallholder farmers have 1 hectare or less of
land, and about one-third cultivate less than one-half of a hectare—simply not enough to
sustain the average household (International Fund for Agricultural Development 2010).

Coffee Indicators
In 2008, the agriculture sector comprised almost 45% of Ethiopia’s GDP, with coffee its
main primary crop (World Bank 2008). Ethiopia, arguably the world’s first exporter of
60

The HPI-1 measures deprivation in health by the percentage of people not expected to live to 40 (UNDP
2010).
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Ethiopia’s population for 2008 was over 80 million (World Bank 2009).
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coffee (Aregay 1988),
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is currently the world’s 8th largest coffee producer and exporter

(International Coffee Organization 2010). Coffee comprises 60% of Ethiopia’s exports,
and the country is the largest producer and exporter of coffee in Africa (Petit 2007).
There are more than 1.2 million coffee growers in Ethiopia and, including coffee
workers, approximately 15 million households are dependent on coffee for their
economic livelihoods (Transfair 2007). The majority of Ethiopia’s coffee farmers are
impoverished small producers, with the majority holding less than 1 hectare of land.

Coffee Culture
Coffee is central to Ethiopia’s culture. In homes in Addis Ababa, in huts in Yirgacheffe,
even at the airport, elaborate coffee ceremonies are performed—to welcome guests, to
gather women, to conduct business, to celebrate life, and to mourn death. During these
ceremonies, coffee is roasted over a flame, then ground, poured into a pitcher with water,
boiled until thickly brewed, and served to guests in tiny cups in three rounds.

Coffee Quality
Ethiopian coffee holds a reputation as being among the best in the world. “Top Ethiopian
coffees are sold at high premiums over the New York market price and are essential to
give ‘character’ to blends. They are also sold as single origins in the specialty market”
(Daviron and Ponte 2005, 99). According to a Master Cupper interviewed in the
documentary film Black Gold, “There is one coffee here that is probably the best coffee
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The other possibility is that it was smuggled, not traded, to Yemen.

63

This is down from 6th, probably due to the trade disputes Ethiopia has had recently with Japan, one of its
major buyers.
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that I have ever tried. It’s a coffee that you can put in an espresso or you can sell straight
or…it’s beautiful…just unbelievable when you find something like this. It’s Ethiopian
Harar. It’s absolutely fantastic” (Black Gold 2006).
Ethiopia is the only major coffee exporting country that consumes so much
domestically: approximately 35-40% of coffee grown in Ethiopia is consumed there
(Petit 2007).

National Coffee Policies
When the EPRDF came to power in 1991, the new government instituted several reforms
that reflected broader structural adjustment prescriptions at the time and impacted most
sectors of the economy, especially coffee. Coffee market reforms began in 1992 as a
method for increasing the export price, which would thereby promote production and
reduce the amount smuggled out of the country. According to Petit (2007), Ethiopia’s
coffee reforms have been a gradual process, occurring in phases, and have focused on
removal of the old state monopoly, more involvement of the private sector at various
levels, and abolishing price controls and the quota system. Nevertheless, only partial
liberalization has occurred and strict government controls have remained in several areas.
For example, the government continues to maintain the auction; the extent of vertical
integration is extremely limited through licensing rules; multinational companies are not
allowed to register as exporters; and local consumption of coffee is severely restricted
(only rejected coffee can be consumed domestically).

The Coffee Crisis in Ethiopia
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Given how fundamental coffee is to Ethiopia’s economy and culture, the impacts of the
coffee crisis in the country were that much more devastating. At the household level,
coffee farmers had no choice but to sell assets (like cattle), take their children out of
school, and reduce their food purchases (Oxfam 2002). It was described by one
Ethiopian coffee farmer:
I have no other income, just coffee. I don’t even have animals. I depend
on coffee for all clothing, food, to pay taxes, children’s uniforms, and
medical expenses. Our lives depend on coffee. Coffee is everything for
us…Five to seven years ago I was producing seven sacks of red cherry
and this was enough to buy clothes, medicines, services, and solve so
many problems. But now even if I sell four times as much, it is
impossible to cover all my expenses….I had to sell my oxen for only 400
Birr to pay back the loan I took out for fertilizers for corn, or face
prison…My brother has died and I have to help his four sons. Three of
them can’t go to school now because I can’t afford the uniform…We have
stopped buying teff this year and edible oil. We are just mainly eating
corn (Oxfam 2002, 2).
Farmers’ struggles were worsened by the “dry check” problem. “Some coffee
exporters simply purchased coffee at auction without paying any money by issuing postdated checks” (Jena 2007). Those checks never cleared, pulling farmers deep into debt
they are still trying to pay back.
Mirroring the global pattern of farmers shifting from coffee to illicit crops, in
response to the coffee crisis Ethiopian farmers began ripping out their coffee bushes to
grow an amphetamine called “chat” (or “khat”). Indeed, chat is much easier to grow than
coffee, not as susceptible to pests, can be harvested several times a year, and typically
brings a better price. Beyond the cultural (and genetic)
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loss of switching from coffee to

chat, there are health impacts, especially from the fact that it is extremely addictive. “The
more we chew khat, the more we become addicted” (Thompson 2003).
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As the birthplace of coffee, Ethiopia is the in situ storehouse of coffee’s genetic diversity.
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Furthermore, coffee has long been a key source of tax revenues for the Ethiopian
government. Thus, the coffee crisis hit the country very hard, rapidly depleting the
country’s foreign exchange reserves. The country lost $814 million in tax revenue from
coffee exports between 1998 and 2003; it lost more still when, in 2002, it reduced the
export tax in response to the coffee crisis (Petit 2007).

The Oromia Coffee Farmers Cooperative Union
In response to the problems that coffee farmers were facing during the coffee crisis,
65

Meskela and Jena directed their organizing efforts to their home region, Oromia,

the

largest coffee-growing region in the country and the place where coffee was first
discovered. “We wanted to establish cooperatives in order to minimize those [coffee
crisis] problems, to minimize problem of post-dated checks” (Jena 2007). They also
wanted to cut down on the role of intermediaries in the Ethiopian coffee industry. “We
wanted to avoid middlemen. If we could export the coffee directly the farmers can be
beneficiary. This is how [coffee cooperative] idea emerged” (Jena 2007).
The Ethiopian coffee industry is indeed a complex network involving many players:
smallholder coffee farmers, state farms, primary collectors (sebsabies), suppliers
(akrabies), processors, the cooperatives and unions, exporters, government institutions,
and international NGOs.
Farmers sell their coffee to sebsabies, who sell it to akrabies (both must be licensed)
who deliver to the coffee auction in Addis Ababa (the country’s capital) or Dire Dawa
(the main exporting outlet). At the auction centers, the beans are tested by the Coffee and
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Ethiopia is a federalist state, with administrative levels: federal, regional, zonal, district (woreda), and
village (kabele). Regions are divided ethnically, Oromia being the largest coffee producing region in the
country.
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Tea Quality Control and Liquoring Unit (CLU) and graded according to quality
(measured by the number of defects) and processing-type.
There are two basic processing types: wet and dry. The wet method (washed coffee)
involves removing the hull before the beans are dried, and requires specific equipment
and a large amount of water. The dry method is less capital-intensive and involves
cleaning the cherries and drying them in the sun on tables or other surfaces (Jena 2007).
As opposed to most other coffee-producing countries, which grade and classify by
bean size, at the two Ethiopian auction centers the coffees from different regions are kept
separate in order to maintain the distinctions of their respective flavor profiles.
The coffees that do not fulfill the auction’s export standards are rejected and sent to
the domestic market. It is impossible to know how much coffee is consumed in Ethiopia,
as much of it occurs farm households, but the estimate for local consumption is
approximately 40% of production (Petit 2007).
OCFCU has grown dramatically since it was established in 1999. As of 2008, the
union has 146 cooperatives and almost 140,000 members (their initial membership had
22,000 and 34 cooperatives). In 2001, their total sales volume was 126 tons of coffee; in
2007, it was over 3200 tons (OCFCU 2007). Ambitious expansion plans include building
a coffee business center in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’s capital. OCFCU has been lauded for
its role in Black Gold (2006), which has shed light on the severe economic and power
disparities that structure the global coffee industry.

Table 1 Membership of Oromia Coffee Farmers Cooperative Union
Year

Member Cooperatives
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Farmer Members

1999/00
2000/01
2001/02
2002/03
2003/04
2004/05
2005/06
2006/07

34
34
34
34
34
74
101
115

22,503
22,821
23,043
23,593
23,593
47,912
74,795
102,950
Source: OCFCU Powerpoint (2007)

Table 2 Volume (in Tons) and Value of Output Sold by the Union in Years
Year
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

Sales Volume
126
375
967
2432
2691
3182
3248

Sales Value (Birr)
2,271,157
7,679,344
18,796,130
45,309,011
67,207,845
86,644,278
102,725,628
Source: OCFCU Powerpoint (2007)

Meskela specifically credits both the International Labor Organization and the Fair
Trade system for OCFCU’s growth and success (Meskela 2007). The ILO targeted most
of its cooperative support in the Oromia region, which is now, according to the
organization, “leading the way in cooperative development in Ethiopia” (Meskela 2005,
2). In 2005, Oromia’s cooperative unions comprised almost one-third of all unions in the
country.

Conclusion: Ethiopia’s Cooperative Resurgence
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The cooperative movement in Ethiopia is expanding. The number of cooperatives has
grown from what remained after the Derg was overthrown

66

to almost 15,000 in 2005.

Cooperatives now exist in every region of Ethiopia and in most sectors of its economy
(Lemma 2008).
But this burgeoning movement is very young, and the extent to which Ethiopia’s
cooperatives in general, and Oromia’s coffee cooperatives in particular, will be
successful at fostering development in this very poor country remains unclear. The final
chapter of this dissertation uses Elinor Ostrom’s theory of collective action in an effort to
answer this important question.
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According to Lemma (2008), there were about 7,336 cooperative organizations in 1991, but it is unclear
whether those are pre or post-Derg numbers.

107

CHAPTER 7

UNDERSTANDING COOPERATIVE GOVERNANCE: LESSONS FROM OROMIA

Introduction
This dissertation has explored several layers of the Ethiopian cooperative narrative: the
mainstream economic perspective of cooperatives; the early history of cooperatives and
cooperatives’ relationship to the global justice movement; the main tenets of Ostrom’s
theory, as well as some general critiques; the political economy of the coffee industry,
including the “Coffee Paradox” and examples of alternative trade paradigms; and, finally,
the Ethiopian cooperative history, its coffee sector, and the story of the Oromia Coffee
Farmers Cooperative Union. We can now draw from this material, especially the
OCFCU and coffee stories, and return to Ostrom’s theory and the main question of this
dissertation.
Can Ostrom’s theory of CPR institutions help to explain whether OCFCU’s coffee
cooperatives will or will not endure as viable, long-lasting forms of collective action?
More specifically, does Ostrom’s theory of collective action make sense for
understanding when coffee farmer cooperatives will be successful at obtaining the most
valuable of their coffees’ bundle of attributes?
I begin this analysis by comparing CPR institutions and Oromia coffee cooperatives,
highlighting their main similarities and their differences. In this section, I also define the
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collective action of Oromia’s coffee cooperatives in terms of Daviron and Ponte’s (2005)
the “Coffee Paradox.”
The second section provides actual and potential examples of Oromia’s collective
action, all defined in terms of obtaining the material, symbolic, and in-person service
quality framework that Daviron and Ponte (2005) present for overcoming the “Coffee
Paradox.”
The third section describes the secondary free-rider problems that could potentially
arise from these examples of collective action.
The fourth section applies Ostrom’s theory to the way I have defined Oromia’s
collective action and secondary free-rider problems; these are attempts to connect
Ostrom’s theory to Oromia and then draw from the Ethiopian evidence. For example,
what do Oromia cooperative by-laws look like in terms of Ostrom’s design principles (of
CPR governance rules)? To what extent do the Oromia cooperatives exhibit the traits
that Ostrom argues predict successful efforts at collective action? Does the evidence
support the view that these indeed are the factors that foster strong Oromia cooperatives?
The fact that Ethiopia’s cooperative resurgence is still in its infancy means there is no
better time to ask these questions, but it also makes trying to answer them problematic.
Cooperative research conducted in Ethiopia is, thus far, sparse. Nevertheless, drawing
from available sources I am able to offer some tentative conclusions. These sources
include my personal interviews with Oromia cooperative leadership; the 2005/06 OCFCU
annual report (the only one translated into English); and, in the spirit of Ostrom’s own
research methodology, secondary sources that have been essential in gaining an
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institutional understanding of how cooperatives function in Ethiopia. From this evidence
I offer some preliminary conclusions.
The fifth section of this chapter returns to a discussion of Ostrom’s theory and
economic methodology more generally. I address my criticisms of Ostrom’s theory,
particularly focusing on her too narrowly-defined frame of governance and her
inattention to social inequality, which I argue are related. I then discuss these in the
context of Oromia.
The final section provides some recommendations based on the results derived from
this analysis.

Solving the Tragedy of the Commons or the Coffee Paradox: Similarities and Differences
between CPR institutions and Coffee Cooperatives
CPR institutions are collective governance institutions that manage commonly-used
natural resources. In general, cooperatives are collective governance institutions that
democratically operate business enterprises. In particular, OCFCU’s coffee cooperatives
are collective governance institutions of coffee farmers who collaborate to process
(sometimes), market, and sell their coffees.
Both CPRs and cooperatives are forms of collective action, which, as Ostrom defines
it, occurs when two or more people act collectively to achieve a common goal: to
overcome some kind of public good/free-rider problem (whether that be the “Tragedy of
the Commons” or the “Coffee Paradox”). The very act of solving collective problems
produces what Ostrom calls “secondary” free-rider problems. In other words, the
institutions themselves are a commons or public good, thereby creating opportunities to
enjoy the benefits of membership, but shirk responsibilities of producing those benefits.
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Ostrom says that what defines a successful governance institution in achieving its
collective action goals is whether or not it is able to overcome these secondary free-rider
problems. How groups accomplish this is what Ostrom is trying to explain with her
theory.
The key differences between CPR institutions and cooperatives involve the nature of
their “original” free-rider problems and the mechanisms each form of governance
institution uses in solving them.
The original free-rider problem that CPR institutions are solving is “the Tragedy of
Open Access.” Individuals using natural resources in a “free for all” scenario (to borrow
from Boyce 2002) will ultimately degrade the resource. However, by collaborating in a
CPR, they transform the open-access resources into common property through the design
and enforcement of informal rules.
The collective action of CPR institutions can be described as the creation,
appropriation, management and protection of a certain bundle of property rights for the
joint, sustainable management of a common property.
The primary free-rider problem that Oromia cooperatives are trying to solve is the
“Coffee Paradox.” The global trade of coffee has created a vast “social distance”
(borrowing from Boyce 2002) between who controls the value of coffee attributes and
who does not. It follows, then, that the objective of Oromia cooperatives is the creation,
appropriation, management and protection of the most valuable bundle of their coffee’s
quality attributes.
Another key difference between CPR institutions and Oromia’s coffee cooperatives
involves who makes up the members of the “group” in the respective group action. In
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her 8th “design principle” of CPR governance rules, Ostrom claims that the enduring,
complex CPRs were nested in broader forms of governance: mainly local, but also state
and national governments. Coffee cooperatives are nested not only in local and national
layers of governance, but also their collective action expands to global governance
structures involving the global justice movement activists (described in Chapter 3), coffee
buyers who are developing alternative trade channels to help coffee farmers overcome the
“Coffee Paradox”, and other supportive organizations like the ILO and Oxfam. These
forms of global governance play key roles in the efforts of coffee farmers and
67

cooperatives to empower themselves.

Their collaboration fosters an enabling

environment, without which the Oromia farmers could not achieve their collective action
goals. This environment includes carefully-designed laws established by the government
to help lessen conflict and confusion amongst individual cooperatives; the information
provided by coffee buyers on market conditions and coffee quality that the cooperatives
could not otherwise access; and the efforts by movement activists in changing Northern
mindsets from seeing coffee only as their morning beverage to seeing it as a means of
economic empowerment and self-determination for coffee farmers around the world.
With this broader picture of collective action—and its range of participants—in mind,
the following describes some examples of specific collective action efforts (in terms of
material, symbolic, and in-person service attributes) by OCFCU and member
cooperatives, which includes the role their broader partners play.
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Their collective action, in fact, involves a variety of players: the government and its various federal and
regional agencies, Ethiopian civic organizations, global governance institutions like the ILO, USAID, and
Oxfam, global justice activists, and a host of coffee industry actors, and, most importantly, coffee buyers.
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The Collective Action of Solving the “Coffee Paradox” in Ethiopia
Material Quality in Ethiopia
Recall that Daviron and Ponte (2005) define material quality attributes as what can be
perceived by the senses (and machines that separate and sort coffee beans). Mainstream
or commodity coffees (coffee traded on the New York and London exchanges) are
evaluated in producing countries solely in terms of material quality attributes that are
defined by the industry as “objective parameters:” official grade standards that are
defined by features like color, size, shape, moisture content, number of defects, presence
of disease or mold, etc.
One of OCFCU’s most profound achievements was persuading the Ethiopian
government to allow its cooperatives to bypass the country’s coffee auctions, which
thereby authorized coffee roasters to purchase directly from the cooperatives. This has
allowed coffee roasters to work directly with the farmers and cooperatives, giving them
technical assistance to improve the quality of their coffee and empowering them with
knowledge of their coffee’s material quality. Bypassing traditional trade channels has
also enabled farmers to get better price information with which to bargain with the
industry’s sebsabies (see Chapter 6). Finally, many of the cooperatives run their own
processing stations, which internalizes another layer of quality control.
By avoiding Ethiopia’s main trade channels, Oromia cooperatives are able to sell
their coffees for a price that reflects their very distinct material attributes, which also
gives farmers further incentives to improve their coffees material quality and potentially
provides an even higher price.

113

Symbolic Quality in Ethiopia
Symbolic quality is developed through branding, packaging, retailing, and consumption.
These attributes are based on reputation and signaled mainly through trademarks and
geographical indications, which are protected by intellectual property rights.
One of the most obvious ways OCFCU has worked to symbolic quality attributes is
by trying to access the value derived from sustainability labels, particularly organic
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and

Fair Trade certification.
In 2003, OCFCU was the first Ethiopian coffee union in which one of its cooperative
members obtained Fair Trade certification. The Fair Trade system has had important
impacts on Ethiopia’s coffee cooperatives. These include helping coffee farmers pay off
debt incurred during the coffee crisis; the creation of savings and credit services; and
investments in community development projects (Grundy 2005). However, the problem
with certification labels, as mentioned in Chapter 5, is that not all coffee cooperatives
have access to them, and this is true of Oromia’s cooperatives as well. When I was
visiting in 2007, Meskela was battling (to no avail) with FLO to get all Oromia
cooperatives dual-certification (organic and Fair Trade). As of 2008, however, only 20%
of OCFCU’s cooperatives were Fair Trade certified (Jena 2008).
Another way OCFCU and its cooperatives have worked to control the symbolic
attributes of their coffees is via the “The Ethiopian Fine Coffee Trademarking and
Licensing Initiative.” Started in 2004, this is a collaborative project between Light Years
IP,
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the Ethiopian Intellectual Property Office, and the Ethiopian Fine Coffee

All OCFCU coffees are organically grown.
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Lightyears Trade is a non-profit organization committed to helping developing country producers access
their intellectual property, use it to increase their export income, and improve their livelihood security.
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Stakeholder Committee, which is comprised of coffee unions (including OCFCU), coffee
exporters, and other groups.
The purpose of the collaboration is to help Ethiopians free themselves of the generic
Arabica commodity market by branding Ethiopia as the birthplace of coffee—the home
of Arabica—and obtaining a better price for their coffee.
Prior to the trademarking and licensing initiative, Ethiopia was receiving
as low as 6% of the final retail price for its fine coffees. Farmers were
receiving about $1 per kilo, with the exporting sector receiving about $2
per kilo. Wholesalers receive about $6-11 per kilo, with the final retail
price about $20-28 per kilo. In one promotion in the United States in 2005,
the retail price for Sidamo reached an astounding $57.20 per kilogram
(Light Years IP 2009).
The group specifically targeted Ethiopia’s three most prominent coffees: Yirgacheffe,
Harar, and Sidamo. The three main brands were secured with trademark registrations in
around 30 countries and distributors were required to obtain licenses to sell them.
The first year of licensing saw improved bargaining positions and, thereby, higher
export prices. For example, OCFCU reported that in 2007 that farmers in the Yirgacheffe
region saw their incomes double from 2006 (Jena 2008).

In-Person Service Quality
In-person service quality attributes are a “product of interpersonal relations between
producers/providers and consumers” (Daviron and Ponte 2005, 128). They are not only
about the quality of a physical transformation, but a quality of the “affective work”
(Daviron and Ponte 2005, 128). This can include the interactions between consumers, the
expertise of the barista, and the particular ambience of the coffee shop, even the
particular language used by coffee chains, an example being Starbucks’s naming
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practices for its coffee sizes: “tall,” “grande,” “venti,” and “trente,” which is the newlytested 32 ounce size.
Accessing in-person service quality is, of course, more difficult for cooperatives
because, by definition, they must have direct contact with the coffee consumer.
However, there are some examples of cooperatives in Latin America that have
established coffee shops that sell their own farmers’ coffee. It might be possible for
Oromia to follow suit. Another potential course of action would be performing their
coffee ceremony in coffee shops in consuming countries. As a kind of cultural program,
coffee shops could host (women-led) coffee ceremonies featuring their coffees, a
“service” that only Ethiopians could provide. Finally, coffee shops could invite coffee
farmers to visit and speak about their coffees, their experiences during the coffee crisis,
the impacts that the sustainability labels and the trademark initiative have offered their
communities, etc..

Potential Second-Order Free-Rider Problems
According to Ostrom’s theory, solving collective action problems (free-rider problems)
brings with it new, “secondary” free-rider problems. The following provides some
potential free-rider scenarios that arise via Oromia’s collective action to obtain the value
of their coffees’ material and symbolic quality. (I have excluded a discussion of inperson service attributes because, at this point, there are no tangible examples coming
from Oromia.)

Material Quality
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There is a vast range of opportunities for shirking in this setting. For example, farmers
could try to get a higher price for their coffee than its value by adding rocks to their
coffee bags. They might be unwilling to invest in the cooperative’s capital
improvements, e.g. washing equipment and storage facilities. They could simply not sell
their coffee to their cooperative, opting to sell to the sebsabies (for a higher price)
instead. They might skimp in their growing methods, knowing they will get the
cooperative price regardless. At the same time, cooperative managers could cheat the
farmers by, for example, not paying them in full or in a timely manner.
Similar free-rider problems could occur amongst cooperatives within OCFCU. For
example, cooperatives, or their representatives, could try to shirk their organizational
responsibilities to the union. Any carelessness in a cooperatives’ processing methods
would also impact the marketing efforts of the union as a whole.

Symbolic Quality
Daviron and Ponte (2005) defined Fair Trade etc. as “sustainability labels” under the
umbrella of symbolic quality. Free-riding problems associated with fair trade, for
example, would involve cooperatives somehow “shading” (Princen 1997) their labor or
organizational practices. Direct trade buyers could try to capture part of the farmer’s and
cooperative’s coffee price for themselves. Finally, roasters could ‘greenwash” altogether,
using a sustainability label without paying the premium for it or falsifying a coffee’s
symbolic quality altogether.
These are just a few examples that free-riding problems can arise from collective
action (framed in terms of obtaining valuable coffee attributes). The next step in this
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analysis is to consider how the two main aspects of Ostrom’s theory—the design
principles of CPR rules and predictors of CPR institutional success—apply to the
collective action of Oromia’s coffee cooperatives. Can the features of her theory explain
whether Oromia can and will overcome its secondary free-rider problems?

Ostrom and Oromia
The Design Principles of OCFCU Cooperative By-Laws
As review, Ostrom argued that in order to overcome secondary collective action
problems (and be successful), any CPR institution must have rules in place that conform
to the following design principles.
1. Clearly defined boundaries
2. Congruence between rules and local conditions
3. Collective choice arrangements
4. Monitoring
5. Graduated sanctions
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize
8. Nested enterprises

We can proceed by looking at the analogous “design principles” for cooperative
governance rules. Most of Oromia cooperatives have instituted by-laws that are
prescribed by Ethiopian law, which itself was shaped by the ICA principles and
recommendations (via ILO consulting). These specifications for cooperatives are
analogous to Ostrom’s design principles for CPRs.
The 1998 Ethiopian cooperative proclamation (#147) mandated that every society
have by-laws. The specifications for Ethiopia’s cooperative by-laws are as follows:
(1) name and address of the society;
(2) objectives and activities of the society;
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(3) working place (area) of the society;
(4) requirements necessary for membership of the society;
(5) the rights and duties of members of the society;
(6) the powers, responsibilities, and duties of management bodies;
(7) conditions for withdrawal and dismissal from membership;
(8) conditions for reelection, appointment, term of office and suspension or dismissal
of the members of the management committee or other management bodies;
(9) conditions for calling of meeting and voting of the society;
(10) allocation and distribution of profit;
(11) auditing;
(12) employment of workers;
(13) other particulars not contrary to this Proclamation.
Furthermore, the Federal Cooperative Agency (FCA)
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has now prepared ten by-laws for

cooperatives to use, which most Ethiopian cooperatives simply appropriate (Emana
2009).
How do these specifications compare to Ostrom’s design principles? Specifically, do
they conform to what she observed makes good CPR governance rules? Do her design
principles make sense in the Oromia context?
Ostrom’s principle of “clearly defined boundaries” would not fit for cooperatives in
general because, by ICA definition, cooperatives are meant to be “open to all people able
to use their services and willing to accept the responsibilities of membership, without
gender, social, racial, political or religious discrimination” (Birchall 1997). Because
most cooperatives explicitly embody principles of democracy and economic and social
equality, they do not have a size restriction. Ethiopia’s cooperative laws also adhere to
the ICA principle of open membership.
The particular design element that I want to focus on is the need for monitoring and
enforcement. According to Ostrom, the design of monitoring rules and punishment by
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the group gives the group a sense of ownership and accountability that could not develop
if an external agent was trying to detect cheating and deciding the punishments.
The Ethiopian recommendations include a specification for auditing. According to a
manual on the design of cooperative by-laws (for U.S. agricultural cooperatives), auditing
is “a condition sine qua non for the existence of any cooperative system. As it becomes
difficult to involve the members directly in the running of the cooperative enterprise, it
becomes ever more important to provide for transparency of the management in order to
preserve the democratic nature of the cooperatives” (Henry 2005, 49). The hitch is that
most cooperatives, and this applies to Ethiopia’s cooperatives, employ independent
auditors.
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In fact, Henry (2005), in writing recommendations for the design of

cooperative legislation (for the ILO), argues auditors should be “qualified and
independent.” In other words, auditors should be external agents.
What would Ostrom say to this recommendation and the general practice of external
auditing? I think her broader point is that groups working together should feel a sense of
ownership over their efforts and one way that happens is through the design and
enforcement of their own rules. To feel a sense of ownership over their own
cooperatives, they need to feel a sense of proprietorship over the by-laws that they use to
govern themselves.
In Ethiopia, unfortunately, this does not seem to be the case. On the surface, the
Ethiopian legal specifications for by-laws leave room for context-based adaptation, but
according to Lemma (2008), cooperatives are on a fairly short-leash (in general, and in
terms of by-law design). For example, cooperatives are required to submit to the Federal
71

Interestingly, monitoring and sanctioning of other forms of community-based collective action in
Ethiopia (Edir, Equb and so one) are governed by the group, not externally.
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Cooperative Agency (also formed in the 1998 Proclamation) the minutes of the founding
meeting, the by-laws of the cooperative, names, addresses and signatures of all members,
and the names of the management committee. Furthermore, the enforcement of the bylaw specifications is often very strict. For example, it is difficult for cooperatives to
change the number of terms for serving on a board (e.g. from 2 to 3 years) and to engage
in any economic activities not clearly specified in earlier by-laws. In other to change the
by-laws in any substantive way, it has to re-register the cooperative (and pay the
registration fee again).
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“According to the information of local NGOs working with

cooperatives, the by-laws as allowed by the proclamation are not flexible enough to
accommodate the interests of cooperatives” (Lemma 2008, 136).

Kodama’s (2007)

fieldwork with the Yirgecheffe Cooperative Union (YCFCU) supports this claim, finding
that while its cooperatives seem to function democratically—e.g. the selection of
management was conducted according to the by-laws—there was a lot of apathy
exhibited and his interviews revealed that most members did not feel any sense of
ownership of their cooperatives, that they were not “their” organizations.
Ostrom’s theory would argue that without a sense of agency, independence, and
ownership over their own organizations, which at least partially stems from designing
their own rules, Oromia and Ethiopia’s cooperatives are less able to overcome their freerider problems, which ultimately threatens their long-term viability.

Predictive Factors of Success
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In 2008, the registration fee was Br. 60 (and Br. 30 if they needed to replace their certificate (Lemma
2008).
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Ostrom argued that there are elements she observed across all successful CPR institutions
that predict whether or not CPR institutions will institute governance rules that conform
to the above design principles. As review, these factors are the following:
1. Agreement by the involved individuals that the problem at hand is important.
2. The degree of autonomy a group has to take collective action on its own or within
a nested institutional setting.
3. Secure property rights.
4. Participants must also have some level of trust in the reliability of others and be
willing to use broad strategies of reciprocity.
5. Prior organizational experience & presence of supportive local leaders.

Because some of these issues in Ethiopia are more complicated than others, I discuss the
simpler elements first.

1. Agreement by the involved individuals that the problem at hand is important.
Ostrom’s point was that local populations need to “perceive collective action problems as
either relevant to their concerns or within their abilities to address.” Residents will not
engage collective action to support a wildlife refuge, for example, if they do not benefit
in tangible ways.
I would rephrase this to “Participants agree that the solution at hand is viable and
have reasonable expectations for it.” Considering Ethiopia’s cooperative history, the
status of farmers’ perception of cooperatives is a fundamental issue. Meskela and Jena
both described the great difficulty they had in convincing farmers that cooperatives were
a viable route out of poverty. On the other hand, they now face the dilemma that some
farmers have outsized expectations of their cooperatives and union, well beyond the aims
and the capacity of these organizations (Jena 2007). A successful cooperative has a
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membership base that believes in cooperatives (both philosophically and practically), but
also has reasonable expectations about the capacity of cooperatives to serve its members.

2. Prior organizational experience & presence of supportive local leaders.
Ostrom very briefly explains (2004) that these are the key elements to overcoming the
transaction costs associated with organizing collective action. I would emphasize the
importance of supportive, experienced leadership within the organization (not just
locally).
I would also add that these leaders must uphold the cooperative idea strongly. When
we look back at the early history of cooperatives in Europe (Chapter 3), the birth of each
type of cooperative was directly linked to the role of strong leaders (usually more than
one) who carried with them the vision and belief in the cooperative idea and worked
steadfastly to bring that vision to reality.
The relationship between the EPRDF and Ethiopia’s citizens has had a problematic
effect on the presence of leadership in Ethiopia’s cooperatives. According to an article in
the Economist (2010), “Ethiopia has a cheap and disciplined workforce,” but few with the
skills and capacity to think creatively and take on leadership roles. Many among those
who do have these are either in jail, in the diaspora, or generally disinterested in
supporting what they perceive to be a government program or worse, a reprise of the
Derg’s cooperative program.
Successful Oromia cooperatives specifically require skilled and committed leadership
to promote cooperatives (especially considering Ethiopia’s history), run the

123

organizational meetings, host coffee buyers, and other players in the coffee world, and
serve as the main conduit between OCFCU and the coffee farmers.
Meskela argues that the ILO leadership training and support has been crucial to the
growth of OCFCU (Jena 2007). But, competent, educated leadership in Oromia
cooperatives is not abundant, which OCFCU argues is a substantial impediment to
cooperative success (The Oromia Coffee Farmers Cooperative Union 2005/06).

3. Participants must have some level of trust in the reliability of others and
be willing to use broad strategies of reciprocity.
Ostrom argues that it is necessary for CPR appropriators to trust each other to keep
promises, which impacts their sense of reciprocity. “If participants fear that others are
going to take advantage of them, no one will wish to initiate costly actions only to find
that others are not reciprocating” (Ostrom 1990, 2).
As described in Chapter 4, trust is a primary entry point for thinking about the
instrumental ways inequality functions in collective action. But the extent to which
wealth and power inequality fosters or hinders collective action outcomes is not clear,
especially in Ethiopia where so little research has been done.
Recall that Farrell found that moderate disparities can foster trust, whereas larger
inequalities undermine it. Cardenas (2007) argued that when heterogeneous groups also
have large wealth distances, it undermines the ability to build trust. Finally, in terms of
cooperatives, Jones (2004) found that inequality fostered trust in the initial stages of
cooperative development, but undermined it in later stages.
The few studies on Ethiopia’s current cooperatives include no discussion of the role
that trust plays in overcoming collective-action problems, nor of the ways inequality
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encourages or undermines the development of trust. Nevertheless, we can proceed with
the assumption that Ostrom is correct; trust is extremely important, not only within
cooperatives, but across the other forms of collective action between cooperatives and
their union and between cooperatives, the union, and coffee buyers.

4. Secure property rights.
Ostrom argues that those who have been successful in overcoming collective action
problems typically have a lower discount rate in regard to the particular situation at hand.
Resource users with a higher discount rate lack the motivation to commit time and effort
to creating a healthy, long-term governance system.
These individuals [with a low discount rate] live side by side and farm the
same plots year after year. They expect their children and their grandchildren
to inherit their land. In other words, their discount rates are low. If costly
investments in provision are made at one point in time, the proprietors—or
their families—are likely to reap the benefits (Ostrom 2004, 1).
Holding secure property rights, Ostrom argues, is the key ingredient in reinforcing low
discount rates and the long-term perspective.
There is a well-developed body of research on security of tenure and its impact on
agricultural productivity. The need for tenure security is also brandished in land reform
debates, typically by proponents of private property (see Abegaz 2004 for this argument
applied to Ethiopia). Thus, tenure security could potentially be important for
cooperatives. It shapes the incentives for contributing to institutional development, but it
also shapes the incentives for enhancing coffee production, which itself is crucial to
successful coffee cooperatives and their efforts to obtain the attributes of their coffees.
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What is the evidence regarding tenure security for OCFCU cooperatives? The
EPRDF has made minimal changes to Ethiopia’s land policy since the Derg’s 1975
proclamation. According to wa Githinji (2005), the EPRDF “realizing the political
sensitivity of the land question and also as a matter of practical political purposes,
decided to retain the public ownership of rural land” (wa Githinji 2005, 7). (In fact,
according to Nega et al. 2003, it upheld state ownership in the new federal constitution of
1995.)
Despite these measures, the land reform debate is alive and well in Ethiopia, with
arguments falling along the standard fault lines of state versus private ownership. The
state and ruling party advocate for public ownership while most external economic
advisors and opposition political parties tend to favor private ownership.
Deininger et al. 2003 asked the Ethiopian farmers themselves how they perceived
their tenure stability. They found that farmers indicated attaining tenure security was
more of a priority than the ownership form. Their data suggest that the farmers preferred
a flexible landholding system centered on providing security of tenure. From Ostrom’s
theory, we can conclude that the farmers’ lack of a sense of security in their user rights to
land could pose a problem for the viability of cooperatives in Oromia and Ethiopia.

5. The degree of autonomy a group has to take collective action on its own or
within a nested institutional setting.
Ostrom’s point is a group’s collective action can prove to be dangerous for the
participants, since “in a highly authoritarian regime, independent action is perceived as
threatening to the center. Individuals who have lived in such regimes for long periods of
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time are always nervous about independent action, even when assured that the regime has
changed” (Ostrom 2004, 1).
For the CPR institutions, the threat of a political regime is delivered via hostility the
rights of its citizens, lessening their incentives to organize. The other threat, as Ostrom
described in Governing the Commons, is the threat of underestimating the capacity of
citizens to effect the outcomes that are best for them.
For OCFCU cooperatives the threats from the government to collective action efforts
are reversed to some extent. There is indeed the general threat of tyranny, but, in terms
of cooperatives, there is also the threat of forced participation (even if not with the threat
of force, then via political pressure), not the prevention of participation. For OCFCU
cooperatives, for all Ethiopian cooperatives, both of these threats remain a serious
concern to their viability, and the viability of the country’s cooperative movement.
The Ethiopian government, ruled by Meles Zenawi since 2000, has severely restricted
individual political freedom. Several international institutions, including the Human
Rights Watch, claimed that the 2005 election violated basic fair voting practices (Human
Rights Watch 2010). That election, and its violent aftermath, exposed the current lack of
civil liberties.
“When the EPRDF came to power in 1991, it adopted a national charter and to their
great joy, journalists were informed that except in matters concerning state security, they
were free to enjoy full rights to disseminate information in any shape or form without
state interference” (Milkias 2006, 21). In reality, this has not come to pass. The Ministry
of Information frequently cancels the licenses of publications it deems “irresponsible.”
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Much worse, between 1992 and 2005, 16 Ethiopian journalists were killed by the state’s
armed “death squads.” Many more are still in prison.
According to the Economist magazine, as part of his “revolutionary democracy,”
Prime Minister Meles “contends that a strong hand and development in the villages—
rather than liberalizing markets—is the way forward” (The Economist 2010). Part of that
“way forward” is a national cooperative policy that plans to restructure and strengthen
cooperatives, increasing membership as a proportion of the Ethiopian population from
30% in 2005 to 70% by 2010 (Teshome 2006).
Critics of the current cooperative movement argue that it has devolved into a
government program and that the individuals running these organizations “are not
peasants themselves but government functionaries who favored those who voted for the
EPRDF and punished those who supported the opposition parties” (Milkias 2006, 25).
We thus have a situation in which a government does not the respect the democratic
rights of the Ethiopian people, while at the same time it has turned the cooperative
movement into a government policy. In light of Ostrom’s argument that group’s cannot
overcome their collective-action problems in such a context, it is logical to conclude that
cooperatives in Ethiopia will, at the very least, not meet their full potential. At worst the
political setting will hamper the cooperative movement altogether.

Preliminary Conclusions
The conclusion that can be drawn by applying Ostrom’s theory to the collective action
efforts of Oromia’s (and Ethiopia’s) cooperatives is not encouraging. Many cooperatives
lack experienced, effective leadership; many farmers bring with them, from the Derg era,
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their tarnished perceptions of cooperatives (and yet some now have outsized expectations
of their potential); farmers on the whole report feeling that their property rights are
insecure; and the autonomy of cooperatives is threatened by the state’s general treatment
of its citizens and its cooperative policies.
The only potentially auspicious element for Ethiopian coffee cooperatives, in
overcoming their collective-action problems is the role of trust, which is a heavy burden
on one particular factor, for which we have no evidence. Before I offer some potential
opportunities for building trust amongst Oromia cooperative members, the union, and
their coffee buyers, as well as recommendations in general, I want to return to my
broader discussion of Ostrom’s theory.

Returning to Ostrom’s Theory
This dissertation has called into question mainstream economic methodology, which,
according to Grapard (1999), can have two meanings. First, it is an epistemological
process involving the ways that economists decide what is economic knowledge.
As such it deals with issues of disciplinary authority and legitimation: it
addresses questions about who gets to define the domain of economic
inquiry, how it is decided which activities will be the subject of economic
inquiry, which variables will be considered important economic variables,
and which assumptions the world and the nature of scientific analysis
economists will adhere to (Grapard 1999, 545).
The second meaning refers to the tools and techniques economists use—the
theoretical models and empirical methods—to articulate economic relations. To my
mind, what defines neoclassical economics is the convergence of these two meanings of
methodology. In other words, from the perspective of the mainstream, what conforms to
the standard economic models is, indeed, what is “economics.”
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Given that standard economic models are described through the language of calculus
(the same language of mechanical physics), what is defined as “economic” is essentially
the market and its various components. The economy is comprised of “rational” actors
spontaneously converging via perfectly competitive markets on the holy grail, Pareto
efficiency.
Anything that diverges from that narrative gets a rewrite to fit into the main storyline.
Individual rational actors, not collaborative groups comprised of members with a range of
motivations and abilities, simultaneously use (and degrade) natural resources.
Cooperatives, comprised of rational actors, form organizations not to redress social
injustice, but to maximize profit.
Given that these narratives were born in the academy, it is easy to assume they are
harmless. But, as the “queen” of social sciences, economics plays a predominant role in
shaping popular rhetoric about the economy (McCloskely 2000, 236),.
As Ostrom has articulated so well, economics also profoundly shapes the way policy
is designed and implemented. When models that are meant to be illustrative metaphors
are used to set policy, they threaten the communities that are trying to develop solutions
to the problems before them, efforts that are essentially ignored or at best “exogeneous”
in the models.
What happens when we change our definition of the economy? Instead of viewing
the economy simply as a vast set of markets, we follow Boyce’s (2002) lead and take
Karl Polanyi’s (and “old” institutionalists in general) conception of the economy as
comprised of markets and the social institutions that shape and constrain market activity.
Add to that picture a much broader conception of human behavior than what underpins
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the market-efficiency paradigm, and our picture of the economy is more comprehensive
and more complex. It also allows us to ask more questions.
Trying to identify and understand patterns in this more comprehensive economic
sketch becomes more difficult than when the economy is so narrowly defined. This is
especially true for framing collective action. According to Bowles and Gintis (2002),
“communities solve problems in a bewildering variety of ways with hundreds of differing
membership rules, de facto property rights, and decision-making procedures” and thus
“there can be no blueprint for ideal community governance” (Bowles and Gintis 2002,
F31).
Instead of the mainstream economic theories to which we are accustomed—which
Ostrom argues are really models, not theories—the best we can do is to identify the
common elements that make “good governance” at the group level. Rather than a
mathematical model, this style of theory reads more like a recipe, one that can be passed
from hand to hand and adapted as needed, the way a cake recipe is often slightly altered
to account for changes in kitchen humidity, altitude, the hot spots of an old oven, and the
temperament and preferences of the baker.
With that in mind, this “baker” wants to make a few changes to Ostrom’s “recipe.” In
particular, I want to add to her “list of ingredients” to better address and incorporate the
issues of inequality and more comprehensive portrayals of various governance
institutions.
These two modifications go hand-in-hand. Proposing solutions for the ways in which
one form of governance reproduces inequality involves including other forms of
governance into the mix. In other words, it involves a broader picture of who and what
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comprises an economy, expanding beyond the market and the state to forms of collective
action that exist locally and at the global level.
It also requires recognizing that no single form of governance is wholly ideal or
objectionable. Markets can, in fact, offset “participatory exclusions” reproduced by
cooperatives and CPR institutions. No one form of governance is a panacea; all are part
of a broader economic system that we can harness to articulate the world we want to
have. But any theory of a “new economy” must first recognize that a comprehensive
economic framework, while including the market, should not be imprisoned by its
contours.

Cooperative Inequality in Oromia
How is inequality reproduced in Oromia cooperatives? There is very little literature on
how cooperatives perpetuate various inequalities or how inequality might impede or
foster (via trust or otherwise) cooperative outcomes in Ethiopia. One piece, written by
Bernard et al. (2007), identified some key factors determining who joined cooperatives.
For example, Bernard et al. (2007) found that land ownership is a major predictor of
cooperative membership; participation increases by five percent with each additional
hectare. They also found a ten percent increase in probability that a household will
participate in a cooperative if the head of household is literate. Finally, the more remote
kebeles (peasant associations) are less likely to have a cooperative than those closer to
markets.
This article does not address the extent to which these inequalities between who does
and does not participate in cooperatives translate into disparities of well-being. Many of
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the Fair Trade projects developed by Oromia cooperatives benefit those outside of it.
The roads, the wells, the schools, and the health clinics are not for the exclusive use of
cooperative members, but are explicitly intended for the use of the broader community.
According to Lemma (2008),
Cooperatives generally do not explicitly target the poorest. However, they
mix the poorest with the less-poor members. They care about the
wellbeing and economic problems of all their members. Due to their
cohesive nature, they address the issues of poverty at an individual level
through various means such as providing opportunities for casual labor,
waiving contributions and mobilizing resources from members to support
the very poor (Lemma 2008, 146).
The extent to which this statement is true needs to be a major focus of future research.
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Gender Inequality

According to the Chairman of the Board of Oxfam USA, Oromia cooperatives have a
long way to go in empowering the women in their communities (McKinley 2008).
Indeed, only a small proportion of OCFCU’s members are women (see Table 3), most
having inherited their memberships from their husbands.
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The gender inequality amidst OCFCU cooperatives are not surprising given Ethiopia’s GEM rating. The
UNDP’s GEM combines measures for economic participation and decision-making, political participation,
and decision-making and power over resources. According to the UNDP (2006), the country’s GEM
ranking is extremely low, placing the position of Ethiopia’s women at 170th out of 177 countries.
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This gender disparity is not restricted to OCFCU, female members of the Yirgacheffe Coffee Farmers
Cooperative Union (YCFCU) account for only 6.5% of the total membership despite the fact that 20% of
landholders (and thus, by definition, household heads) in that region are women. Actually, Kodama (2007)
interviewed a female coffee producer who “lost her household’s membership because of the death of her
husband. She had not asked for entry to the cooperative, and had not been asked to join the cooperative”
(Kodama 2007, 100).
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Table 3

The Percentage of Women in OCFCU’s Cooperatives

Year

Member
Cooperatives

1999-2003

Farmer members
Male

Female

Total

%

34

21,342

1,161

22,503

.2%

2004

74

45,237

2,675

47,912

.6%

2005

101

70,816

3,909

74,795

.2%

2006

115

98,247

5,315

103,562

.1%

2007

129

122,461

5,720

128,361

.5%

Source: OCFCUa (2007)

Why is female membership in cooperatives important? Along with ethical concerns,
which are reflected in the principles laid out by the ICA and the Ethiopian government,
another important reason is the existence of gendered intrahousehold spending patterns.
The feminist development literature has demonstrated that in many areas of the global
South, women and men spend money differently, with women spending a larger
proportion on children’s welfare, including food, health care and education. “Research
shows that when women have direct control over income they are more likely than men
to spend it on the well-being of the family, particularly on improving the nutritional
status of the more vulnerable members” (SEAGA 2003, 12). Sam Daley-Harris, director
of the Microcredit Summit Campaign, described this pattern in an interview on the radio
show Against the Grain (2007).
What [the Grameen Bank] realized was that a loan that went [into] the
family through the woman, the proceeds from the little accrued more to
the family and the children when it went through the woman than when it
went through the man. The man might take the proceeds or benefits and
spend it on drinking or taking friends to a movie or something and the
woman would more volitionally focus on improving the health of the
children or get the kids in school or whatever it was…If your goal was the
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transformation out of poverty than it was more powerful that the loans go
through the woman (Daley-Harris 2003, 1).
Using Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS) data, Quisumbing and Maluccio
(2003) show that spending on food increases when Ethiopian women control income,
whereas alcohol and tobacco expenditure shares rose with assets controlled by men.
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Jena (2007) confirmed to me that these gendered spending patterns were generally true
for Oromia coffee households, too (Jena 2007).
There are also participatory exclusions within cooperatives to consider. Very few
women participate on decision-making boards. Meskela, the general manager of
OCFCU, is well aware of these disparities and has appealed to cooperatives to elect
women to decision-making boards. But Meskela seems defeated, saying that when
women are elected, they still do not participate (Meskela 2007).
Given some interesting threshold effects that Agarwal’s (2006) research shows, this
lack of women’s active participation is not at all surprising. She found that the higher
percentage of women serving on the executive committee of a particular CPR institution,
the more likely the women members will actively participate (attend and speak up in
them). “This supports the idea mooted by some political scientists (although rather little
tested empirically) that we need a critical mass of women to ensure effective voice”
(Agarwal 2006, 10).
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See also Karl 1996, Katz 1995 and Phipps and Burton 1998.
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Furthermore, Agarwal (2006) demonstrates that ensuring a certain threshold of women’s “effective
participation” impacts collective action outcomes. “The larger the percentage of women in the EC the less
the likelihood of firewood shortages, although again this makes a difference only after reaching a threshold
of 25% or more women in the EC. A critical mass of women in the EC are able to induce the CFG to open
up the regenerated forests a few times in the year, so that more firewood can be extracted sustainably”
(Agarwal 2006, 10).
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With that in mind, one possibility for ensuring effective participation would be not
only electing more women to cooperative boards, but to form women’s committees at the
union and cooperative level. This would give women in coffee-farming households an
opportunity to voice their concerns in a comfortable environment. At the union level,
these meetings could be attended by activists, for example lawyers from the Ethiopian
Women’s Lawyers Association, arguably the strongest feminist civic organization in
Ethiopia, which had a major hand in writing most of the family legislation since the
EPRDF took power (Paulos 2007).
Another possibility would be for the women of OCFCU cooperatives to build microenterprise projects. However, when I spoke with Jena, the deputy manager of OCFCU,
about potential micro-enterprise projects for women in coffee households—in particular,
the possibility of women raising bees to sell honey—he gave me a confused look and said
“Beekeeping is not women’s work.”
To solve the problem of gender inequality, other forms of governance must be
involved, including the state, various examples of global governance via NGOs, and
social movements.

Broadening State Governance
Bowles and Gintis (2002) argue that all forms of governance—states, markets and those
at the community level—have their capabilities as well as their failures. The challenge is
finding the right institutional arrangement such that they complement rather than
undermine each other. Boyce (2002) emphasizes the importance of various forms of
global governance. I have already articulated how various forms of global governance
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play a role in Oromia’s effort to overcome the “Coffee Paradox,” thereby broadening
Ostrom’s conception of other forms of governance. But Ostrom’s portrayal of the state’s
role in collective action, which is to say, hands off, is also too narrow. State governance
is crucial to the success of cooperative governance, especially in places where
cooperatives fail. The state should provide a policy environment that “complements the
distinctive governance abilities of communities” (Bowles and Gintis 2002, 15). For
example, “a comparison of Taiwanese and South Indian farmer-managed irrigation
organizations shows that the greater success of the former is due to the effective
intervention of national governments in providing a favorable legal environment and
handling cases in which the informal sanctions of the community would not be adequate”
(Bowles and Gintis 2002, 15). Thus, the state can help cooperatives to overcome market
failures.
My conjecture is that the government’s role (beyond not threatening the basic civil
freedoms of its citizens and not imposing cooperatives upon farmers) should be both to
establish a cooperative law that complies with international standards and to create
institutional support to help cooperatives alleviate market failures (by, for example,
building roads to more easily access markets, providing extension services, and helping
transmit market information).

Recommendations
Based on Ostrom’s framework, and the above comments, the following are
recommendations that might improve the viability of Oromia cooperatives. These target
a range of players involved in the collective action of Oromia cooperatives to overcome

137

the “Coffee Paradox” by gaining power over the supreme quality of their own coffee
building improved livelihoods for themselves, their families, and their communities.

Oromia Cooperatives
OCFCU and its cooperatives should seek alternative trade relationships outside of the
Fair Trade system, particularly amongst “direct trade” buyers. This is true not only
because, as I argue from Daviron and Ponte’s (2005) attribute framework, direct trade has
the potential to offer more of their coffees’ bundle of coffee attributes, but because the
market expansion that is occurring within the Fair Trade system (mainstreaming) is
losing the quality of trust-based relationships that Ostrom argues is so important to any
collective action effort. Given the nature of the cooperatives’ relationship with the
Ethiopian state, these relationships are even more important for empowering farmers,
whose human rights are generally not recognized at home. As discussed in Chapter 5, the
more Fair Trade expands, the more these concerns are undermined in favor of market
expansion, which as Daviron and Ponte (2005) have demonstrated, does not necessarily
translate to coffee farmers gaining power over their coffees attributes.
OCFCU should also explore another potential source of symbolic value: a labeling
system that would indicate to consumers the rich genetic diversity of Ethiopian coffee.
The celebrated Russian botanist Nikolai Vavilov “hypothesized that the ancient centers of
crop origin tend to be the modern centers of crop diversity, a suggestion that, by and
large, has stood the test of time” (Boyce 2004, 5). This correlation holds true for coffee
as Ethiopia is coffee’s center of origin and today has the greatest genetic diversity of
coffee in the world (Wale and Mburu 2006).
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Unfortunately, the southwestern and southeastern rainforests where Ethiopia’s wild
coffee grows are threatened by deforestation—for agricultural land, new settlements, and
timber extraction. Conserving these forests, and thereby protecting the main in situ
source of coffee’s genetic diversity, has national and international importance. It also
holds significance as part of the broader Eastern Afromontane Biodiversity Hotspot, a
region globally recognized for its rich plant diversity as well as its vulnerability to habitat
destruction (Schmitt and Grote 2006).
One possible solution for stemming the deforestation process—and creating further
economic value for Ethiopia’s coffee farmers—is by identifying Ethiopia’s genetic coffee
resources as symbolic attributes of Ethiopia’s coffees through environmental
certification, akin to the forest certification provided by the Forest Stewardship Council
(FSC). The FSC is an international umbrella organization established in 1993 by a range
of actors: timber users, traders, and environmentalists and human-rights groups. The
FSC International Center, located in Germany, defines and maintains the agreed upon
standards and policies of sustainable forestry, and certifies forestry professionals who
comply with these standards.
In Africa almost two million hectares of forest in seven countries (Cameroon,
Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Uganda, and Kenya) have been certified
by FSC. The majority of these certifications are for private forests, because the FSC
system is “expensive to implement and difficult to apply to informal community-based
projects” (Schmitt and Grote 2006, 6). Nevertheless, FSC is beginning to attempt
certification for community groups. Collaborating with FSC on the potential for
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certifying wild coffee cultivation could be seems a potential way for Oromia to further
create and define the unique attributes of their coffees.
OCFCU and its cooperatives should also work to find ways to create in-person
service attributes, particularly by member farmers, and Oromian women in coffee
households, visiting consuming countries to talk about their experiences, as well as
“perform” their elaborate coffee ceremony.
OCFCU cooperatives should also continue to try to empower women in their
communities, through microenterprise projects, cooperative committees that focus on
their economic and political empowerment, and via leadership training.

The Ethiopian Government
Meles and the Ethiopian government should be lauded for enacting proclamations that
support cooperatives and setting up institution support for building and sustaining coffee
farmers. Clear cooperative laws and institutional support are key elements to creating an
enabling environment for successful cooperative efforts. Laws enrich the soil required
for restructuring and strengthening a wide range of cooperatives, as well as germinating
new ones, while institutional support is necessary for helping coffee farmers overcome
market failures that are beyond their collective ability to solve.
However, they should also be less concerned with setting target goals for
cooperatives and be more concerned with honoring the basic human rights of its citizens.
Many of the educated class, who are arguably well-suited to serve in leadership and
organizing positions, are in prison or amongst the diaspora. This political “brain drain” is
severely hindering the cooperative movement in Ethiopia.
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Fair Trade Players
Fair Trade players should not lose sight of the crucial role that trust plays in the collective
action of building alternative trade relationships and the work coffee cooperatives are
doing to empower themselves. There is a genuine risk that in expanding the specialty
markets to build the wealth of coffee farmers, the trust-based relationships on which the
Fair Trade system was founded, are degraded. As Ostrom has demonstrated, trust is a
main ingredient to the success of collective action efforts. For Oromian and Ethiopian
coffee farmers, it is the most viable ingredient.

Global Governance Organizations
The ILO has been fundamental to building Ethiopia’s cooperative movement. They, and
other supportive international organizations should continue to identify particularly
vulnerable cooperatives and target those for leadership training. (This would relieve
OCFCU’s leadership somewhat as they now do much of the training and organizing.)
They should also focus on creating by-law recommendations for cooperatives. (Their
current recommendations only target policymakers.)
These organizations should also focus on leadership trainings for women and gender
mainstreaming for OCFCU’s leadership.

Economists
One of the underlying concerns of this dissertation has been the importance of properly
defining human behavior and the way those assumptions impact the construction of
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theories and the explanations those theories derive. In the cooperative literature, Sen
(1966) demonstrates this by assuming some level of sympathy among cooperative
members, an assumption that can generate the opposite result than Ward’s “perverse
supply.”
This is true of collective action theories in general. A well-worn concept across the
social sciences, collective action is generally understood to be the pursuit of a goal or set
of goals by two or more people. In economics, the definition of collective action is very
narrow. Bardhan et al. (2007) defines collective action as the “voluntary provision or use
of collective goods” (Bardhan et al. 2007, 36). Another way of saying the economic
version is the following: collective action is the provision and use of public goods by two
or more people.
Sociologists define collective action as the following:
at its most elementary level, [it] consists of any goal-directed activity
engaged in jointly by two or more individuals. It entails the pursuit of a
common objective through joint action—that is, people working together
in some fashion for a variety of reasons, often including the belief that
doing so enhances the prospect of achieving the objective (Snow et al.
2004, 6).
Sociology tends to conflate collective action with social movements, the goal is some
kind of social change (whether that be the 1960s-era Civil Rights movement working for
racial justice in America or its backlash by racial hate groups). According to Goldberg
(1991), “a social movement is an organized group that acts consciously to promote or
resist change through collective action” (Kendall 2010, 562).
Social movements are one of the principal social forms through which
collectivities give voice to their grievances and concerns about the rights,
welfare, and well-being of themselves and others by engaging in various
types of collective action, such as protesting in the streets, that dramatize

142

those grievances and concerns and demand that something be done about
them (Snow et al. 2004, 3).
The action in movement-level collective action can involve a range of activities, e.g.
violet or non-violent protests.
Finally, Ostrom’s definition of collective action lies somewhere in the middle. She
defines collective action as any effort by a group to organize themselves to retain the
residuals of their own efforts.
What is striking about all three of these definitions of collective action is that all three
conceptions of collective action come from three different understandings of human
motivation and behavior, which range from economics’ strict rational choice, Ostrom’s
somewhat broader rationality, and sociology’s, which seem to be broad enough to allow
77

for at least some degree of altruism.

There is obviously a direct linkage between

theories about human behavior and theories about human institutions. If we are strictly
rational, then any attempt at collective action will ultimately fail. If our motivations and
abilities are opened up, however, then we have the capacity to do more than weigh costs
and benefits. We have the capacity to build institutions that reflect our values and our
goals.
If, in the words of Folbre (2010), another economics is really underway, than it is
imperative that economists, especially heterodox economists, recognize the relationship
between how we define humans and how we define the economy. The more credibility
77

At least more than in the first two treatments. During the civil rights movement in the United States,
many white activists from above and below the Mason-Dixon line risked their physical well-being,
sometimes their lives, definitely their freedom, in participation of various marches in the cause for racial
justice. Some maybe did it because they were in a bi-racial relationship. Some possibility went to upset
their parents. But it is reasonable to assume that at least one of the reasons white individuals participated
was altruistic or “sympathy” or “commitment” (Sen 1966)—to further the cause of civil rights for minority
groups in America.
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we give people, the more we can understand their behavior as the collective action of
“building an economy,” which thereby defines the economy as a public good and, in the
spirit of Elinor Ostrom, allows people to feel ownership over what we share in common.

Question for Future Research
One key question that arises from this project is the extent to which the coffee industry is
unique in its vastly uneven power structure. Is the “Coffee Paradox” generalizable to
other commodities? This is an important question because if the power disparities are
similar, then it is arguable that the solutions for overcoming them are analogous as well.
Certainly coffee is unique in that it is the second most traded commodity (after
petroleum) in dollar value and it has the most well-developed certification network of any
crop. Nevertheless, the global industries for cocoa, cotton, tea, and sugar have all faced
global policy shifts similar to those that ultimately destabilized the coffee industry. The
extent of the power inequities within each industry might vary, but the push for exportled growth and simultaneous effacement of regulatory controls and protection have left
commodity producers unilaterally vulnerable to dramatic market shifts. The collective
solutions that Oromia’s farmers and farmers in coffee growing regions all over the world
have devised to protect themselves may prove to be a viable approach for producers of
other food commodities. Mapping Ostrom’s framework onto the collective action efforts
of cooperatives across a range of global food industries would be a viable future research
project.

Concluding Remarks
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The Oromia Coffee Farmer Cooperative Union office in Addis Ababa is a site of
commerce and commotion: an inspiring froth of coffee buyers coming in and out of
offices, workers rushing down the hallways seeking a signatures on a purchase order, and
cars pulling out of the driveway carrying journalists and Fair Trade activists visiting
coffee farmers in Ethiopia’s highlands.
How does an economist frame this story in a way that is most consistent with the
aspirations of the Oromia coffee farmers (along with coffee farmers all over the coffee
regions of the global South)? Rather than using the rational-choice/efficiency paradigm
that would essentially strip them of their cooperative and democratic ideals, their sense of
community, and their range of development objectives, I have drawn from Elinor
Ostrom’s theory of the commons—and Daviron and Ponte’s framework of the “Coffee
Paradox”—to analyze how OCFCU’s coffee farmers can and do seek to build the wealth
and well-being for themselves, their families, and their communities. Elinor Ostrom’s
theoretical framework represents a significant step forward in devising a comprehensive
theory that captures the essence of collective action while not shrouding its inherent
complexities.
If Nancy Folbre is right and a “new economics” is indeed taking root, then both
cooperatives like those in the Oromo region of Ethiopia and Elinor Ostrom’s theory of
collective action are essential to its cultivation.
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APPENDIX A
GENERAL BACKGROUND STATISTICS
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Europe
•

In Belgium, there were 29,933 co-operative societies in 2001

•

In Finland, S-Group has a membership of 1,468,572 individuals which represents
62% of Finnish households.

•

In Germany, there are 20 million people who are members of co-operatives, 1 out
of 4 people.

•

In Norway, 1.5 million people of the 4.5 million people are member of cooperatives.

•

In Portugal, approximately 3000 co-operatives are responsible for 5% of the
Gross National Product of the country.

•

Co-operatives and mutuals in Scotland account for 4.25% of the Scottish Gross
Domestic Product, having an annual turnover of GBP 4 billion and assets of GBP
25 billion.

•

In France, 21,000 co-operatives provide over 4 million jobs.

•

In Germany, 8,106 co-operatives provide jobs for 440,000 people.

•

In Italy, 70,400 co-operative societies employed nearly 1 million people in 2005.

•

In Slovakia, the Co-operative Union represents more 700 co-operatives who
employ nearly 75,000 individuals.

Latin America
•
•

•

78

In Argentina, co-operatives are responsible for providing direct employment to
over 233,000 individuals.
Argentina, there are 12,670 co-operative societies with over 9.3 million members
- approximately 23.5% of the population. 2008
In Bolivia, 2,940,211 people or one -third of the population is a member of the
1590 co-operatives 2008

International Cooperative Alliance (2010).
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•

In Bolivia, 1590 co-operatives provide 32,323 direct jobs and 128,180 indirect
jobs.

•

In Colombia over 4.4 million people or 10.7% of the population are members of
the 7,833 co-operatives in the country. The movement reports an annual growth
rate of 11.27% with 453,180 new members joining co-operatives in 2008.

•

Costa Rica counts over 10% of its population as members of co-operatives.

•

Colombia, the over 7,300 co-operatives are responsible for 5.61% of the GDP in
2007 - up from 5.37% in 2006 and 5.25% in 2005. They employ over 110,000
people and some sectors are providing a significant proportion of the jobs - 24.4%
of all health sector jobs are provided by co-operatives, 18.3% of the jobs in the
transport sector,8.3% in agriculture and 7.21% of the jobs in the financial sector.
Co-ops provide 87.5% of all microcredit in the country; they provide health
insurance to 30% of all Colombians and are responsible for 35.29% of Colombian
coffee production.

•

In Colombia, the co-operative movement provides 123,643 jobs through direct
employment providing 3.74% of all jobs in the country.

North America
•

In the United States, 4 in 10 individuals is a member of a co-operative (25%).

•

In Canada, four of every ten Canadians are members of at least one co-operative.
In Quebec, approximately 70% of the population are co-op members, while in
Saskatchewan 56% are members.

•

In the United States more than 30 co-operatives have annual revenue in excess of
USD 1 billion. In 2003 the top 100 US co-operatives had combined revenues of
USD 117 billion.

Asia
•

In Indonesia, 27.5% families representing approximately 80 million individuals
are members of co-operatives. Cooperatives provide jobs to 288,589 individuals.

•

In India, over 239 million people are members of a co-operative.

•
•

In Japan, 1 out of every 3 families is a member of a co-operatives.
In Malaysia, 5.9 million people or 24% of the total population are members of cooperatives.

•

In Singapore, 50% of the population (1.6 million people) are members of a cooperative.
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•

In Vietnam, co-operatives contribute 8.6% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

•

In Korea, cooperatives produce an output of USD 11 billion.

Africa
•

In Kenya, co-operatives are responsible for 45% of the GDP. 1 in 5 is a member
of a co-operative, 250,000 people are employed by co-operatives and 20 million
Kenyans directly or indirectly derive their livelihood from them.

•

and 31% of national savings and deposits. They have 70% of the coffee market,
76% dairy, 90% pyrethrum, and 95% of cotton.

Middle East

•

In Iran, there are over 130,000 co-operative societies with 23 million members or
approximately 33% of the population.
In Iran, co-operatives have created and maintain 1.5 million jobs.

•

In Iran, co-operatives contribute 6% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

•
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APPENDIX B
ROCHDALE PRINCIPLES
At the 1937 ICA Congress, a special committee presented a revised set of principles.

1. Open membership
2. Democratic control
3. Distribution of the surplus to the members in proportion to their transactions
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4. Limited interest on capital
5. Political and religious neutrality
6. Cash trading
7. Promotion of education
They also added two that the Rochdale’s never wrote down, but which the ICA felt were
inherent to their philosophy and practice.

8. Voluntary membership
9. Mutuality (trading only with members)

In 1966, the principles were again revised to reflect a shift in the cooperative movement
to the developing world and defined the principles as “those practices which are essential,
that is, absolutely indispensable, to the achievement of the Cooperative Movement’s
purpose” (Birchall 59). They kept the voluntary principle but abolished the political and
religious neutrality (as many cooperatives were born out of religious organizations), they
reintroduced education and added a brand new principle—cooperation among
cooperatives.

1. Open membership and voluntary membership
79

The dividend on purchases brought up to date.
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2. Democracy
3. Limited interest on share capital
4. Equitable return of surpluses of members
5. Provision of education
6. Cooperation
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